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Summary 
This thesis examines an assumption that has recently permeated social 
theory, that power and knowledge constitute each other and are mutually 
reinforcing. Knowledge is an instrument to be used to realise the interests 
of some group, i. e. is subservient to agency. This assumption is oblivious to 
the rise of realist social theory which has argued that the facilitating 
frameworks of social life, structure and culture (which would typically 
include 'knowledge') must be construed as having a causal influence 
themselves, regardless of what people make of them or do despite them. 
These do not automatically satisfy groups' wishes and may hinder them. 
The power/knowledge thesis has taken greatest hold in the study of 
prisons; it is argued that the penal reforms instituted in the 19 th century 
were designed to control prisoners so that what seemed like a benevolent 
regime was actually an efficient mode of control. Thus the ideas that were 
used to direct the treatment of offenders were a means of power over 
prisoners. This thesis will incorporate historical material on the development 
of the prisons and show that supporting ideas of reform was not necessarily 
an exercise in power, so undercutting the principal thesis of the power/knowledge 
school. 
I will draw on recent developments in social theory to show how the 
interplay between power and knowledge might be better conceived. I will 
argue that only by estimating the logical connection between ideas can we 
understand their proper role- how they may facilitate or frustrate action. 
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Thus I will query whether reform ever gained the prominence it did and 
show that it had always to be balanced by its logical counterpart, 
deterrence. 
I 
Introduction 
How should we interpret shifts in punishment? There have been two schools of 
thought on this topic. The first is the much caricatured liberal school, usually 
thought to be exemplified by Radzinowicz & Hood's work, A History of English 
Criminal Law and its Adminisiration from 1750, vol. 5.1 It conceives of the 
history of prisons as developing from a revulsion at the cruelty inflicted by 
previous forms of punishment and so the prisons were a beneficent shift away 
from excessive punishment toward a more just treatment of offenders. 
The liberal school has two related weaknesses: a belief that people will 
automatically become repulsed by cruelty and will seek to reduce it; thus 
conscience is emphasised 'as the motor of institutional change 2 or in a more 
sociological idiom, cultural values are the causal influence upon change. The 
problem is that not only are the roots of these values assumed to be natural but 
that this emphasis upon cultural values excludes reference to wider social factors 
such as economic or demographic changes, what would generally be classed as 
structural influence. 
The revisionist histories arose as an attempt to remedy both of these defects: 
they examined the basis for prison reformers' beneficence, refusing to believe that 
people naturally become more altruistic. This led them to link up the reformers' 
beliefs and intentions with changes in the structure of society at the time of the 
prison's birth. The instability of the social order, brought about by 
industrialisation, had made the ruling classes anxious and previous modes of 
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punishment, such as capital punishment, were thought to be ineffective in 
maintaining order. Thus the prison developed not because it was less brutal form 
of punishment, but because it was seen as a more effective means of maintaining 
social order. There are disagreements between various revisionist histories as to 
how and when the prison actually operated as a form of subtle form of control, but 
the notion that the prison is primarily an instrument of control is shared by all of 
them- though this has been occasionally disputed. In some respects, the revisionist 
school throws the baby out with the bathwater: in its efforts to provide a basis for 
the cultural values of reformers, they explain them as being brought about a 
change a structural influences. Perhaps the simplest and most fundamental 
criticism one can make of this kind of history is the charge of 'over-schematising a 
complex story'. 3 As stated, several revisionists have acknowledged the 
weaknesses of their own accounts and Michael Ignatieff has stated that the 
the real challenge is to find a model of historical explanation which 
accounts for institutional change without imputing conspiratorial 
rationality to a ruling class, without reducing institutional development 
to a formless ad hoc adjustment to contingent crisis, and without 
assuming a hyper-idealist, all-triumpliant humanitarian crusade. 4 
This work is intended to be a sociological contribution to penology. Any 
sociological work must achieve a balance between three key variables, structure, 
culture and agency. Liberal history relied too much on cultural values, revisionism 
runs the danger of subsuming everything under structural developments and there 
is a version of history which sees the past as simply one damned event after 
another; this last kind of history extracts agency from its conditions of actions and 
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sees history as a continual 'ad hoc adjustment' to various events. Neither structure 
nor culture make much of an appearance. This dissertation utilises developments 
in social theory, notably a movement known as realism, to try and show how a 
balance might be achieved the three variables. Realism argues that structure and 
culture should be conceived as pre-existing any act of agency and hence 
autonomous from it. Because they are autonomous, cultural and structural 
frameworks will possess properties which will influence agency. It is the effects of 
the cultural frameworks that this study is dedicated to uncovering. 
Since it has been the role of ideas and values that have been so contentious in 
penal history, it is these cultural influences that will be the primary focus of this 
study. It has become commonplace to assert that many of the individualised 
programs of treatment that were ostensibly developed to aid the prisoner were 
actually a way of controlling his behaviour, a process of normalisation. This has 
been termed the power/knowledge complex, a self-reinforcing process whereby 
power and knowledge mutually constitute each other. This was developed by 
Michel Foucault in his work Discipline and Punish who traced the emerging 
power/knowledge complex in the development of the prison at the turn of the 19th 
century. This thesis has been revised by David Garland who argues that the 
development of the reforms necessary to exert a more subtle means of control 
could only have been developed at the beginning of the 20th century, with the 
inception of the discipline of criminology. Garland is explicit about using the 
power/knowledge formula, 'utilising a conception of knowledge which always 
sees it in relation to power'. 5 
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Historians have often been sceptical about the extent to which new modes of 
treatment gained a foothold in the British penal system. W. J. Forsythe is insistent 
that 'the local and convict prisons clung tenaciously to the concepts of 
measured punishment, moral culpability, limited deterrence and uniformly 
administered discipline' and the prison authorities 'were distrustful of any 
eugenic or other theorising which might lead to abandonment of mens rea 
6 at the heart of criminal jurisprudence' . While a 
historian like Forsythe is 
able to document the various ornissions which, if included, would undermine 
the plausibility of the revisionist thesis, he is unable to provide a 
compelling reason why there are such lacunae. I will argue that these 
omissions are a result of the selective perception of the power/knowledge 
formula encourages; it occludes events that militate against the view that 
knowledge leads to power and that while this formula is maintained we 
will never arrive at a satisfactory understanding of how the prisons 
developed. It is the assumptions embodied within the power/knowledge 
formula that I will be criticising rather than the writings of any one author. 
In Chapter II will briefly set out the basic points of the revisionist penal 
history and then critically examine it, incorporating some of the revisionists' 
own criticisms of the project, I will indicate how the power/knowledge formula 
is unable to include fundamental issues which must be part of any social 
history. Having hopefully convinced my readers of the deficiencies of the 
power/knowledge approach, I will set out to show in Chapter 2 how I 
believe the connections of power and knowledge should be broached and 
5 
point out how this approach differs from that adopted by Foucault and his 
followers. 
I will then apply the theory I have developed to British penal history, to 
show how it can be expounded in a fuller fashion than a Foucauldian 
narrative and to substantiate the theoretical points that I make in Chapter2. 
I will cover the period extending from the establishment of the first national 
prisons and the burgeoning efforts of the government to secure changes in 
the local prisons. This dates from approximately 1815 and it will be my 
concern to show that from the outset penal administrators were plagued by 
the problem of reconciling reform and deterrence. This problem will be the 
main focus of the historical chapters for two reasons: 
(i) Just as a liberal view of history would ignore the continual clamour for 
policies of deterrence that disregarded any concern for the individual 
prisoner, so too does the Foucauldian account, though it puts a different 
interpretation on reform. If I can convincingly show that prison policy was 
always animated by both reform and deterrence, this should quell notions of 
prisons being increasingly oriented to the one without reference to the 
other; it should also put to rest one of the central tenets of the revisionist 
case, namely that of prisons being increasingly animated by reform, and call 
into question the revisionists' whole approach to writing penal history. 
(ii) If I am able to demonstrate the indispensability of both reform and 
deterrence for penal policies then the scenario of knowledge that arises 
fromconsidering both of them should lead one to reassess the usefulness of 
the power/knowledge formula. It is by the endorsement of this formula that 
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revisionist historians have been unable to acknowledge the persistence of 
policies of both reform and deterrence and if I can make a good case for 
this persistence, a method needs to be found that will allow us to make 
good this major omission of the revisionist school. 
This will be the point of my excursion into cultural analysis in Chapter2 
for it allows me to fashion the tools necessary to unpick the complex 
problems of penal history. Having outlined the method I will use, I will then 
show how the problem of both reform and deterrence can be incorporated 
within a penal history, so that my thesis has both a positive and negative 
agenda: negative because it aims to show up the limitations of the 
revisionist school of penology and positive because it tries to show how 
such limitations can be overcome. 
As stated I will begin from 1815 and continue up to 1921.1 will divide 
the historical thesis into three parts with the focus throughout being on the 
problem of reconciling reform and deterrence. 
(i) 1815-65, a period when reform predominated 
(ii) 1865-95, a period when deterrence predominated 
(iii) 1895-1921, a period when a synthesis between the two was attempted 
Such a wide time-span permits me to make the case for the continual 
persistence of both reform and deterrence and thus show how the 
revisionist school gives a skewed picture of the development of both prisons 
and ideas of punishment. I will explain how either reform or deterrence was 
able to predominate at the expense of the other in Chapters 3&4 and the 
reasons behind the subsequent search for a synthesis between the two. Since 
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Garland has made so much of criminology's impact I will examine its basis 
and development in Chapter 5. In Chapter 61 will show how the attempted 
synthesis between reform and deterrence fared and why it did not succeed; I 
will also assess the impact of criminology upon penal practice and suggest 
why it might not have had as great an impact as has been thought. The 
historical analysis ends where it does for 1921 represents a date at which 
David Garland believes reformatory efforts to have triumphed but others 
dispute this so it is a useful watermark by which we can test the 
revisionist case. 
This thesis is not meant to be primarily a work of history as the 
emergence of prisons has been covered exhaustively elsewhere. It will be 
concerned to demonstrate how the influence of ideas affected the actions of 
agents in the context of penal affairs and to demonstrate that vital parts of 
history are omitted by the use of the power/knowledge formula. Since I am 
presenting this as a marker toward the proper place of ideas and knowledge 
in history it would be as gross a misrepresentation as the power/knowledge 
formula if I suggest that the development of penal punishment and the 
prisons was solely due to intellectual turmoil. The power/knowledge school 
tries to overthrow the picture of reform as the beneficent application of 
ideas of reform by always tying such ideas to the vital interests and 
machinations of various groups. I will show in Chapter 7 how this approach 
actually excludes factors that could usually be classified as structural and 
try to show how they can be included alongside the cultural explanation 
that I introduce earlier. It is a pivotal assumption of this study that 
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structure and culture are relatively autonomous of each other, so that it is 
their interplay over time which needs examining; any approach which 
subordinates either one of them or compresses both together is unable to 
do this. 
What this work does not do is provide a general theory with which one can 
interpret the development of the prisons. Realist social theory works from the 
local up; once it is admitted that cultural and structural frameworks are 
autonomous of agency, they cannot be treated as putty in the hands of agents. 
They may obstruct or facilitate certain courses of action but they will certainly 
have an affect. Hence any general theory must take them into consideration, for 
their influence will demonstrate the validity, or otherwise, of any theory. Thus, 
this work should be considered as a providing a yardstick by which any general 
theory can assess itself and not itself establishing a general theory. 
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1. Revisionist Penology: A critique 
In this chapter I will develop a criticism of the methodology developed 
by revisionist historians of the prison which is responsible for many 
questionable assumptions and lacunae in their work. I will restrict my criticisms 
to the role of ideas and knowledge in penal history and to matters arising thereof. 
Many of the points I will make have been made by others, including self- 
confessed revisionists. I will draw these together and show how they are 
connected to assumptions about the role of knowledge and power. 
1.1 Reform as effective control 
Foucault begins Discipline and Punish with a description of a terrible 
punishment being wreaked upon an assassin in France by the state 
authorities and suggests that this was emblematic of the punishment that 
was carried out as it consisted ofpunishment of the body and infliction of 
pain. He believes that there was a shift away from such punishment in the 
19th century toward punishment which seemed on the face of it more 
constructive since it attempted to train the individual to lead a law-abiding 
life, to correct him. Hence the usual connotation of the reforms within 
prisons as a sign of progress which Foucault actually disputes, because he 
believes they were a more effective means of control; crowds no longer 
cheered the sight of offenders being cruelly dismembered but displayed 
sympathy for their plight so that grisly executions were becoming less and 
to 
less effective in upholding the law, for the punislunents seemed 
incommensurate with the crime. For Foucault 
'the reform of criminal law must be read as a strategy for the 
rearrangement of the power to punish, according to modalities that 
render more regular, more effective, more constant and more 
detailed in its effects; in short which increase its effects while 
diminishing its economic and political cost'. I 
Thus the prison was born for it meted out ostensibly less severe and 
more humane treatment to offenders and moulded its inmates in a certain 
manner, hence its regime, and power generally for Foucault, cannot be 
construed in a wholly negative way. Punishment is no longer construed in a 
wholly negative way because it is no longer primarily concerned to exact 
retribution for the crime committed but to train the individual so that he 
will no longer commit crimes, to 'normalise' them. This involves 
a means of assessing the individual in relation to a desired 
standard of conduct: a rneans of knowing how the individual 
performs, watching his movements, assessing his behaviour, and 
measuring it against the rule. Surveillance arrangements and 
examination procedures provide this knowledge, allowing incidents 
of non-conformity or departures from set standards to be 
recognised and dealt with, at the same time 'individualising' the 
different subjects who fall under this gaze. And since the object 
is to correct rather than punish, the actual sanctions used tend to 
involve exercises and training, measures which in themselves help 
11 
bring conduct 'into line' and help make individuals more self- 
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controlled . 
The successful exercise of discipline depends upon a body of knowledge being 
developed which provides information on those who are the objects of this' 
discipline. Hence the development of knowledge is intrinsically connected to the 
exercise of power. 
It is the prison which creates the delinquents and in two ways, as Garland 
points out. Firstly, by virtue of the new discipline of criminology there exists 
an individual known as a 'criminal' distinct from the ordinary populace and 
secondly, because the prison exists to perpetuate a criminal class whose 
transgressions of the law are repeated because they have little option. It is 
Foucault's claim that the prison has succeeded where it seems to have 
perpetrated its greatest failure: namely its inability to deter persistent 
offenders. Instead the prison has managed to produce a 'closed milieu of 
delinquency, thoroughly structured by the police' which has 'turned out to 
3 be useful, in the economic domain as well as the political'. How this 
supervision was accomplished is hastily adverted to: 'by locating individuals, 
infiltrating the group, organising mutual informing', 4 techniques which were 
far more difficult to carry through in practice than is assumed. Foucault may 
well have been forced into this untenable position by his own ambiguity 
concerning the putative function of the prison. On the one hand, he wishes 
to argue that once a person is received within the prison walls he is 
subjected to a range of 'disciplinary techniques' all designed to mould the 
inmates in a particular way; at other times he seems to believe that 'prison 
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labour aimed to teach them nothing' 5 which, if this was not always the 
aspiration, was very often the outcome. However, even after admitting this 
failure he still wants to maintain that released prisoners (and by implication 
the prison) still serve some function, that of constituting a close-knit band 
who serve as 'an agent for the illegality of dominant groups'. 6 Foucault 
seems to assume that by labelling an activity illegal, this makes it more 
amenable to supervision and control and potential profit, a contestable claim 
at the very least. Even presuming this to be true why does the prison have 
to subject them to all the disciplinary techniques within the prison if they 
are not expected to live law-abiding lives but will be always under the 
scrutiny of the police? 
'This surveillance has been able to function only in conjunction 
with the prison.... Prison and police form a twin mechanism; 
together they assure in the whole field of illegalities the 
differentiation, isolation and use of delinquency. In the illegalities, 
the police prison system segments a manipuable delinquency'. 
These three groups form a triangle which 'support one another and form 
a triangle that is never interrupted. Police surveillance provides the prison 
with offenders, which the prison transforms into delinquents, the targets and 
auxiliaries of police supervision, which regularly send them back a certain 
number of them to prison'. 7 Even assuming that prison service and police 
were in such close agreement 8, the metaphor of the electrical circuit fails to 
provide illumination simply because the notion of prisoners being moulded 
within prisons and then to be sent out into the community with a 
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percentage of them being picked up again as the authorities saw fit has no 
basis in historical fact. The period from 1865-95 in English prisons was one 
in which little attention was paid to educating the prisoners yet some of a 
Foucauldian bent might assume from the fact that an increasing number of 
offenders were recidivists that the authorities were happy to see crime 
confined to a small band of criminals. But this failure to halt recidivism 
was precisely why a degree of specialisation was being introduced into a 
tight-knit system to deal with precisely this problem and why the ideas 
governing penal practice were transformed. 
More recently, the Foucauldian thesis has been modified somewhat in 
Garland's Punishment and Welfare wherein he argues that chronologically, 
Foucault's thesis goes awry because the kind of knowledge necessary for 
individualised treatment only developed at the beginning of the 20th century, not 
the 19th. Garland still retains its essential idea, that reform is a method better 
suited to controlling its recipients and so is a more subtle means of control 
than deterrence. The onset of mass democracy had made it necessary that 
people not be treated so harshly in prisons yet still abide by the accepted 
norms of society. Criminology helped in making this switch in the 
modalities of punishment as it now identified the offender as a deviant 
who would be 
'subjected to a work of normalisation, correction or segregation 
which ensures one of two things. Either they become responsible, 
conforming subjects, whose regularity, political stability and 
industrious performance deems them capable of entering into 
14 
institutions of representative democracy; or they are supervised and 
segregated from the normal social realm in a manner that 
minimises(and individual ises) any damage they can do. 
Garland is clearer than Foucault as to the reasons why modes of punishment 
were transformed: it was necessary to inculcate within the prisoners the norms 
that were essential to the maintenance of existing interests in a different 
political climate, that of mass democracy and the working-class vote; 'the 
sweep of the franchise and the social realm is indeed widened, but at the 
same time the conditions for participation in social life are made more 
rigorous, more contingent upon behaviour and character'. 9 
Why should the authorities be interested in reform if not for the obvious 
reason of enabling offenders to live better and more honest lives (the 
traditional liberal assumption), apart from some inexplicable desire to 
control? The answer is that it was necessary to maintain the hegemonic 
domination of the bourgeoisie (whose constituents are left unspecified). Why 
was such domination proving so tenuous? The onset of the mass vote 
opened up the prospect that traditional class domination would be displaced 
and also meant that penal punishments could no longer be so harsh in their 
treatment of criminals, the great mass of whom were composed of the 
working class, since they now had a voice in the political process. 
In the new democracy, where citizenship and security extended to 
all classes, discipline could no longer function through repression 
and exclusion. Henceforth its modalities would have to be more 
refined and discreet. Yet at the same time they would require to 
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be more systematic and penetrating, more thorough in their 
effects. Their task was to ensure that the new and permanent 
threat posed to the system of class domination by the workers' 
vote, their mass trade unions and their collective political 
existence was counterbalanced by an equally extensive and 
thoroughgoing regulation and discipline, reducing the 'risks' that 
democracy entailed, ensuring that the new citizens were good 
citizens. 10 
The penal authorities were now being required to police the working 
class to ensure that they continued to fit the requirements that were 
necessary to continue the system of class domination. The administration of 
justice was no longer the blunt instrument of the past, consigning criminals 
to a period inprison intended to instil in them a fear of the consequences 
of law-breaking which would deter them from infringing the law again. The 
problem with this system was that it was 'either too harsh - spiralling 
individuals downwards into the criminal class - or else ineffective, leaving 
those ineligible for prison completely beyond control [the inebriates, feeble- 
minded et al. ]'. 11 This novel system of punishment would be more discreet 
but also more effective since it would not disturb the sensibilities of the 
newly enfranchised. As was constantly reiterated, punishment, from the 
handing down of sentences to the dispensation of probation, would no 
longer focus on the offence but on the individual offender all under the 
guise of seeking the most suitable punishment for the particular offender. 
Criminal justice would have available to itself 'new supplies of knowledge 
16 
implying a new scope for power. For the new system of normalisation, with 
its capacity to prise open and enter into the intimate details of the 
individual's life, allows a measure of penetration and subtlety, which was 
altogether new to the forces of the criminal law'. 12 
It should not be supposed that purely punitive punishments applied 
without consideration of the offender's circumstances were discarded; beyond 
the normalising sector of punishment (probation, after-care and licensed 
supervision) and the correctional sector (including all those institutions such 
as the Borstals and various reformatories which tried to inculcate a 
disposition that would not prove disruptive when released) lay the 
segregative sector in which were housed all those who had 'refused to 
submit or [had] been unable to submit to the disciplines of the dominant 
social order'. 13 The foremost institution was the prison into which were cast 
those whose probability of reform was low and whose offence was serious 
enough to warrant time in prison. The prison was a place of last resort, 
functioning as a back-up mechanism after people had passed through the 
first two sectors without effect, or simply by-passed them. 
Garland not only tries to provide a more convincing historical account than 
Foucault, he also tries to provide a more convincing explanation for the weight 
that was lent toward programs of reform. His work is not only Foucauldian in 
its inspiration but also in its methodological approach: it always views ideas 
as being tied to power and the elaboration of these ideas as contributing to 
the successful exercise of power. Thus the development of criminology is 
crucial for itprovides both the catalyst and rationale for novel methods of 
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punishment; an obvious question is what happens to the previous conception 
of punishment, as according to the principles of classical justice which 
insisted on equal punishment for all offences of a kindred nature and 
punishments which would 'fit' the crime, the working out of this proportion 
being a matter for judges and legislators. Crim i no logical ly-inspired policies 
could not be incorporated into the criminal law without attention being paid 
to how this would affect previous notions of punishment. 
It is not surprising that one reviewer of Garland's book wrote of the neglect of 
the 'force of the rule of law [a previously existing cultural framework] and the 
constraints it imposes'. He goes on to note that 
'the root principles of the rule of law are legality and due process. 
Restraints are placed on the definition of conduct as criminal and upon 
the methods available to law enforcement officers. Granting arbitrary 
powers contradicts [my italics] the rule of law as does the absence of 
equality before the law. 14 
To overcome this objection, Garland would had to have shown how this 
contradiction was resolved. He realises that 'no one single program completely 
succeeded in imposing itself on the world of practice', "s that there were 
various forces of resistance which operated to prevent the wholesale 
adoption of any one program. Moreover among the various programs which 
it was proposed would be implemented there existed several contradictions 
such as the ideas of criminality advocated by eugenists and 
environmentalists. However there were various forces which supported the 
continuation of punishment along classical lines so that the Government 
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would not lay itself open 'to charges of showing favour to or prejudice 
against particular prisoners'. 16 There always existed a strong current of 
distaste against the proposals of the eugenics movement which smacked too 
much of autocracy. We should not make the mistake of collapsing the ideas 
governing practices with the beliefs supporting them; we can imagine a 
scenario in which many people lose faith in the legitimacy and efficacy of 
these ideas but if there is nothing to be put in its place, the practices 
continue as before. 
Garland argues that the rise and fall of the prominence of certain ideas 
can never be understood apart from the push and pull of politics so that a 
'sound theoretical basis and the promise of effective penal or social 
intervention were never enough to ensure the success of new proposals. 
They also had to be representable [his italics] in political and ideological 
terms'. 17 1 hope it is clear that Garland is saying that saying that the new 
programs had to be convincing on psychological terms, not logical grounds. 
If they could be fitted in with the prevailing prejudices of the day, then the 
battle was won and these new programs would prevail. Thus this process 
will involve 'arbitrary assumptions, non sequiturs and logical contradictions', 
all of which are produced not by the search for 'truth' (in a non- 
ideological sense) but by a political process through which is established a 
new 'regime of truth'. 18 Yet if such a regime rests on a logical 
incompatibility it is unlikely to be stable. 
Pragmatic eclecticism was the order of the day with paltry reverence 
being paid to the dictates of logic, so much so that 'theoretical difference and 
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conceptual discrepancy were made to disappear if divergent positions could 
be satisfied by a common recommendation or policy objective'. 19 How 
precisely these differences are effaced is never made clear, but if a patch is 
put over a logical hole surely someone astute enough to see the logical 
deficiencies canpull on the thread and reveal that the emperor actually does 
not possess any finery worthy of the name. Moreover those who are 
applying the patch surely recognise that it is a temporary expedient which 
is designed to divert attention from the problem and not address it. 
This refusal to admit that logical incoherence can cause problems in 
implementing logically slipshod policies ensures that Garland's approach is 
curiously bloodless but triumphalist. He admits that the policies developed 
contained glaring logical faults but somehow they emerged as the dominant 
ideas directing policies. There is little indication of how these policies fared 
beyond the legislative stage, with scant reference being made to the 
reluctanceof the courts to endorse disproportionate punishment for offenders 
or the reluctance of various groups such as the Church of England 
Temperance Society or the local aid societies (whose compliance he over- 
estimates; see p. 210-14) to go along with any innovations. There is no 
indication of the reluctance of the magistrates to convert their courts into 
settings that would be more akin to tribunals of social welfare that were 
meant to unearth the social conditions which may have been influential in 
provoking the offence in question. The reformers wished to curtail, in the 
case of children, notions of criminal responsibility and consequent punishinent 
but the magistrates wereunwilling to countenance such changes for fear that 
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the law would then be too lenient toward children. Although the civil 
functions of the court were enlarged, the underlying legal principles were 
retained so that nothing was done 'to resolve the dilemma of conflicting 
principles which had always afflicted the jurisdiction [of the juvenile 
court]'. 20 There is little sense in his work of the fierce disputes that were 
enacted about relaxing the scope of the classical justice model. 
Pragmatism is all very well but perhaps some people abide by a sterner 
criterion of truth. It is suggested that the compromise effected between 
classical justice and criminology was one whereby the responsibility of the 
individual 'became a presumption which was always put in doubt'. 21 What 
would it have taken for this presumption to have been discounted? It is too 
strong to say that those who handed down sentences always presumed that 
various factors, other than the individual's intention, were decisive in 
producing the offence; would it not be more accurate to say that the burden 
of proving that various factors, irreducible to the individual will, were 
decisive in producing the act in question, was placed on the shoulders of 
the proponents of the new science of criminology? Perhaps the Foucauldian 
inspired theorists would be happy to go along with this suggestion for 
if one were crudely to sLimmarise the conduct of the criminology 
programme, it could be said that it began by promising to 
demarcate and identify the criminal by means of objective, 
specifiable criteria. Having convinced its audience of this 
possibility, it then withdrew the offer of a publicly specified line 
of demarcation and instead arrogated to itself the task of 
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demarcating. Moreover this regrouped strategy has advantages 
which extend beyond the promotion of the criminological expert: 
for in its new forms, it specifies not a norm, but an apparatus to 
enforce norms. It does not so much specify the criminal 'Other' as 
indicate his existence and set up an apparatus qualified to identify 
and police 'him'. Thus, to extend Foucault's arguments, it justifies 
an extended form of policing by naming an 'Other' who can 
never be known in advance of' a generalised, but closely drawn 
practice of observation which covers the whole population. 22 
The respective expert profession, having gained the trust of the public in 
their ability to successfully identify criminals, then renege on this promise 
but continue to enjoy public faith in that ability. But why should the public 
be convinced if there is no reliable proof forthcoming that the 'experts' can 
actually carry out the task of identification; we can ask not only why 
should people be so suppliant before these so-called experts but how did 
they gain such a prestigious tag in the first place? What is the basis of 
their expertise? Criminology was an inchoate discipline and did not possess 
a tradition of past successes so that people would have been inclined to 
give it the benefit of the doubt. It would surely have been required to 
proceed by inductive research, issuing predictions that could be verified or 
falsified, but there is no evidence, in Garland, of any such criterion existing. 
All it needs for a science to be accepted is rhetorical promise. It is difficult 
to find any evidence that criminology had managed to insinuate itself into 
such a prestigious position that people automatically deferred to it 
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especially since its acceptance would have meant an upheaval in penal 
practice. Not needing to state the basis of their identification of criminals 
leaves the criminological programme in the advantageous position of not 
having to possess any coherent program at all, just the desire to police the 
whole population. Criminal justice was left in the curious position of being 
animated by ideas which failed to coalesce into any recognisable doctrine 
which anybody could identify but which still provided the basis of 
punishment for vast sections of suspects. Garland does not seem to believe 
that logical inadequacy or incompatibility have a part to play but conceives 
the linchpin of ideas as pertaining to psychology which leaves the 
elaboration of ideas simply a matter of desire and conviction on the part of 
the people involved, so that he can say that 'versions of criminology, social 
work and eugenics' enter into penal practice retaining their 'practical 
advantages, if not their theoretical integrity. 23 But how can the dispassionate 
reader estimate if they have retained their practical efficacy if we are left 
unsure as to the criteria by which they have been accepted? 
Criminology began by making bold statements which did jolt people out 
of a complacency concerning the causality of criminal deeds but did not 
gain mass acceptance precisely because its diagnoses were unsubstantiated. 
The logical connection between the idea of a responsible human action, such 
as a criminal deed, and the idea that there could be others factors, other 
than the human will, which were influential in producing the deed was not 
one of necessity. It was not immediately suggested by the idea of a human 
act, conceived as it was at the time, but neither was it logically opposed to 
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it. It was then a question of trying to find a method by which the 
potentially huge host of factors could be limited, one example being the 
study by Goring, who specified that criminality was largely a matter of 
heredity. These results, in turn, were assailed for not paying due attention to 
social and environmental factors so that we can see that the development 
of criminology produced increasing specialisation as more and more effort 
is devoted to discovering just how influential a particular factor is and not 
a consensus of views. As Rose comments on the continuing development of 
criminology, 'an historical perspective demonstrates an increasing tendency 
toward particularism, toward the study of specific problems of importance as 
against the large exploratory study'. 24 
Garland has come to admit that 
'the most obvious limitation of Punishment and Welfare as a historical 
account, is its tendency to view penal change only from the point of 
view of its implications for class domination and control of the poor. In 
doing so, it replaces the analysis of cultural forces by an analysis of 
ideological forces. 25 
What this implies is that we should stop seeing punishment about more efficient 
control and instead try to understand the other considerations that lie behind 
punishment. This is not just a call to attend to the popular sentiments behind 
punishment but also the cultural frameworks that underpin these sentiments. 
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1.2 The Links between Power and Knowledge 
I have briefly reviewed the thrust of the revisionist theories and made 
some isolated criticisms; I now wish to draw them together and demonstrate 
how most of them are connected to the endorsement of the 
power/knowledge formula. 
There often seems to be an unstated assumption within social theory that 
while social structures can have an influence, irrespective of agents' desires, 
ideas and beliefs are far more malleable and do not constrain in the way 
that social structures do. It should be an empirical question whether there 
can exist such influences but it should be noted that the Foucauldian 
approach would discount them immediately, indeed it would have to or 
otherwise their whole approach would be invalidated, premised as it is on 
knowledge standing in a complementary relationship to power. The suspicion 
then arises that there may be an element of concealment within such 
narratives, not perhaps intentionally, but as a result of the method adopted 
which will only admit a certain type of ideational influence and denies or 
skims over all others and which results in a very peculiar account of the 
development of knowledge and culture. Despite repeated avowals that the 
power/knowledge formulation was designed to facilitate a greater 
understanding of the relationship between these very elements, it actually 
radically simplifies their relationship and proves unable to provide a 
narrative which adequately captures the full complexity of the relationship 
between cultural factors and the social agents on which they impinge. 
25 
On what grounds am I faulting the power/knowledge formula? What are 
the consequences of compacting power and knowledge together so tightly 
that they are always seen as necessarily linked? The first objection is that by 
postulating an immediate relationship of knowledge to power, Foucault relies 
too much on the notion of power and so uses it where it is inapplicable. 
Knowledge can be used as a resource in a struggle between various groups 
but to attempt to attribute power solely on the basis of the possession of 
resources runs the danger of confusing a distributive conception of power 
(power to: the capacity of individuals or groups to realise their intentions) 
with a relational notion of power (power over: the capacity of individuals 
or groups to realise their will despite the resistance of others) which is a 
social relation in which some people or groups exercise power over others. 
If power be construed as 'power to' this means that it is a generalised capacity 
to bring about intended outcomes which the utilisation of resources makes 
possible. However, as this is not a social relation we can read off from the 
resources the likelihood of the outcome, so that by looking at the finances 
of the government we can say that it will be able to build better housing 
because there will be no human resistance. But if the outcome is contested 
(power over) there is no guarantee from studying one set of resources in 
isolation from another set which it will be used against that it will procure 
success. We could not have ascertained with much likelihood if the U. S. was 
going to win the arms race in the 1950s simply by examining their then 
defence budget for once it entered into competition with the USSR the 
nature of this interaction determined future outcomes. Success depends on 
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the strength of one party vis-A-vis another and so cannot be determined 
apart from interaction itself. If we then accept that power is a relational 
concept then we should be wary of attributing it by examining one set of 
resources alone. What all this entails is that we first look at the resources 
that the respective parties and groups can bring to the negotiating table and 
attempt to estimate their probability of success from a direct comparison. 
Thus we must compare the relative strength and coherence of a group's 
policies to gather who is the more powerful. 
Many commentators have interpreted Foucault's power/knowledge formula 
as arguing that a successful exercise of power is dependent on knowledge 
aboutwhoever is the 'intended' target, or as Garlandputs it 
the successftil control of an object -whether it is an object in 
nature or a human object -requires a degree of understanding of 
its forces, its reactions, its strengths and weaknesses, its possibilities 
for change. Consequently the more it is known, the more 
controllable it becomes. For Foucault the relationship between 
knowledge and power is thus an intimate and internal relationship 
in which each implies and increases the other, and his use of the 
term 'power-knowledge' is a kind of conceptual shorthand used to 
emphasise these interconnections. 26 
Why should we refer to a human agent as a human object? To do so is 
to prejudge the success of any venture by one agent against the resistance 
of another and to rob agency of one of its most fundamental characteristics, 
that of autonomy. It is to believe that those who are undergoing an attempt 
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at control can have no recourse to any initiative or resource that will help 
to stave off an outcome that would be unfavourable to them. Not only does 
it strip agency of one of its most fundamental powers, it also reveals 
something striking about the conceptualisation of the field of knowledge. 
To state, prior to interaction, that the implementation of a body of knowledge 
will be successful is to conceive it, the program or policy as knowledge, as 
possessing a great degree of comprehensives and coherence, such that it is 
intrinsically superior to any potential rival programs. T'he objections which 
can be placed against it are minor so people simply have to knuckle down 
and accept it. Surely this scenario seldom pertains in the field of intellectual 
progress, as often what looks like a promising development may, in the light 
of objections, turn out to be sorely lacking. Any proposed link between 
power and knowledge would confuse what is a rare example in intellectual 
history with general progress. Such is the case with the early development 
of criminology: to say that the development of criminology induced power 
ignores both how varied criminology was and how it was plainly 
incompatible with the principles of classical justice, so that objections could 
be raised against it from this perspective. This is why I object to those who 
have tried to amend Foucault's revisionist history by suggesting that his 
notion of assuJetissement (subjectification probably being the closest 
translation) could only be possible with the development of criminology 
with its close attention to the factors which may have contributed to the 
individual committing crime. The inchoate and uncertain state of this new 
science made it unlikely that it could ever gain such dominance so quickly 
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that it could be said to be the intellectual bedrock of all penal programs. 
The ideas of criminology permeated into public debate in Britain through 
the dissatisfaction of marginals who went looking for ideas that would 
serve their interests better than those that were currently established. The 
social fact that it is those who were on the margins of influence and 
power makes it likely that those in power would have most to lose from 
accepting the proposed innovations so that they would try to resist any 
attempts to gain a sympathetic audience for these ideas. 
Having questioned whether there is such a perennial link between power 
and knowledge, I now wish to turn to what the formula implies for 
knowledge itself. By stating that a field of knowledge constitutes power 
relations, 27 he suggests that knowledge is somehow bom as a seamless 
whole, requiring no handiwork at all before it can be used. This points to 
one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of Foucault's genealogy of ideas in 
that it paints intellectual history as a series of abrupt swings, as one set of 
ideas proves to be unsatisfactory another instantly rises to take its place 
with little explanation as to how this alternative program was constructed. 
The possible Foucauldian retort that it was less a matter of theoretical than 
of practical logic, i. e. people desired it so that it appeared is hardly 
convincing and does little to answer the query. 
What is missing from the Foucauldian account is how the ideas that are 
put in place in social life in the form of policies, doctrines, regulations 
actually come about. We get no indication how such theoretical projects are 
constructed and how the elements and accidents of social life may 
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influence their development, 'how practices or discourses are articulated to form 
complex wholes'. 28 Even the most favourable intellectual scenario that I will 
present, that of a comprehensive and coherent program, must be patiently 
worked at as linkages are built up between various ideas and some degree 
of systernatisation between the parts is attained. But while this is being 
achieved various factors may influence it so that ideas which seem 
propitious are never actually realised. This is why I favour a broader definition 
of knowledge than Foucault, because it allows one to see how the institutional 
modes of treatment actually arise and are implemented. 
The failure to allow an adequate temporal element in a history of ideas, 
during which people develop these ideas further, leads to another strange 
failing in Foucault's account, namely the unimportance of people. It has 
often been remarked that it is difficult to tell with Foucault from whom 
the various tactics and strategies spring and those on whom the consequent 
machinations work are strangely acquiescent. It should be no surprise that if 
power and knowledge are instantaneously linked at the outset, then we have 
a scenario of the most favourable ideational relationship where a web of 
closely linked ideas presents no chinks that can be exploited. Since it has 
already been developed to the hilt and presents no opportunity for criticism, 
there is nothing to do but implement it or subordinate oneself to it, 
depending on one's social position. Hence the relative unimportance of 
social actors, despite all the vaunted talk of doing away with idealism, since 
there is nothing they can do in the way of constructing or obstructing the 
elaboration of these ideas. It is important to note that not only is it those 
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on the receiving end of these ideas who have little influence or effect but 
also those who implement these ideas. They are reduced to bearers of these 
ideas since they do not question, criticise or amend them but simply put 
them in place. 
Figure I 
knowledge induces no internal incoherence no choice but 
power; ideas ready ------- 0- among dominant ideas; IN to acquiesce; 
made little trace of subordinate cultural domi- 
cultures nation produced 
So we must reject the instantaneous identification of knowledge and 
power, since instead of offering people a foot in the door which leads to 
cultural change it abruptly slams it shut on them. It presents us with a 
series of abrupt swings as some policies are replaced in favour of others. 
Instead of this scenario we must be attentive to how ideas and policies are 
patiently worked at and problems attended to and resolved. 
As stated, the power/knowledge formulation can postulate only one 
particular kind of relationship between power and knowledge whereby 
immediate and obvious benefits proceed from the combination of certain 
items of knowledge and people are induced to investigate and elaborate 
possible linkages between them. Such was the relationship between 
punishment and justice so that punishment could be legitimate only if it 
was equitable, i. e. tied to the idea of justice and did not suffer wide 
variations in practice which were perpetrated by various judges. Great play 
was made of this connection by members of non-conformist religions in the 
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late 18th century as they protested over the inequity of punishment and the 
link was pursued throughout the 19th century by people such as Bentham 
and prison administrators. This was a powerful weapon for their opponents 
couldnot come up with a convincing rebuttal and had to accept the validity 
of the argument. Even though the judges resisted the logical outcome of 
overcoming such anomalies and disparities in sentencing, the development of 
codified law, they were still intermittently forced to initiate efforts of their 
own to reduce the alleged disparities. For those who had assumed 
responsibility for prisons nationally, this linkage proved to be one of the 
most powerful arguments for pressing the case for uniformity. Here we have 
a clear case where the conjunction of ideas does prove to be a boon and 
worked in favour of the national penal administrators but equally proved to 
be a hindrance for others. What is important to note is how long it took to 
establish this link which gradually everyone came to accept as valid. It was 
over a century after the connection between punishment and justice had 
first been made before the government was able to dictate the content of 
punishment and impose the policies they saw fit. Yet we get little 
indication from the power/knowledge formula how protracted the struggle, to 
realise in the social world ideational connections that are quickly assented 
to intellectually, can be. 
Once we discard the notion that knowledge, giving rise to power, must be 
of a particular type, we can seen just how constraining the power/knowledge 
formula is. Even the most cursory reading of penal history will show that 
one of the greatest sources of tension within penal administration was the 
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need to balance the notions of reform and deterrence within the concept of 
punishment. The term 'tension' assumes that the two notions are in some 
way incompatible (I will address this matter in the next chapter), something 
which contemporaries and historians have accepted. Superficially it seems 
unlikely that people would simultaneously hold two mutually contradictory 
ideas but the Foucauldian approach rules this out tout court and assumes 
that reform and deterrence are implemented to secure the same end; this is 
another result of the extreme coherence of ideas which must characterise 
the power/knowledge approach and the suppression of any suggestion that 
beliefs and policies might be composed of inconsistent or incompatible 
parts. Ignatieff noted that 'Foucault's conception of the disciplinary world view, 
the savoir as he calls it, effectively forecloses on the possibility that the savoir 
itself was a site of contradiction, argument and conflict'. 29 One of the most 
anomalous aspects of the Foucauldian approach is how it is silent on the 
connection between reform and deterrence, either suggesting that there was 
an effortless switch from one to the other or that each notion of 
punishment could be applicable to different categories of prisoner without 
this categorisation itseýf being a problem. 
Itis too static a picture to assume that people unproblematically endorse 
mutually exclusive ideas and somehow labour under this burden without 
doing anything about it. This idea should be shunned for it assumes that the 
inconsistency of ideas and beliefs can be ignored (so denying them causal 
autonomy) and that there is nobody around to point this inconsistency. 
People may accept the conjunction of two such opposed ideas but try to do 
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something about it, either by accentuating one at the expense of the other 
and exercising cultural power to conceal this fact or else by seeking some 
kind of syncretic formula which would lessen the incompatibility between 
the two elements. There are two points of importance to note here: the first 
is that those who maintained the need to implement policies of reform and 
deterrence at the same time were placed neither in an advantageous position 
nor one of power as a result of holding on to such ideas, which questions 
the central tenet of the Foucauldian approach. Thus power is not 
automatically established through people upholding ideas and the endorsement 
of particular ideas may actually detract from it but may still be maintained 
nevertheless. The second point follows from our first observation that the 
endorsement of ideas does not confer power upon people but rather often 
to hold onto these ideas and to maintain them, the exercise of power is 
required to conceal the mutual incompatibility. It is quite the opposite from 
what one would expect from the power/knowledge formula which suggests 
that knowledge somehow confers power. These points will be substantiated 
by historical analysis in later chapters. 
The power/knowledge formula fits well with a widely-held preconception, 
that while social structures may constrain people by virtue of the interests 
and obligations built into various positions in a social structure (a landlord 
must extract rent by virtue of his very position) the world of knowledge 
represents an arena of freedom. But positions may carry intellectual 
conditions as well: the position of a Christian priest means that he must 
uphold the apparently contradictory doctrine of there having existed a 
34 
person who was both divine and human; he may find this untenable and 
wish to transform the figure of Christ into a political agitator or radical 
iconoclast but what he must do is grapple with the accumulated doctrine 
which seems so contradictory. Similarly the curious position of criminal 
offenders meant that they occupied a strange twilight zone where they did 
not enjoy the same privileges as the law-abiding person but were not to be 
treated with utter disregard either. This can be summed up as the perennial 
debate between deterrence and reform which has continually bedevilled 
prison administrators and which could not be either ignored or disregarded. 
This is why the power/knowledge formula is singularly inappropriate for 
dealing with penal history since the dilemma of deterrence and/or reform 
can be traced from the inception of prisons up to the present day and in 
no way confers power. What must be done is find a method that allows us 
to estimate what kind of influence the dilemma of deterrence and/or reform 
had on prison administrators without either allowing ideas and beliefs or 
people to dominate. This would rob either ideas or people of an 
independent influence or else the other option would be to clasp them 
together so tightly that the respective influence of either is difficult to 
divine. Those who endorse the power/knowledge formula rarely fall into the 
first category of idealism (at least not explicitly), of viewing ideas and 
values as mysteriously transmitting themselves into the minds of people and 
being unquestioningly enacted but I did argue how this was the outcome 
with respect to those who were implementing these ideas; their formulation 
can often be taken as covering the latter two categories, as either viewing 
35 
ideas as a useful device to achieve certain ends or else melding them 
together. Such a method will fail to grasp precisely what problems are set 
by the taking up of certain ideas, since it insists on viewing ideas as 
perennially bound up in power struggles. 
Thus in the case of two mutually opposed but unconnected ideas, the 
question of power does not arise immediately but only after the agents 
involved have surveyed the situation and then decided upon a course of 
action. The exercise of power may then arise as they seek to conceal the 
fact that they favour the primacy of one idea over another, as occurred in 
the prisons after 1865 when the primacy of reform was downplayed in 
favour of a policy of deterrence. This set of ideas did not constitute a 
power relationship but rather the contrary, it depended on the exercise of 
power for its continued survival in the social sphere. 
There are other respects in which the supposed congruence of both 
power and knowledge occludes much of the complexity in any relationship 
between them. Any quick coupling of the two may conceal how much effort 
has to be put in before knowledge can yield any sort of benefit. An 
example is offered by the clash between the two competing models of 
penal discipline, what were called the separate and silent system. Again it is 
simplistic to suppose that the development of a novel form of prison 
discipline (the separate) which ostensibly seemed to be more lenient in that 
it offered less in the way of physical punishment but involved more 
psychological trauma, due to long periods of separation, placed its advocates 
in a position of power, or so the power/ knowledge formula would have us 
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believe. Eventually the supporters of the separate system enjoyed a victory 
of sorts but this cannot be simply assumed, the reason being that the 
advocacy of this system stirred many who were aghast at its cruelty and 
ill-effects on the prisoners' mental faculties which were incongruent with a 
supposed emphasis on reform into formulating a disciplinary model of their 
own which would avoid the other's defects. 
The areas which were exposed to hostile fire were where the greatest 
gulf lay between the two models, namely the incompatibility between a 
prison sentence according to isolation or association; the two could not be 
simultaneously combined, therefore each side had to show up the demerits 
of either isolation or association and show how their own model could 
remedy such defects. People are driven to make repairs so that their model 
does not buckle under the strain of hostile criticism levelled by their 
opponents. So the models become more intricate and elaborate as criticism is 
either rebuked or accepted and so the model continually adapts and changes. 
Though the aim is outright elimination of the opposing model and 
complete acceptance of their own, the outcome may be very different and 
wholly unintended and unexpected. Each side was intent on pin-pointing the 
weaknesses of the other with the result that the defects of both sides are 
fully exposed in the course of this public debate. It was public because it 
was not themselves they were trying to convince of the opposing model's 
futility but the wider public. There is no logical terminus at which one of 
the two sides might be said to have won and arguments are halted but 
debate might have become so elaborate and intricate that there is little 
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point in carrying on. The reason behind such fervent debate was not a love 
of competitive debate or even point-scoring but to convince those concerned 
that the alternative on offer was no good and their model of penal 
discipline was the best that could be hoped for and so sway the sceptical 
and unconverted. Debate between the two groups might become so intense 
that they lose sight of this end in concentrating on meeting the accusations 
and objections of the other side. Though the aim had been to introduce 
some clarity into the pool of ideas on offer, there had been so much 
thrashing about by both sides that it had become impossible for those 
neophytes in the debate to gauge where one system ended and the other 
began. Thus to ordinary ratepayers in the counties the debate had taken an 
increasingly outlandish turn and they were unwilling to commit themselves 
or their money - through increased rates - either way to what seemed like 
artificial and abstruse distinctions. Even if they had bothered to follow the 
debate it is unlikely that either model of prison discipline would have 
attracted a decisive number of supporters since there had been no 
compelling victory for either side, which is not to say that there had not 
been any skirmishes in which both sides had inflicted damage. 
It is difficult to see how Foucault could trace such developments since 
the advance of knowledge automatically brings about the successful exercise of 
power. This either ignores or obscures the effort that must be put in to 
making ideas stick socially, i. e. have them accepted and implemented. 
Depending on the logical relationship between ideas, this will involve a 
corresponding amount of effort. Thus for ideas which contradict another set 
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of ideas which are promoted by another group, powerful enough to make 
their voice heard in the first place, it will be most difficult of all to have 
them accepted since opposition has to be overcome at both the ideational 
and social level. It is not surprising then that such ideas rarely survive in 
their original pristine state but are implemented having conceded various 
compromises. Not only does the power/knowledge formula fail to show how 
knowledge develops in such a scenario but also how the scenario of two 
opposing policies prevents any one group from seeing its favoured policies 
whole-heartedly endorsed, so calling into question any facile link between 
power and knowledge. Foucault does advert to the existence of a debate 
between these two competing schools of thought and notes that 'a whole 
series of different conflicts stemmed from the opposition between these two 
models [the separate and silent systems]: religious ... medical ... economic... 
architectural and administrative. This, no doubt, was why the argument lasted 
so long. But, at the heart of the debate, and making it possible, was this 
primary objective of carceral action: coercive individualisation [my italics], 
by the termination of any relation that is not supervised by authority or 
arranged according to hierarchy -) . 
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Appearing to concede pluralism at the level of ideas Foucault reduces 
any such subsequent debate to an epiphenomenon which is unable to disturb 
the end it serves. Despite the agents' own convictions that the outcome of 
the debate would influence greatly how the project of reform would 
proceed, Foucault believes that it is unimportant which model should emerge 
triumphant since they both attain to the same end. He displays scant 
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awareness of the point I stressed above, that the result of such vitriolic 
competition may be what neither party had expected or wanted, and the end 
desired by each is subverted by the process of competition, delivering a 
result which was wholly unintended. This is an outcome that cannot be 
encompassed by Foucault since there is never any social debate in the first 
place which could significantly affect the ideas first outlined. His method 
rules out a priori that various policies are elaborated in the tussle of social 
life (because they must immediately give rise to power) and so is blind to 
the possibility of an outcome being wrought by all but intended by none. 
It is a constant temptation for devotees of the power/knowledge formula 
to write histories which rule out fractures and pluralism both at the level of 
ideas (since the existence of alternatives makes it harder for any one school 
of thought to predominate) and at the social level; even if people are dis- 
contented with their present set of circumstances they remain handicapped in 
their attempt to articulate an agenda for change since there is one 'dominant 
ideology' with few cracks in its facade. Hence the puzzlement over 
Foucault's talk of resistance as they asked, resisting in the name of what? 
People have always wondered how he could conceive of successful 
resistance within the confines of his own theory. Once he admits that power 
produces truth (and for those who doubt that he meant this should look at 
Discipline and Punish, p. 194 and Power/ Knowledge, p. 5 1) and that this truth 
is internally coherent, there seems scant possibility that those who have 
been 'normalised' could ever see through the dominant regime of truth and 
denounce it. Hence the occlusion of the role of the prisoners in successfully 
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agitating for change because the fact that they could bring ideas that 
conflict with what was imposed from above through different life- 
experiences is ruled out by this method. 
I have criticised the power/knowledge formula for putting a misplaced 
emphasis upon power and for implying that workable knowledge is 
somehow brought into the social world as a finished product, ready to be 
utilised. Yet as I have argued and will show even with the most favourable 
scenario, much work remains to be done even after the initial favourable 
links are grasped and the potential benefits suspected and this process of 
development may encounter resistance. The Commissioners, assigned to 
reform the criminal law and render punishments more equitable in the 
1840s, struggled to arrive at a proportionate list of punishments as they 
debated how many offences there should be with the number of different 
classifiable offences rising from four in their 2nd report to 45 in the 7th 
report. Foucault gives little indication of the toil that had to be undergone 
before people could make use of any knowledge. 
Much is made of the development of criminology by Garland in his 
book, Punishment and Welfare, and he concedes that it was not compatible 
with the demands of classical justice. What was innovatory about 
criminology was that it located the explanation of crime in causes external 
to the individual will such as hereditariness. Closer investigation revealed 
that there were far more possibilities on offer than was originally supposed 
and so the project demanded yet more attention. Lombroso believed that he 
could attribute criminal behaviour to one factor, that of the physical 
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constitution of the individual, but such a theory was soon discarded by his 
successors who nevertheless followed his lead in seeking causes external to 
the individual behaviour to explain his or her behaviour. 
Since that state of play in such a scenario is so unstable with one 
theoryliable to be superseded by another which can better explain what the 
other could not, it is difficult to believe it is solely down to intellectual 
factors alonewhich explain why any one theory rather than another should 
gain a position of prominence. The advancement of one idea cannot be 
explained solely by itstheoretical virtues since it is highly unlikely that any 
one position represents an irreproachable refutation of its rival. Thus it is 
not the knowledge-items alone which explain why they have been adopted 
by the powerful but more of a complex interplay between both the 
ideational and the social. We must examine what kind of congruence there 
is between the group and the ideas that it endorses to see why this and not 
another set of ideas were selected. This is not to say that I endorse 
Garland's approach of entirely attributing the success of certain ideas to 
social factors but rather to the congruence of the logical relationships of 
ideas to group interests. 
In the area of penal history that we will examine there was considerable 
suspicion over any departure from the principles of classical justice so that 
the use of the new science of criminology was extremely restricted. To 
estimate the social reception of the set of ideas which can be classified as 
criminological doctrines two factors must be borne in mind. The first is the 
extent of satisfaction or discontent with the set of existing policies: do they 
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adequately explain and cope with existing problems or are they seen as 
increasingly irrelevant? Secondly how much of a departure would 
incorporating the new ideas actually be? Since such ideas are an uncertain 
bet (no conclusive evidence in favour of one theory or another) the more 
abrupt the break the less willing people will be to back such a departure 
from custom. This is not because people are unthinking traditionalists but 
simply becausethe cost and thus return from backing these ideas seems so 
unsure, though this attitude will vary depending on how discontented with 
their lot in the current set of penal practices. The lack of general acclaim 
for these novel ideas should not be seen as an obstacle but a spur to 
development as each school attempts to improve upon their findings in an 
attempt to gain acceptance beyond their own particular group. 
1.3 The unity of control and its mechanisms 
Those who have sought to revise Foucault but still retain his essential 
thesis have turned to the development of criminology since it seemed that 
it possessed the elements necessary to facilitate control of each criminal 
through individual knowledge and care. But beyond vague intimations that 
such programs for action were adopted, little evidence is produced to show 
that this was actually the case. Such accounts are curiously triumphalist but 
bloodless, for they fail to show how cultural domination is produced, 
whether through persuasion or coercion. By this I do not mean that simply 
the prisoners themselves had to be convinced of the legitimacy of the 
actions that were being taken (supposedly) for their welfare, a consideration 
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which is often passed over, but also so did many of the penal administrators 
and members of the judiciary who had been schooled in the principles of 
classical justice. We are asked to take for granted that all these were 
somehow persuaded that a conversion to radically different principles of 
justice was for the better; so not only is the how of cultural domination 
being ignored but the when remains extremely unconvincing. By this I mean 
that the failure to detail adequately how various groups were convinced of 
the need to adopt new sentencing measures and methods of punishment 
gives a temporally truncated account as the reception of these new ideas is 
squeezed into an implausible time-frame, as the obstacles to such an 
outcome are overlooked. Prior to the development of the new science of 
criminology there existed a previous ideational framework and so I am 
making the simple point that social agents never begin their efforts to fulfil 
their wishes completely de novo. This means that the previously existing 
framework, be it structural or cultural, and here we are dealing with the 
latter, must figure in any account of change. Depending on how the 
innovative developments fit with it, whether they are in accord or opposition 
with it, this will accelerate or impede change. I recounted that since 
criminology with its variable punishments was in opposition to the ideas of 
classical justice, we should expect change to be tardy; this would be so 
even if everyone had sanctioned such a break with the previously 
established principles of justice for these could not simply be ditched 
overnight. Since many people were against these innovations any ideational 
change would be even slower. I have faulted the power/knowledge school 
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twice for lack of attention to temporality in accounts of the elaboration of 
knowledge. Firstly because they seemed to suggest that knowledge suddenly 
comes about as a complete package, lacking nothing and ready to be used, 
which fails to note that often much work remains to be done, whether it is 
to confirm initial suspicions or rebut hostile criticism. Secondly because they 
see society made up simply of people and so initiating change is just a 
matter of persuading people to accept it. Practices do not change just 
because of persuasion as the reasons that inform such practices must be 
addressed as well; time will have to be spent in deciding just how much of 
the former practice must be amended or discarded in order to suit the 
parameters of the new policies. 
Any theory which asserts that developments in punishment were part of an 
effort to secure more effective control must be able to detail fully one of the 
how was such control produced. This is one of the weakest parts of the 
recent revisionist school of penal histories as they assume that because 
control was attempted, and it is a questionable assumption that the reform 
movement was just this, the result was a foregone conclusion in favour of 
those who had initiated such changes. 
But to question the revisionist account on this score we do not even have 
to go this far; we can take one step back and question why should we 
label the programs undertaken in the prisons as efforts in social control. For 
what proponents of this train of thought usually mean by this is that the 
prison was usually an integral part of an attempt by the ruling class to 
45 
maintain control. This thesis, however, carries some unlikely assumptions 
within itself Ignatieff shows up these assumptions when he writes that 
it would be wrong to think of these constitutencies of institutional 
reformers as acting for their class or expressing the logic of its strategic 
imperatives. This would make them into ventriloquists for a clairvoyant 
and unanimous social consensus. 32 
If these criticisms are not acknowledged, pluralism is excluded at both the 
social and cultural levels so it is no surprise that we end up with a 
monistic theory, i. e. there seems to be only one way of doing things with 
no other viable alternatives. Those on whom these policies are being 
imposed have no option but to accept. 33 
Once this exclusion of pluralism is dropped and we recognise that there 
was immense debate and development as a result of disagreement among 
those who had an interest in penal discipline, the possibility of change 
arises through the admission of such divisiveness. Thus the prisons could not 
be reflecting the bias of the class system alone, for there were many groups 
who perceived that their own material welfare depended on the outcome of 
the penal debates and so pitched in with their own contributions so that the 
direction of policies might reflect their interests. Such groups as the prison 
officers, the incipient movement of probation officers and the Church of 
England missionaries who were involved in the forerunner of the probation 
movement all had different ideas over what shape penal policies should take 
in the early part of this century. The first two groups were trying to obtain 
better conditions for themselves, in the case of the prison officers attempting 
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to forestall the burgeoning reform movement which made their task more 
complex whilst also devaluing the role they played. The probation officers 
were in direct conflict with the church missionaries as they wanted a more 
professional service relying less on the individual influence that was so vital 
to the work of the missionaries and more on clinical diagnosis. 34 Each body 
was able to make a valid case for itself, as the prison officers called for 
the primacy of deterrence in any prison service and the latter two bodies 
invoked two incompatible notions of reform. The Church missionaries had 
not seen the assault on their good work completely rebuffed so their 
insecurity had not been completely allayed but the probation service, though 
it had been granted some concessions still felt that it had not secured a 
fully professional service so that it was only spurred to greater efforts to 
achieve this goal. 
The revisionist account fails to notice how a change in the organisation 
of the prison service (a structural arrangement) eventually had far-reaching 
effects on the cultural level also. The continuing professionalisation of the 
prison service brought into being a group of people who recognised that 
they had common interests and that these were often gained at the expense 
of the prisoners. After the Gladstone Committee's report, reform began to 
have a greater role and this in turn caused re-arrangements at the structural 
level, an effect which rebounded upon the cultural level as people coalesced 
to form a distinct group to agitate for their own conception of reform. As 
the prison administrators tried to meet the incessant demands for reform, 
various groups seized this moment to press their own agenda. Thus the fact 
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that the idea of punishment was itself based upon conceptual incoherence 
represented a point which could be exploited by those who wished to see 
changes in how the prison service was run; after some of the initial 
demands were granted, those groups brought into being by the initial thrust 
for change acted back upon the prison administrators in seeking further 
changes. 
It is no accident that the power/knowledge school cannot include such an 
instance of an institutional rearrangement affecting ideas, as they work with 
an emaciated theory of institutional structure since it is only through treating 
structure as a conduit possessing negligible friction or resistance that 
pluralism can be kept at bay. If we were to allow structure a real presence 
this would be a crucial influence in fostering pluralism so upsetting the 
power/ knowledge thesis. If structure were granted a real presence and not 
just construed as the sum of the various roles within it, then it would have 
to be admitted that this structure may exercise a more decisive influence 
upon the conduct of those who worked within it and were affected by it 
than some general social change such as mass democratisation. Thus the 
prison officers, post 1895, were not impressed by calls for more reforms 
since it meant that they would lose out if the existing arrangements were 
cancelled and so tried to resist the reforms to protect their interests. They 
evaluated the changes affecting them and acted according to their 
perceptions; this was not a uniform response and so makes the point that 
structure determines nobody. Some decided to protest in a militant fashion 
by striking but others were more deferential to authority and vented their 
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frustration through unofficial publications. Yet the need for the 
power/knowledge thesis to cultivate monism ensures that occurrences such as 
these are ignored but at the cost of assuming that the success of cultural 
domination is a forgone conclusion. Little wonder, then, that a favoured 
metaphor for power of those inspired by Foucault is that of the electrical 
circuit, 29 a flow without resistance. It is resistance and opposition, substantial 
and not ephemeral, which is most amiss in the power/knowledge thesis and 
the lack of a genuinely realist notion of structure (realism being understood 
in a causally efficacious sense) contributes a great deal to the absence of 
resistance. This means that social analysis must depart from general theories 
such as those of the social control or cultural diffusion schools since these 
assume the transmission, interpretation and assimilation of ideas to be 
unproblematic. A robust theory of structure would ensure that benefits and 
opportunity costs are distributed unevenly and so various groups would 
struggle differently for innovations or persistence so leading directly to 
pluralism. Change is a far less smooth affair since now there are obstacles 
which can obstruct it and alter it in ways unforeseen by its original 
progenitors. 
We get few glimmerings of such change being decisive in the work of 
Foucault as he dismisses incidents like these as ephemeral to any decisive 
transformation of the prisons, as he asks 'is not the supposed failure part of 
the functioning of prisons?, 35 Any changes that could be brought about can 
be dismissed as ineffectual for they fail to upset the function that Foucault 
imputes to the prison that I discussed earlier. Why does Foucault seek 
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refuge in a badly worked-out functionalism? Is it connected to his 
methodology of seeing knowledge bound up with power? Let us recall that 
Foucault assumed that the extension of the prison service served one 
genuine purpose which was to achieve a more economical distribution of 
power, not to punish less but to punish better. The question remains that the 
criteria used to measure any such improvement in punishment may actually 
conflict; for example reform might achieve its purpose by cutting the rate of 
recidivism but general deterrence might be said to have failed as the crime 
rate had increased. He gives no such indication that any such criteria to 
measure the effectiveness of the prison service might be in conflict. 
Having assumed that the prison serves one express purpose (it being the 
question-begging one of effectiveness) he is then bound to dismiss all 
changes which militate against his own conception of effectiveness, for 
instance those periods which have seen a greater emphasis on deterrence 
with little regard for the normalising tools such as training and education, as 
unimportant to the real function of the prison which is to perpetrate a more 
subtle kind of discipline. Again we see that as a result of assumptions 
about monism at the ideational level (there is only one, but unstated, way of 
measuring the effectiveness of prisons) he is unable to cope with the 
historical complexity of the changes in the prison service. What could he 
say of the so-called reactionary period between 1865-95 when policies of 
deterrence were pursued with vigour and notions of reform were only paid 
lip-service? 36 If such a period failed to upset the new economy of the 
prison service, surely we have to ask what would; all we have from Foucault 
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is an opaque denial that it could, accompanied by a refusal to spell out how 
we could assess the true purpose of the prison. 
It can only be a matter of speculation as to why Foucault takes up such 
a position but, as stated, I believe it is bound up with his refusal to concede 
ideational pluralism. All ideas other than those designated by him as serving 
the purpose of effectiveness of the prisons are disregarded as non- 
consequential. Foucault seems to have worked from the belief that since the 
new orientation of the prisons was dedicated to the 'maximisation of regulatory 
power 37, it could not do this in an equivocal fashion, having purposes that 
were not about normalising prisoners. The problem with such accounts is that 
caspects of [modem] punishment which appear non-utilitarian or 
dysfunctional with regard to control values are either excluded 
from analysis or else accounted for by reference to latent 
functions and concealed utilities'. 38 
1.4 The method of domination 
There are other elements at work in Foucault's account which mar its 
worth as a viable social theory; the chief defect for which I have impugned 
this theory is its refusal to recognise pluralism at both ideational and social 
levels. I now wish to return to the question of the how of cultural 
domination. In Foucault's account the picture is of a set of ideas, embodied 
in various regulations and routines within the prison, which mould and form 
the individual in a manner desired by the administrators. Foucauldians would 
wish to point out that they do not define power in exclusively negative 
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terms 39 so that the changes effected upon the individual prisoner may not 
necessarily be damaging. This still does not explain why such changes were 
accepted: was this because the prisoners agreed with the prison officers that 
such changes were for the better or did they comply as a result of coercion 
(or the threat of)? 
It is hard to see why such a transformation should come about as a 
result of mutual agreement for that would imply that the prisoners saw 
some advantage in the various schemes established by the penal authorities. 
Foucault asks, 'what, then, is the use of prison labour? Not profit; nor even 
the formation of a useful skill; but the constitution of a power relation, an 
empty economic form, a schema of individual submission and of adjustment 
to a production apparatus'. 40 Foucault could reply that the prisoners believed 
that such schemes were useful but did not see through the ruse that prison 
labour inculcated within them habits beneficial to the maintenance of social 
order. If we accept this it becomes harder to retain the thesis about the 
effects of power being positive, for if labour taught the prisoners nothing 
but served some underlying function, can we still say that power had a 
beneficial effect for the prisoners? 
For all the hints of prisoners being empowered they occupy a marginal 
position in Foucault's narrative. They mutely accept the processes of 
indoctrination with little reflection on whether they would benefit from 
them. There is no indication that prisoners have their own beliefs about 
how they should be treated: 'a crucial element in the process [of discipline] is 
always the subjective orientation of the person concerned which may embrace the 
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imposed role or may instead resist it'. 41 We must avoid treating the 'prisoners' 
as some kind of unified body. They differed in skills, resources, status, 
educationand some were differentiated by even more basic categories such 
as age or sex. Some such as the Fenian prisoners effected change in a 
uniform prison system through a highly organised and well-supported 
campaign to grant them the status of political prisoners. Others such as 
women and children by their very presence in a system designed primarily 
for the deterrence of adult male criminals brought about change, not by their 
own actions, but because they had gained the sympathy of others. So here 
we see that it is an unnecessary condition for a policy-change that there be 
some group with a pre-formed opinion as to how they should be treated. 
Change did not come about solely when prisoners were being badly treated 
and they sought arguments to give credence to the cries for relief. Even 
when reforms were afoot toward making conditions more relaxed for 
prisoners at the preventive detention camps, the prisoners seized the initiative 
and demanded conditions more in line with their own expectations. 
It was because prisoners so often seemed to be unreceptive to the values 
and ideals being propagated within the prisons and the lack of an effect on 
the crimc-rate that there resulted so many changes in the way prison was 
organised. From the outset where there was an emphasis upon reform and 
after this had failed to still the crime-rate it was decided that prisoners 
would respond better to discipline of a deterrent nature. Even as this policy 
was accompanied by a falling crime-rate, attention remained riveted on those 
who had succumbed to criminal ways again after leaving prison so that 
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there were calls for new policies to be devised that would successfully deal 
with this trenchant problem. Therefore, one of the greatest factors behind 
change was not the successful transmission of the prison's message to its 
inmates but rather the perceived failure of this. Prisoners for whatever reason 
had failed to absorb the message of particular penal regimes and this led to 
calls for the regime to be placed on a new, more effective footing. 
It is not enough to cite the locus of cultural dissemination and assume 
that because there was an attempt to inculcate certain ideas among certain 
people that success was a foregone conclusion, which was the first objection 
I lodged against the power/knowledge thesis. Even if the changes proposed 
do benefit those who will be subjected to them we must show why people 
opted for them. It may be as a result of negotiation or both parties agreeing 
it was for the best or else if such changes of attitude or lifestyle were not 
undertaken voluntarily we must show how this was achieved. Was the use 
of power only threatened or actually used? On what basis did this power 
rest, for example superior force or legal restrictions? Even if power is 
involved this hardly renders the transition intelligible yet this is how it 
appears with Foucault. He wants to say the changes introduced as a result 
of the policies of individualisation within the prisons should not be seen as 
detrimental but he also believes that these were not advantageous to the 
prisoners since 'prison labour aimed to teach them nothing 02 but he does 
not try to reconcile these two positions. Why did the prisoners not question the 
impact, beneficial or otherwise, of the policies adopted in the prisons? Is this 
not introducing 'cultural dopes' who unquestioningly accept all ideas that 
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are placed before them. As a self-confessed revisionist historian writes, 
'Foucault's account consistently portrays authority as having a clear field, 
able to carry out its strategies without let or hindrance from its own legal 
principles [note how Ignatieff implicitly accepts that institutionalised beliefs 
can constrain action] or from popular opposition. Power is always seen as a 
strategy, as an instrumentality, never as a social relation between contending 
forces A3 ; i. e. power is defined with reference to one party alone, not 
relationally which means that it is perceived as an a priori capacity to 
obtain dominance usually without failure. 
Despite the massive disadvantages in terms of resources with which the 
prisoners were faced, they were by no means forced to accept what was 
expected of them. Prison policies had always veered between trying to 
effect a change of heart as opposed to an apparent change of habit. When 
the stress was upon deterrence this was not really an issue since there was 
not much of a response to be called for from the prisoners. But when the 
question of recidivism was on the agenda again and some held that it was 
not enough that prisoners be cowed into submission for the duration of their 
sentence with the hope that such conditions would deter them from future 
crime once they were released, policies designed to effect more permanent 
changes were introduced. Such are the policies that Foucault talks about 
when he writes of punishment designed to fit the individual but he fails to 
note that such policies called for a voluntary response, a response which 
could easily be dissembled. The image of the prisoners we get from 
Foucault is that of animals who are caught, tamed through certain routines 
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and then released back into the wild never realising that they have been 
tagged and their every movement is supervised. 
I will provide a brief summary of the criticisms of Foucault which flow 
from his development of the power/knowledge formula which compacts the 
new concepts together too hastily and is unable to bring the complexity of 
their relationship to light. The foremost defect is that this method denies 
pluralism and endorses extreme coherence at both the intellectual and social 
level with several disastrous results ensuing. 
1. Power is given too much emphasis as one particular configuration of 
ideas, a comprehensive and systematically linked set of ideas without a 
rival, is assumed to be paradigmatic of all ideational relationships and these 
come about ready-made. 
2. People are squeezed out of having any meaningful role in this 
account since they neither figure in having an input into these ready-made 
ideas and because the ideas are so tightly bound together there is scant 
scope for criticism. 
3. There is an extreme assumption of coherence which, coupled with the 
lack of pluralism means that there is little chance of divisiveness even 
among people who share the same interests. This ensures there is little room 
for debate so that we are given a temporally truncated account of how 
ideas develop. 
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4. The how of cultural domination, the mechanism by which this is 
achieved, can never seriously be addressed simply because its success is a 
forgone conclusion. This is because Foucualt assumes that there will not be 
a subordinate culture with which the socially marginalised could compare 
and contrast the ideas that were being offered to them in the prison and so 
accept or reject them on the basis of their past experiences. Thus the 
acceptance of ideas depends partly on evaluation by those who must 
endorse them and this evaluation will inevitably be interest-based. 
5. The structure of particular institutions and systems and their influence 
must be discounted since a realist notion of structure would foster the 
detection of pluralism at the social level. This would undercut the monism 
of the power/knowledge school and the unquestioned success of any one set 
of ideas. 
6. Since the success of the prison is a closed book, all the events which 
might seem to be failures are dismissed as we are reassured that the prison 
continues to fulfil its true function. Incidents that might seem to have 
brought about real change are disregarded but because of the complacency 
concerning cultural domination, we are never told what kind of event or 
circumstance might tell against such success. 
It is my conclusion that given such results, any further endorsement or 
adoption of the power/knowledge formula is untenable since it paints a 
picture of a surveillance society within which no-one can escape the 
scrutiny of the powerful; nor is there any realistic prospect of change since 
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it is unclear why such policies were ever adopted in the first place. In fact, 
the only possibility of change seems to reside in an even more efficient 
means of punishment being discovered, one that seems more benevolent but 
is more insidious than its predecessor. Not only does the power/knowledge 
formula distort actual history and present-day reality but fails to show how 
social theory should proceed by leading it into a morass of implausibilities. 
I will attempt to so by outlining how a method which will allow social 
theory to gain some purchase on the on the complexity of social life by 
indicating just what the influence of knowledge might be. If the aim is of 
understanding just what this influence might consist, knowledge itself must 
first be examined. By this I mean that the ideas which make up various 
programs, policies and agendas must be examined for their consistency or 
incompatibility with each other; this will determined how easily or how 
difficult it is to follow through on them. The influence that they exert will 
however never leave human agency with no option but to mutely enact these 
ideas according to the dictates of this influence for actors will always have 
the choice whether to do this or to incur a greater cost by disregarding this 
logic. What such a method will permit us to do is to estimate the relative 
contribution of both the conditions of action and the human action which is 
bounded by these conditions. I will now specify, in more detail, what this 
method is in the next chapter. 
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2. Ideas within penal history 
The history of prisons has usually been represented as a period of progre- 
ssive amelioration or more recently, the very reforms evidenced in the 
former account as a sign of progress, have been said to be a more subtle 
means of achieving the original goal for which the prisons were intended, 
control and emasculation of a criminal class. Both these accounts dismiss as 
unimportant the tensions which characterised the notion of punishment 
within the prisons from their inception. The first account sees the prisons as 
moving away from allegedly cruel practices commonly associated with ideas 
of deterrence, whereby the prisoner was treated as a means towards cowing 
potential criminals into non-committal of crimes, toward more lenient 
practices usually linked to greater emphasis upon reform. The second sees 
no inconsistency either between the idea of deterrence and reform viewing 
the latter as a more amenable method of controlling prisoners so that the 
former could be discounted. 
What needs to be captured in an account of the development of the 
prisons is how the various ideas related to punishment influenced the 
people who ran the prisons. Once we have discounted the notion that the 
implementation of any set of ideas or beliefs leads to power, we need some 
method which allows us to characterise adequately the influence of ideas. 
This must be done without undercutting human autonomy which the 
power/knowledge formula does, despite the dependence of knowledge upon 
social factors. Equally we must grant ideas a real presence by detailing how 
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they make some actions much more difficult than others because only then 
can we avoid the fallacious belief that social actors are free to do anything 
they like in the realm of ideas. 
2.1 Grasping the influence and effect of ideas 
I stated earlier that all action takes place in a prior framework; this is 
true of both action which might be classified as material, such as strike 
action, and intellectual, such as developing a novel doctrine. This assumption 
has two consequences: the first is that this framework will partially 
determine the courses of action available (one cannot strike in a feudal 
society) and that this framework has to be confronted regardless of the 
personal predispositions of the agents involved. I shall be making the case 
that the dilemma of how to treat prisoners was bifurcated between the 
options of reform and deterrence and no matter whether penal 
administrators' preference was for one or the other they had to confront the 
problem of dealing with both and this conditioned all their future actions. 
The term 'conditional influence' is crucial: 'conditional' means that the 
framework doesn't determine anything but merely sets a premium on certain 
types of action and so leaves a space for agency and freedom to discount 
the influence; 'influence' denotes how a structural or cultural framework 
works as opposed to human agency for whom power is a prerogative. 
Influence may be operative in the absence of any intention whatsoever as in 
the case of the weather affecting one's plans or the moroseness of a partner 
affecting your mood; intention is not involved here since the result is not 
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desired. Only if a result is intended can we speak of power being exercised 
and since intentionality is the prerogative of human agency only agents can 
exercise power. Thus the frameworks of human action shape but do not 
determine the course of human action. This is another reason why we must 
refute the notion that power and knowledge are always connected for, 
translated into a more sociological idiom, this means that the frameworks 
exert their influence regardless of the desires of the respective agents; now 
while this may hold true in specific contexts, for example where knowledge 
proves to be of universal benefit, we should not presume it to be 
universally valid. 
It would be another error to believe that agents are able to escape the 
conditioning of these frameworks especially when institutionalised roles and 
policies are involved, as in the case of prisons. Those who were running 
prisons from the outset had to confront the extremely diffuse and 
uncoordinated state that characterised the local prisons and had to take heed 
of the beliefs concerning of what punishment should consist. Furthermore 
each position brings with it a vested interest, though that which the interest 
represents should not be assumed to be always a felicitous situation, which 
agents would be either loath to give up or eager to transform, such as the 
prisoner campaigning for better treatment. That many prisoners might be 
unable to do so because of their lowly social position does not mean that 
the structured interest does not exist for then social conditions have proven 
to be more influential than structural conditions. 
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Interests always represent presumptive motives for acting, but 
actors may fail to recognise their interests, and even when they 
do recognise them, they may choose to act against them in 
favour of other considerations. However, since when actors fail to 
act in their interests they incur some cost, it is expected that 
actors generally will act in conformity with their interests. Even 
here, that does not necessarily mean that interests determine 
specific actions. Actors frequently respond to their structured 
interests in creative ways that in principle cannot be predicted in 
advance. I 
The attribution of vested interests and the opportunity costs that were 
incurred if these interests were not acted upon was one of the elements 
that was most evidently lacking in the Foucauldian account of the prisons. I 
said that this was partly due to the absence of a realist notion of structure 
which motivates people to defend or transform the positions associated with 
them; no mention was made of the truculence of the prison officers as they 
were discomfited by the increasing prominence given to policies of reform 
which made their task more difficult and which gave them little in return. 
Likewise the judiciary had a vested interest in defending the classical model 
of justice since it fitted in with their presumptions and their training and 
so they could not easily be shifted from defending this interest. This is not 
to say that individual judges could not act against their interests but that 
there were costs associated with doing so. 
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I have outlined how the frameworks of action can condition the activities 
of agents but the precise nature of this influence is still very vague. It 
seems to be left to the discretion of agents to decide how best to defend 
their interests; if this is so then we are left with an extremely indeterminate 
theory for it can tell us nothing about what course of action agents might 
take in a particular scenario. Is there anything that can be done to improve 
upon this situation? 
The frameworks of action must first be examined in a more precise 
fashion so we might ascertain if these frameworks are characterised by 
strain or compatibility (this is analogous to the distinction made by those of 
a functionalist hue about the parts of a system being integrated or not). 
Thus if we look at the foremost intellectual framework confronting prison 
administrators, the dilemma between reform and deterrence, we can 
characterise this as a state of malintegration since the two ideas of 
punishment do not fit easily together and are, in fact, incompatible. This 
strain between parts of a framework is experienced by agents, here penal 
administrators, as a frustration since their interest in running a smoothly 
function prison system is undermined by the presence of these incompatible 
notions and so to secure their interests they feel compelled to do something 
to resolve the dilemma that confronts them. More can be uncovered for as 
Archer says 
the mechanism by which the 'parts' causally influence the 
6people' can become a good deal sharper than the rudimentary 
notion of their shaping frustrating or rewarding situations in 
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relation to agents' vested interests. Instead it is possible to show 
how quite distinctive situational logics, which predispose agents 
towards specific courses of action for the promotion of their 
interests, are created by the relations within and between the 
various ['parts']. 2 
What is meant by the term situational logic is that depending on the 
'fit' between the parts of a framework, whether they are incompatible or 
not, will have an effect on the type of action that seems most propitious. 
Furthermore the situational logic will vary depending on whether the 
connection between the parts is one of contingency or necessity, i. e. is it 
possible to conceive of these parts existing apart from one another or not? 
Since the situational logic represents the conditional influence of these 
frameworks, actors are not obligated to follow the logic but may decide, for 
whatever reasons, to buck it. Not only will structural conditioning allow us 
to recognise who will act to defend the status quo or promote change but it 
will also indicate what kind of action they will undertake to achieve these 
ends. If Parts of a framework are necessarily linked but are incompatible 
then those seeking to defend this conception of punishment will either seek 
some kind of syncretic formula to efface the most blatant differences or else 
try to conceal that one element is being favoured at the expense of another. 
I will now outline how various ideas germane to penal theory can be so 
conceptualised. 
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2.2 Four cultural frameworks and their situational logics 
The method elaborated has been termed analytical dualism for though it 
admits that the conditions of action and agency itself are often bound 
together in social life the only way of estimating their respective influence 
upon consequences is to examine them separately. Thus the dualism that is 
being advocated is a methodological one; the frameworks do not reside in 
some reffied realm but only by extracting them from their immersion in 
action, hence an analytic method, can we establish their causal powers. 
One of the most important ideational frameworks which has already been 
adverted to is the tension between the two elements of punishment, reform 
and deterrence, both of which were deemed essential to punishment within 
the prisons and neither of which could be discarded even though this was 
manifestly a less troublesome option. I want to argue two points: (i) that it is 
impossible to disassociate reform and deterrence as ideas of punishment and 
(ii) that the two are incompatible. Doing this will permit me to argue that 
the connection between them is not simply a matter of some people being 
inclined to view punishment in a schismatic light but that the very notion 
of penal punishment is riven by this incompatibility. I stress that I am not 
trying to provide a justification for punishment but an explanation of its 
complexities as an idea and their implications. 
Punishment by a recognised authority takes place after a law has been 
transgressed and it serves to bring home to the offender and any potential 
audience the seriousness of his misdeed. This it does by carrying out a pre- 
formulated response to any such transgression which is intended to act as a 
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deterrent and an apposite rejoinder to the act of law-breaking. A deterrent is 
only effective if the offender and potential criminals believe it will be used 
so that the offender is compelled to undergo suffering to retain the 
effectiveness of the deterrent and prevent future crimes. Punishment is 
always a reminder not to transgress again but it is not only this. It also 
involves an effort to communicate to the offender the seriousness of his 
transgression and why it is wrong; hence there is little point in deceiving 
the public through a sham punishment, as Bentham would have wished, 
hoping to retain the deterrent effect yet to minimise the sum total of pain 
involved. If we hit a dog with a newspaper after he has fouled the carpet 
we do not expect him to understand why his action is forbidden and 
deserves punishment nor do we search for a penalty which reflects his 
degree of culpability. Such notions are inappropriate and punishment is 
driven by a purely pragmatic concern- what actions will ensure that his 
action will not be repeated. 
However, humans are not animals since they have the capacity to offer 
reasons for their actions which are very often the causes of these same 
actions. The state of mind of the offender is crucial: did he knowingly 
cause a prohibited harm with full awareness of the consequences? 
Punishment is, then, a reflection of the degree of culpability of the offender 
and this necessitates an analysis of his mental state at the time of the 
offence. As they have this capacity to reflect, punishment cannot be 
considered solely for its deterrent purposes though it may be interpreted as 
solely comprised of this, especially by its recipients; it must also be 
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understood as an effort to convince the offender of the wrongfulness of his 
deed. This is what we call the reformatory function of punishment and it is 
done by reasoning with the individual or situating them so that they 
consider theirpast actions in the hope that they will renounce and denounce 
their past offences. Forsythe calls this the 'reclamation of the individual' 
through which 
faulty parts of the attitude of the individual prisoner towards 
himself, towards others and towards the wider society may be 
changed at more than a mere calculative level. Fundamental and 
permanent alteration may consequently be achieved in those aspects 
of behaviour which are criminal or seen as crime-linked, and a 
reunion with law-obedient society can be brought about. 3 
This entails that punishment is not similar to the way we treat brute 
animals, for we do not delve into their state of mind when they do 
something that is forbidden nor do we even consider that they could reflect 
upon their actions and be remorseful about them. As we are dealing with 
reflective beings when we punish people, punishment is meant to provoke 
them into such reflection on their acts; but neither is it completely 
dissimilar to the way we treat animals; in Von Hirsch's phrase 'an angel 
would require no appeals to prudence, and a brute could not be appealed to 
4 through censure' . This 
idea of man being divided between his rational and 
sensual elements has an ancient lineage and is implicit in many ideas of 
punishment: we are, as human beings, susceptible to both counsels of 
prudence and wisdom, we can recognise that we should not repeat action 
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both from motives of self-interest and morality. Since a person is neither 
angel nor beast, punishment, as a human institution, must try to cover both 
these aspects; it can neither be just an appeal to her conscience nor an 
solely an effort to cow her into submission. This is what makes punishment 
so unstable, as it tries to straddle both the gulf between both reform and 
deterrence and frequently slips between the two. 
Deterrence is vested in suffering bringing home to the offender and 
potential law-breakers the seriousness of his deed and gives them an 
incentive not to offend again; reform is attempted whilst suffering is being 
undergone and the offender's state of deprivation is meant to provoke him 
into reflection upon his act. If there were no suffering then it is difficult to 
see how there could be any talk of punishment so that reform is always 
balanced by deterrence. The idea of punishment is caught between these two 
notions: the infliction of suffering to provide a deterrent and to help the 
offender realise why his deed was wrong. But does not the deterrent 
function squeeze out reform by assuming its function- to convey a message 
to the offender- and by obstructing its implementation? 
Reform is a fundamentally a form of persuasion as it seeks to convince 
its recipient through moral reasoning to alter his beliefs and actions; 
persuasion can assume many guises with some bordering on coercion so 
that deterrence could be classified as a form of persuasion. The difference 
then, between reform and deterrence, is not that the former tries to induce 
reflection and the latter does not, for it does albeit of a calculating, self- 
interested kind: what must I do to avoid the repetition of such 
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unpleasantness to me. Rather the former strives to provide either an 
opportunity for the offender to reflect on why his deeds are wrong or 
seeks to offer such moral reasons to him. Deterrence is unconcerned whether 
the offender has understood why his act was wrong - hence its affinity with 
how we treat animals- but imprints the consequences of re-offending upon 
the people's minds so that they will refrain from offending out of fear. 
Reform is always in danger of being squeezed out by deterrence as 
unpleasant consequences are essential to the idea of punishment; the 
difficulty is finding a space within this unpleasantness where there is an 
opportunity for persuasion; not to do so is to admit that humans are being 
treated as brute animals. 
This was very much what happened when prison conditions began to be 
transformed in the late 18 th century. The so-called reformers wished to 
improve prison conditions because they believed that the external conditions 
within the prison would be replicated within the internal states of the 
prisoners' minds so filth outside would produce a degradation in the 
prisoner's conscience; they believed that if reform was to have any chance 
of success, if the conscience of the prisoner was to be awakened, he would 
first have to reside in orderly conditions so that a reconstruction of the 
prisons would have to ensue. As the material conditions inside the prison 
began to become more ordered and hygienic, the difference between what 
prevailed inside and the conditions in the world outside the prison walls 
became more apparent: ininates were enjoying better living conditions than 
those who had not committed any offence. If nothing was done prison 
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would lose its meaning as a place of punishment, as conditions inside had 
to be more unpleasant and exacting than those that obtained outside for the 
worst-off in society - the doctrine of 'less eligibility' - otherwise prisoners 
were not suffering any deprivation since there were no unpleasant 
consequences in being sent to a prison. Reformers could maintain the 
doctrine of 'less eligibility' in two ways: the first was by doing nothing, 
letting the squalor fester and leaving conditions as they were before; the 
second was that they could devise some new way of making the prison a 
place of suffering: 'the justices and gaolers exercised their ingenuity in 
5 developing completely useless tasks merely to "torment" the prisoners'. The 
word 'torment' is Bentham's; it indicates how a utilitarian logic blinded him 
to the conflicting elements of punishment; what looks like a senseless 
infliction of pain to the utilitarian becomes comprehensible when the 
necessity of balancing reform and deterrence is borne in mind. 
Once the prison reformers had taken it upon themselves to cleanse the 
prisons 'punitive labour was the inevitable concomitant of improving prison 
conditions'; 6 inevitable because the reformers had to find some way of 
making conditions within the prison more onerous if the prison was to 
remain a place of punishment; if they had done nothing to counter-balance 
the improvement in material conditions punishment would have lost its 
meaning as essentially involving suffering and/or deprivation. 
Yet this introduction of elements of deterrence had precisely the 
consequences that were predicted above, namely that they would tend to 
exclude traces of reform. De Lacy writes that there was a 'fundamental 
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conflict between the attempt to provide particularly odious labour for felons 
and a desire to encourage reformation. By making work itself a punishment, 
hard labour was unlikely to establish a positive attitude among imnates'. 7 
Yet why is there this alleged 'fundamental conflict' between reform and 
deterrence? The assumption that deterrence and reform are indeed 
incompatible is accepted by many, especially historians- Thomas calls them 
'two mutually exclusive tasks'8- but is seldom examined. What might be the 
basis of this assumption? 
Sometimes it seems to be that deterrence is supposed to operate with an 
utter disregard for the individual offender on which it is working but this 
is only true of general deterrence. Here 'the offender is used as a means to 
achieving a diffused social goal and [there are] no assumptions about the 
effect of the punishment on or its significance for her'. 9 The key phrase is 
'used as a means' since this indicates that the welfare of the individual 
offender may be completely sacrificed to achieve the end of a reduction in 
punishment and little concern is evinced for the effect of punishment upon 
the individual offender. This is the basis of fears of disproportionate 
punishment being wreaked upon the offender if it helped to decrease the 
level of crime (this is to say nothing about fears of the punishment of the 
innocent). 
Can the same fears be raised about individual deterrence and how is it 
distinguished from general deterrence? As the term indicates, the distinction 
resides in the fact that the former is primarily concerned to have an effect 
upon the individual offender but there are no inherent limits or constraints 
71 
on what form punishment might take nor how much of it there might be. 
Perhaps the only limit is that of having to keep the offender alive, for if 
punishment was so severe that it resulted in her death then she would be 
beyond deterrence. The common objection that could be lodged against both 
forms of deterrence is that they are 'overextensive to the extent of 
justifying ill-treatment by the state wherever this would result in a 
maximisation of utility'. ' 0 While it isnot true that policies of deterrence tout 
court operate with a complete lack of regard for their effects upon the 
individual offender since punishment may be adjusted or adapted for 
individual offenders to obtain a 'maximisation of utility', it is the case that 
they treat the individual offender as a means to achieve a desired goal. The 
attainment of this goal does not recognise any obstacles in treating the 
offender this way. Are policies of reform any different? 
Before embarking on this question, it is necessary to distinguish clearly 
two concepts that are often run together. Reform and rehabilitation are often 
treated as synonymous but they should be distinguished. It was only with 
the advent of criminological doctrines into the criminal justice system that 
the notion of 'rehabilitation' began to gain currency; prior to that, the 
dominant motif had been that of reform. It is clear that the increasing 
prominence of 'rehabilitation' was connected to the discoveries of 
criminology and its discrediting of the classical notion of the free will of 
the offender. Reform had been reliant upon this latter notion so that 
punishment was reformatory if it tried to incite the conscience of the offender 
into acknowledging her offence as an effor, which she had committed out of 
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choice, so she could recognise it as such and renounce it. Criminology 
presented the offender as in some way the victim of circumstance, whether 
it be hereditary or psychological or environmental, so that it could not 
simply be left to the offender's free will to renounce her past deeds, since 
the offender's free will was not fully responsible for the occurrence of the 
offence in the first place. Rehabilitation seeks to adjust the circumstances 
which are adjudged to be beyond the control of the offender but were 
partly responsible (causally) for the offence so that the offender would find 
it easier not to re-offend. Since these circumstances vary according to the each 
offender, rehabilitation points toward individualised treatment for the offender. As 
reform is based upon the principle that free will, which every offender possesses, 
is the root cause of every crime, it will offer the same facilities for reform to all 
offenders. 
Rehabilitation sidesteps what is a dilemma for reform, namely knowing if an 
apparent change in behaviour meant a genuine change of heart. Rehabilitation is 
not so concerned with moral conversions but changing the causal circumstances in 
which the offender had found himself. The offender may not have decided that 
morally it is better to live according to the law, but that the force of 
circumstances, which led him to commit an offence, are no longer operative . 
Reform attempts to better a person's character so that she will be less 
likely to re-offend. It offers an offender the opportunity and context within a 
penal establishment to change his behaviour to that of a law-abiding 
person, through freely-reached convictions. The greatest difference between 
the two notions is that rehabilitation tries to modify circumstances beyond 
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the purview of the offender's will whereas reform tries to convince the 
offender that his or her breach of the law was wrong; the vehicle through 
which this effort of persuasion is attempted is punishment. One of the 
consequences of the difference between them is that 'reform is to be 
effected through punishment, whereas rehabilitation entails that reform 
accompanies punishment'. 11 1 argued that there was a logical connection 
between reform and punishment but this is not the case with rehabilitation, 
so there is no need for it to be connected with unpleasant treatment and 
may be completely detached from it. According to rehabilitative criteria, 
treatment is only justified to the extent that it modifies the behaviour of 
the offender and so may veer between 'hard' and 'soft' options. 
The above quotation indicates why it is so necessary to discriminate 
between reform and rehabilitation for the latter notion is far less at odds 
with deterrence than reform could ever be. The great problem that policies 
of reform always encountered was being simultaneously implemented with 
policies of deterrence which ensured that neither of them were observed 
satisfactorily; since rehabilitation can accompany punishment it is clear that 
it can also be distinguished from it. Thus there is not such an onus upon 
penal administrators to ensure punishment be dovetailed to meet 
reformatory and deterrent criteria as punishment can be composed mainly of 
the latter, doling out unpleasant treatment and rehabilitative policies can be 
invoked afterwards; this is not to say that this solution is stable- since 
rehabilitation slides between hard and soft options- or will satisfy those who 
wish to see more exclusively deterrent policies. 
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Rehabilitation eventually evoked a set of objections relating to the 
paternalistic and (potentially) arbitrary tyrannical position that it granted penal 
administrators vis-A-vis the prisoners under their charge. It seemed to licence 
many extreme forms of treatment such as electric shock therapy without 
any firm basis for a guarantee of success. It was not that rehabilitation was 
intrinsically threatening to the welfare of prisoners but that its basis for 
treatment was 'dangerously general and manipulable'. 12 Many different forms 
of treatment could be justified and implemented, ranging from group 
counselling to extreme measures such as the above. All this was backed up 
by various criminological doctrines which purported to explain criminal 
behaviour and offer treatment which would help to instil in offenders a 
certain standard of behaviour. Rehabilitation, depending on the circumstances, 
may assume the form either of what would normally be thought as policies 
of deterrence through the infliction of unpleasant consequences even though 
it may be justified along the paternalistic lines of 'to be cruel is to be 
kind'; or it may seem to embody the ultimate in seemingly soft treatment 
such as giving the offender a job. Even though rehabilitation may conflict 
with deterrence, this is not a matter of necessity; at times, they may be in 
harmony. 
By distinguishing rehabilitation from reform, we have learnt a little more 
about the latter notion but have we gleaned any hints as to why it might 
be considered inconsistent with policies of deterrence? We understand that 
reform is characterised by efforts to persuade the offender that it is morally 
worthy to observe the law. Since this must be a freely-willed response, 
75 
otherwise there would be no point in offering reasons for consideration, 
coercion is ruled out. The inevitability of coercion was what especially 
characterised deterrence and also entailed the lack of any limits to this 
coercion (what was called its over-extensiveness). Reform, unlike 
rehabilitation, is limited by the responsiveness of the recipient of 
punishment. Though reform may not be successful in driving down the 
crime rate, it is impossible to force the offender into accepting that he or 
she should not break the law again and still maintain that this is reform. 
This is where the incompatibility between reform and deterrence lies: not 
that the former treats the offender as an end-in-herself and the latter a 
means to achieve a socially-desired goal; reformatory policies could equally 
well be used in this manner if it was decided that they were the most 
apposite means to reduce crime. It is rather that the success of policies of 
deterrence are not dependent upon the offender in the same way that 
reformatory policies are. It is important to be careful about what is at issue 
here: the difference is often presumed to be that deterrence bypasses the 
consideration of the individual offender completely whilst reform consults 
the offender at every turn. However, this is not the case as we saw that 
individual deterrence cannot disregard the opinions and assessment of the 
offender completely; its success does depend on the offender considering the 
harms of punishment to outweigh any benefits of crime. Reform seeks a 
different route toward non-recidivism, through persuasion, which is a 
relationship which is difficult to classify as an exercise of power 13 since 
the person who is the focus of persuasion is free to reject any arguments 
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that are offered. If there is any effort to force the person concerned to 
accept the arguments, this spells a departure from the realm of freedom and 
onto the path towards force and compulsion. 
Thus reform relies upon voluntary acceptance for its success, free from 
any hint of compulsion, whereas deterrence is based upon the attempt 'to 
establish in the mind of the power subject the future credibility of the 
power holder's willingness and capability to use force'. 14 Since any response 
is given in the light of this threat, it cannot be considered as voluntary but 
rather as non-voluntary since factors beyond the control of the individual 
directly influence his decision, which has always been at the heart of the 
incompatibility between reform and deterrence. As Wrong has recognised, 
'there is an inherent incongruence in combining persuasive and moral 
appeals with the implicit threat, let alone the actual use, of force, which 
15 tends to neutralise the effectiveness of the former' . Wrong supposes that 
this incongruence arises from the fact the 'persuasive power tends to be the 
least alienating ... [and] the application of force is the most alienating'. 
16 
What Etzioni calls alienation, which we might term 'disaffection from a 
regime', arises because the wishes of the individual are overridden and he 
is given no possibility of participating in the respective regime. Thus the 
basic incompatibility springs from the fact that deterrence imposes a non- 
voluntary choice (I hope this does not seem too oxymoronic) and that 
reform relies upon the individual to make a genuine choice, having 
presented the best arguments to him. If the incompatibility between the two lies 
in the level of coercion applied, it follows that general deterrence will be in even 
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greater opposition toward reform since it can operate with complete disregard for 
the individual and indulge in greater punitiveness toward offenders. Thus 
deterrence per se is incompatible with reform because it necessarily implies 
coercion which excludes the possibility of reform. 
This is what I will label a necessary incompatibility, necessary because 
the two are always elaborated with reference to each other, since the concept 
of punishment includes both, and incompatible because the implementation 
of one obstructs the observance of the other. Each element acts as a check on 
the possible extensiveness of the other so that it is impossible, for instance, to 
institute a policy of deterrence throughout the prison without it running up 
against reform. Furthermore since they are linked together, i. e. prison administ- 
rators have to confront this issue regardless of their own personal 
convictions, it does not require a group distinct from the prison 
administration for this issue to be confronted. This is not to say that such 
groups may not intervene, as they may be unhappy with the emphasis 
accorded to one or other of these ideas, but the necessary connection 
between the two ideas introduces a problem which cannot be ignored by 
those involved in the running of the prisons. 
The influence of such a connected incompatibility will be such that the 
option of erasing the differences between the two ideas by offering a novel 
re-interpretation of each would seem the least problematical so that the 
situational logic could be said to be one of compromise. Of course, since 
such an influence is conditional, people are by no means bound to choose 
this option. They may well choose to adapt one idea to what is demanded 
78 
by another, so in this case by either accommodating reform to the demands 
of deterrence or vice-versa. Whether people are satisfied with such a 
resolution of the problem is a question only to be decided by empirical 
study, but it will chiefly be determined by whether the contradiction has been 
resolved. Rehabilitation might seem like a perfect compromise candidate since it 
can veer between 'hard' and 'soft' treatment but because this is so unstable, it may 
leave everyone unhappy. If the re-interpreted idea of reform still obstructs the 
operation of deterrence, then this effort at incorporation has proved unstable, 
and so the agents involved may choose to bring a novel interpretation of 
reform to the fore, or abandon the emphasis upon deterrence and seek to 
tailor this idea to the contours of reform or it may be thought that the 
only way to proceed is to amalgamate the two ideas by stripping each of 
their most obviously incompatible elements. 
None of these shelters from the storm are impervious to the weather, but 
the question posed is why periods of quiet lasted for the time they did and 
why such relative peace abated. Just because we are looking at the 
evolution of ideas, this does not mean that all change can be attributed to 
intellectual disquiet alone. Even though the min is seeping in, it may be 
resolutely ignored or someone may seek to plug the leak. People are not so 
intellectually fastidious that at the first sign of trouble they abandon 
previously held convictions. People shift positions and replace beliefs because 
they are no longer suitable to the task at hand and the imperative to come 
up with more adequate answers has become more pressing. After the prison 
authorities had decided to operate a more deterrent regime, problems arose 
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as to the place of reform (ill-treatment of prisoners) within the prison 
service. Yet some were content to come up with ad hoc solutions, until they 
were compelled to deal with the problem in a more comprehensive way. So, 
the exercise of power is an important variable in explanations of cultural 
development, but this is not to say that the development of knowledge can 
be related to power alone. The chief concern of this work is with how the 
combined effect of two inconsistent ideas has a causal influence upon how 
agents act. I have made it clear that though the situational logic may incline 
those involved into declaring a truce and working toward a lasting peace, 
some may prefer to remain closely allied to one idea or another and seek 
to subdue its opposite. The interesting question is how people buck the 
trend, how they maintain a degree of social order despite the fact that they 
are presiding over implacably opposed elements. 
Since I am dealing with a relatively recent historical period any notions 
of primitive mentality have to be jettisoned or else it has to be admitted 
that people from hugely variant cultures have a similar degree of 
contradiction-tolerance, so dissolving the comparative element within the 
notion of a primitive mentality. People may be unaware of the implications 
of the ideas with which they are working, which does nothing to lessen the 
actual incompatibility involved and only gradually does it become clear to 
them. This will be seen to be the case in the period following the 
construction of the first national penitentiary as it became clearer what 
reform actually entailed, namely a concern for the individual and a care not 
to injure permanently his faculties. When national penitentiaries were first 
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established, those in charge of running them were aware of the problems of 
reconciling deterrence and reform but seemed to hope that these could be 
ironed out in the daily administration of the first prison. This failure to 
attend to the problem at the intellectual level meant the incompatibility 
between ideas manifested itself as continual strain and divisiveness between 
different departments, each trying to carry out one portion of what 
constituted penal punishment and practical hypocrisy on the part of staff as 
they tried to exhibit two different demeanours whilst on the job. This is 
how incompatibility between parts can manifest itself at the social level, 
frustrating the activities of agents and presenting them with irreconcilable 
diktats through informing the roles they fill. 
Though some people may be aware of the contradiction this does not 
ensure that all interested parties are; even if people are aware of an 
inconsistency unless it actually impinges upon their perceived interests they 
may well treat it as peripheral to their concerns. What must first be assessed 
is the social relevance of the issue at hand, for it is only if people believe 
their positions are being subject to antagonistic scrutiny will they bother 
making an effort to conceal the inherent inconsistencies. Then it is the 
extent of the resources which a group can devote to covering up the 
inconsistency that will indicate how successful they will be in 'maintaining 
their subterfuge, initially at least; this is not to assume that those who 
possess a greater degree of power will always prevail for the more 
successful the exercise of power is in the short-term, this results in inciting 
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an even more intense desire to escape from its yoke on the part of those 
who are subj ect to it. 
Thus, in the second period which I shall be investigating, 1865-95, the 
characterisation of it as a dark age of repression and deterrence during 
which an extremely powerful prison executive was able to impose a severe 
regime upon prison inmates through a policy of exclusion and repression 
fails to note how this works against the prison administrators in the long- 
run. While cultural stability in the social sphere can be attributed to the use 
of power for some length of time, such orderliness cannot be guaranteed by 
the use of power forever. Indeed in the long run the machinations of power 
will probably work against those who have set their shoulders against the 
situational logic, precisely because they have bent their efforts in order to 
give undue weight to one of the two ideas involved. For instance, those on 
the receiving end looked to escape the rigours of the deterrent regime and 
so sought intellectual justification for their claims to special status such as 
the Irish political prisoners who claimed that they should not be treated as 
common criminals, so contributing to cultural elaboration. 
I have so far only mentioned one possible logical relationship among 
ideas, that of a necessary incompatibility. Whilst the effects of this will be 
my main focus of concern, there are other important ideational relationships 
which should not be neglected. An obvious question to be asked is how, if 
punishment within prisons was such an internally divisive project, did it 
ever get off the ground? Did even those who agreed on the need for penal 
punishment agree on a single method to achieve this end or did they have 
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differing opinions? Those ideas which are logically opposed to one another 
but are in no way connected with each other I will term a competitive 
contradiction. The competitive contradiction differs from the necessary 
incompatibility as it needs to be activated by social actors since it is a 
scenario where theopposite of some idea is in no way implicated by it. 
I will show that those who were most zealously promoting the case of 
reform favoured a means of punishment known as the separate system, 
entailing isolation, which was incompatible with the silent system, admitting 
association. Here we have a different kind of situational logic at work: no 
longer is it advantageous to bury the hatchet with one's opponents, rather it 
is better to attack him with it. Alliances are out, assaults are in so that the 
logic is one of elimination. One no longer seeks to discard what is most 
distinctive about one's own idea, indeed these are virtues to be trumpeted 
and laudably compared to the opposing idea's supposed deficiencies. Each 
side will latch onto the other's theoretical weaknesses and declare this to be 
a sign of its obsolescence, which in turn only encourages the other to 
instigate running repairs and emerge once more into the fray. It may well 
be that like two fighters who began circling each other warily, making a 
thrust here, a feint there, end up tangling in the dust to such an extent that 
they are virtually indistinguishable to onlookers, no longer knowing for 
whom they should cheer. Distinctions become so refined and abstruse so that 
the uninitiated cannot see what all the fuss is about. Unless all the relevant 
populace is divided into two strictly partisan groups, many of the 
uncommitted may opt to split the difference and come up with a working 
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approximation to both, simply because the flaws and virtues of both have 
been broadcast so extensively that it is difficult to align oneself with one 
system. 
Again it is a matter of investigating which group is in the more 
powerful position to see how it all pans out. This is not to treat the 
theoretical debates to the role of shadow-boxing, incidental to the hurly-burly 
of social life since the advocates of the separate system, though able to pull 
the levers of the political machinery and so impose their will on those 
gaolers less enthusiastic than them, still had to take account of criticism 
with the result being that the separate system was very rarely installed in an 
unadulterated form. The above does nothing to answer the question as to 
how, if the penal debate was wracked by such divisions, did it ever got off 
the ground; from where did it draw support? It is time to consider another 
set of logical relationships, those of complementarity and see whether idea 
of punishment benefited from any of these. The first notion of 
complementarity which I will examine is where two complementary ideas 
can be said to be necessarily connected orthey can be brought together by 
people sensing some potential benefits from such a union. 
This I will term a necessary complementarity: those who were promoting 
the cause of penal institutions drew ideological support from the idea that 
for legal punishment to be legitimate, its exercise must be uniform 
throughout the land and the only agency which could decide upon a such a 
uniform punishment was the state legislature. Punishment is not necessarily 
connected with justice but since we are talking about legal punishment, this 
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means that its adjudication and application must be without favour or 
disparity. Therefore the local prisons had to fall into line with what central 
government decreed since only its mode of punishment could be labelled 
just. Once this connection had been accepted, further implications were 
discovered: greater economy and efficiency would occur once there was 
uniformity in the practice of punishment. Thus the situational logic induces 
one to establish further linkages between the ideas since their combination 
seems so promising, initially at least. The logic of this particular relationship 
of ideas may be said to be one of fortification as the relationship is built 
up which is simultaneously a way of warding off disruptive innovations. 
The two ideas become linked together in a process of increasing 
complexity as more and more implications come to light, and brought 
within the purview of the original complementarity. The end result is a 
settled system of knowledge and beliefs as the once rich seam of 
compatible items has been extensively mined and such density precludes the 
addition of any significant new items as this would upset the carefully 
constructed edifice of ideas. As Kuhn notes the paradigm 'suppresses 
fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its basic 
committments'. 17 Innovations, once a source of delight now become a locus 
of disquiet. Very often, the results of the complementarity will be presented 
as the natural order of things and alternative ideas spurned as aberrations. 
The implications of criminology were originally castigated as such, 
unacceptable to all right-thinking people. 
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Criminology represents the last kind of logical relationship which I will 
address: it is one whereby two ideas, whose mutual 'fit' is not immediately 
apparent but can be conjoined without contradiction, are brought into 
connection because some agents are dissatisfied with the prevailing state of 
affairs as it brings little benefit; this relationship between ideas I will label 
a contingent complernentarity. An analogy could be drawn with Kuhn's 
picture of normal science which ushers in few novel developments but can 
only offer solutions to problems of a mundane nature, all the time ignoring 
the anomalies it cannot solve and spurning the opportunities which would 
disrupt certain benefits for the sake of unknown advantages. 
Eventually, some build on what has gone before but strike off in a new 
direction unhindered by any attachment to the old order and usually 
threatening (not always intentionally) to pull down some of the theoretical 
pillars which had buttressed it. An example of this would be the 
development of criminology which was thought to secure a greater 
knowledge of criminal behaviour by outlining environmental and genetic 
factors which contributed to crime, and so punishment allied to the expertise 
of criminology could be made more precise and efficient. 
The logic of drawing previously unconnected elements together is that as 
not all are working on such a project, it will be restricted to a few as the 
connection becomes increasingly complex. People will hive off into small 
groups fascinated by what can be gleaned from such novel associations. 
What is important to note is the effect of such specialisation upon the 
overall context in which people are working. Similarly, the specialisation 
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which criminology introduced called into question many of the previously 
held connections between punishment and justice, such as the assumption of 
full responsibility for one's crime, equal sentences for the same crime. Since 
the prevailing logic was one of tightly-bound systernatisation, introducing a 
degree of specialisation was bound to have disturbing repercussions. But 
ideational diversification does not automatically entail social conflict, 
especially since the ideas in question are not antithetical, but it does increase 
the problems of maintaining a previously-dominant consensus. 
The development of knowledge connected with the contingent 
complementarities will be rapid at first, as there is apparently boundless 
territory to explore, some of which in hindsight will prove unsuitable for 
habitation, i. e. an idea that was endorsed may be discarded as a more 
careful scan reveals its deficiencies. The situational logic is one of 
opportunity as each research group sets out into uncharted territory to prove 
the validity of their own findings What may not be apparent to the first 
pioneers is how many of the assumptions which are predicated upon a 
contingent complementarity are incompatible; that in seeking to prove their 
own assumptions others have been ruled out. This will not be anathema to 
variety but will be a blessing to it since absolute refutations will be hard to 
come by. Thus what will usually be the normal situation for the contingent 
complementarity will a proliferation of competing explanations some of 
which will be confronting and complementing each other. 
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Figure 2 
Cultural Framework Situational Logic 
Necessary Incompatibility -------------------------- Compromise 
Competitive Contradiction -------------------------- Elimination 
Necessary Complementarity -------------------------- Fortification 
Contingent Complementarity -------------------------- Opportunity 
[Adapted from Archer, 1995, Fig. 13, p. 218] 
There is little point in developing the abstractions unless it can be an 
aid in actual research and can be shown to be such a boon. To this end, 
armed with the above framework, I will investigate penal developments in 
England and Wales from the establishment of the first state penitentiary to 
demonstrate that analytical dualism can illuminate historical events and 
include what had to be passed over by the power/ knowledge school. In so 
doing I will fill out the ideas sketched above. I will trace the fate of the 
idea of punishment, straddled as it was between reform and deterrence, and 
the dilemmas that were posed by its being composed of two incompatible 
elements and the different strategies that were developed to cope with the 
influence of a necessary contradiction. I have chosen a wide time-frame 
within which to conduct my investigation, from the 1820s to the 1920s. 
This time span will allow me to demonstrate that the problem of reform 
and deterrence has been with British penal authorities since the inception of 
the first prison and not simply after the findings of the Gladstone 
committee. Many have believed this as a result of the second period when 
deterrence was accentuated but this ignores the tactics undertaken to conceal 
the omission of deterrence. The necessary incompatibility between reform and 
deterrence is the keystone of this study and its absence from much of the 
Foucauldian school explains why their thesis has gained such influence. To 
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refute it, I have had to show it has always been a concern for penal 
authorities and that the two ideas should never be considered in isolation. 
I will also make reference to the other cultural frameworks showing how 
they impacted upon penal problems as it would be rare that only one 
framework was active in its influence. I will try to show how the 
development of criminology affected the balance between deterrence and 
reform and how the tension between it and classical justice were resolved. If 
I can convince my readers that the power/ knowledge approach is 
inapplicable in the areawhere its benefits have been most vaunted then this 
will go a long way to demonstrating that the clasping together of power 
and knowledge represents a blind alley for social theory and that those 
seeking an explanation for the development of prisons and the alternatives 
to it should look elsewhere rather than seeking clues in the 
power/knowledge approach. 
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3. The Expansion of Reform 
In this chapter I will trace the development of both the ideas of 
punishment and their reception and effects within the newly established 
prisons. I will show how the uncertainty that surrounded this new venture 
contributed to the belief that both reform and deterrence could be fully 
observed without amendment of either but this effort resulted in obstacles to 
the administration of prisons and practical frustrations for staff. After this 
was realised there was a shift of emphasis towards reform as more elaborate 
procedures were adopted to coax, not coerce, a change of disposition, from 
criminal to law-abiding. 
Even though there was agreement that prominence should be lent to 
reformatory efforts, this did not entail unanimity on the best means to 
achieve this end. I will show how there was an extremely virulent debate 
over the model necessary for prison reform and this dispels any assumption 
about monism at the level of ideas so undercutting the power/knowledge 
approach. As people developed ideas to advance their own beliefs this only 
instigated efforts by others to come up with alternatives to refute the option 
they opposed. I said earlier that the scenario of knowledge that best fitted 
with the assumptions of the power/knowledge approach was when two ideas 
mutually invoke each other creating a linkage that no-one is able to deny. 
Such a scenario existed between the ideas of punishment and justice which 
proved to be a powerful weapon for those who argued for uniformity of 
punishment throughout all prisons as they could argue that it was of the 
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very nature of punishment that it should be applied without variation to all 
within the relevant boundaries. Even here there is no automatic connection 
between the ideational scenario and the bestowal of power, as I will show. 
Finally in this chapter I will examine how the emphasis upon reform was 
tilted back in favour of deterrence and suggest why reform held sway for 
the time it did. 
3.1 The establishment of government penal institutions 
On what basis did punishment rest in the 18th century? There was little 
of the intermediate punishments that were to proliferate in the following 
century. For the serious crimes there was usually the choice between death 
by execution and transportation to one of the colonies. Prisons were usually 
reserved for debtors, minor offenders and those who were either awaiting 
trial, execution or transportation. It has been estimated that by the late 1760s 
nearly 70% of all sentences at the Old Bailey were terms of transportation 
and the majority of these were consigned to the American colonies! How 
then did the government react to the crisis in penal arrangements 
precipitated by the American revolution which foreclosed the chief receptacle 
for offenders? 
The first response was one of procrastination as the authorities 
temporised by placing the prisoners either in the hulks or else transferring 
them to the local gaols. This may have been because they expected normal 
service to be resumed as soon as the colonies were defeated but when this 
failed to occur, the dilemma over what should be done with the convicts 
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remained. The jails were filling up and even though more severe punishments 
were being put in place, their effectiveness was in doubt. A colony was 
again sought that could take Britain's criminals and Australia was selected. 
Interestingly though some were glad of the relief that it offered, others were 
beginning to establish the links between punishment and justice, which 
would call into question the equity of a punishment like transportation that 
inflicted uncertain and unseen punishments. 
The American revolution negated the prior set of arrangements which 
were relatively beneficial to the government since they were a cheap way of 
disposing of the criminals. It is no surprise that there was a delay in 
selecting another means to dispose of offenders while the possibility 
remained that transportation to America could resume. Whilst the 
government was trying to maintain social order many, inspired by Howard's 
tract The State of the Prisons, began to scrutinise the workings of the prison 
more closely. Most of these came from a deeply religious background and 
were discomfited by the lack of opportunity given to the prisoner so that he 
might repent of his sins. They believed that all men were sinners and that 
God's grace extended to the lowliest. There was another school of thought 
which, though coming at the problem from a different angle, came to some 
of the same conclusions. This was the rationalist philosophy, represented by 
Bentham, which stressed that people had committed crime as the result of 
misguided calculations about pleasure and argued that they could be trained 
to reason correctly, the result being that he would commit crime no more. 
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The religious school of thought was more numerous than the rationalist 
and they introduced the very Protestant notion of conscience into talk of 
reclaiming the prisoner: how could his conscience be awakened so that he 
would recognise the rectitude of social laws and the legitimacy of 
punishment? The breakthrough made by these reformers was not that they 
were the 'first to see that punishment could only arouse guilt if it did not 
alienate the offender or the public. But they were the first to argue that 
criminals actually had a capacity for remorse, which could be awakened by 
carefully legitimated and scientifically inflicted pain'. 2 Only if the prisons 
were purged of abusive conditions and unjustified punishments could the 
conscience of the criminal be stirred. 
The spectacle of wrongdoers being executed for ever more modest 
infractions, as the government sought to maintain social order as a 
recession set in after the American market was closed to British producers, 
convinced the reformers of the inequity and hence the inefficiency of the 
present state of punishments. The return of transportation did nothing to 
allay their concerns and in fact they were worried that prisoners might lose 
their chance of reform. Thanks to the reforms drawing attention of the need 
for systematic connections between punishment and justice, others now began 
to question the equity of transportation since it seemed to be something of 
a lottery whetherpeople would suffer or prosper during their sentence. 
Though transportation had resumed the reformershad made their influence 
feltthrough the introduction of a bill in 1778 which encompassed a regime 
of solitary imprisonment, accompanied by 'well-regulated labour, and religious 
93 
instruction .... [which] might be the Means, under Providence, not only of 
deterring others from the Commission of .. Crimes but also of Reforming 
the Individuals and inuring them to the habits of Industry'. 3 The hope that 
two such distinct ideals could be reconciled was never tested under the 
auspices of this bill, enacted as the Penitentiary Act. Funds were 
unforthcoming as transportation to the colonies was thought to be the less 
expensive option, the hulks being used as a preliminary to this. There were 
also constitutional objections to the government becoming involved in 
county matters, objections which the justices had raised at Westminister. 
Though it was 1810 before the possibility of a penitentiary was mooted 
again there had been considerable development in the local prisons. Some 
were intended for custodial purposes with little thought given to reformatory 
work, such as Horsham in Sussex. The Gloucester magistrates followed the 
principles of the above Act in establishing a prison. The regime was to be 
such as to 'produce Reflection; the Food such as will support Life, and 
preserve Health, but by no means animate the spirits. Dejection and Solitude 
are the natural Parents of Reflection'. 4 The prisoner was to be furnished 
with nothing which could lead to distraction, so inducing them to reflect on 
their past deeds. It was believed that a spartan regime such as this abided 
by the principles of reform - the, prisoner would realise the error of his ways 
-and deterrence -the jail would possess' few comforts so that it would not 
attract the destitute. Since punishment was of the mind rather than the 
body, labour occupied a minor role, generally allowed as a reward, rather 
then a penalty. 
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In 1810, an House of Commons select committee was appointed to 
investigate what form penal institutions might take. Evidence was taken on 
the prison regime at Gloucester and the house of correction at Southwell. 
The latter, receiving prisoners who generally had short sentences to serve, 
was less concerned to achieve a change of heart than of habit. Labour was 
an important means to this end, as prisoners were able to keep a portion of 
the profit from their labour. Solitude was invoked as a corrective, but it was 
in association with fellow-prisoners that the inmate was 'expected, under 
proper management to form habits of industry and self-interest, which he 
will be likely to practise on his return to society'. 5 
There were similarities between this regime and that proposed by Jeremy 
Bentham, perhaps the chief difference lying in importance placed on the 
design of the prison (the infamous Panopticon), which possessed the advantage 
that prisoners would never know when they were being surveyed or not; 
they would be in a perpetual state of indecision and torment since their 
every move might be observed. 
There arose conflicts over how the prisons were to be run. Bentham 
believed that the governor should have the largest say, explicitly 
disassociating himself from the trust-management model envisaged in the 
Penitentiary Act, which entrusted a committee with powers to hire and 
dismiss staff and inspect prisoners. Bentham believed that the governor 
would run the prison well since he had a financial stake in doing so and 
this, coupled with inspection by magistrates and visits by the public, would 
prevent systematic abuse. The committee members were apprehensive that 
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'under a system, in which pecuniary advantage is made the most prominent 
object of attention, the experiment of reformation would not be fairly tried I. 6 
More particularly, they did not feel that there were proper institutional 
safeguards to protect the interests of the prisoners. According to Bentham, 
the chaplain and surgeon would be employees of the governor but the 
committee argued that 
to make these officers of real use in this particular [the 
prevention of abuses] they must occasionally confer with the 
prisoner without the presence of the governor or his servants; 
they must neither be under strong obligations to the Governor, 
or subject to his power; and they must be in habits of 
communicating with persons armed with sufficient authority to 
punish or redress the grievances laid before them. 7 
The Holford Committee attempted to steer a middle course between the 
differing courses of action proposed to them. They created a system of 
checks and balances within the prison and also devised a regime which 
tried to embrace the virtues of Gloucester and Southwell. The newly arrived 
prisoners endured a period of solitude before being permitted to move on to 
associated labour. Is this not an attempt at syncretism, not a favouring of 
reform over deterrence? But as McConville notes 'there was [a] fundamental 
incompatibility in the philosophies and objectives directing the respective 
regimes of Gloucester Penitentiary and the Southwell house of correction, the 
depth of which the Holford Committee failed to appreciate. Consequently the 
rashly devised administration of Millbank could blame its hybrid origin for 
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the incurable stresses that hampered the efforts and contributed to the 
ultimate failure of the penitentiary'. 8 
Deployment of cultural power is not always an explanation for the lack 
of divisiveness within a population despite the presence of incompatibilities 
in the world of ideas. It is even too large a step to attribute this to people 
unaware or uninterested in what is going on. People may be unsure how 
events will unfold and bide their time before committing themselves one 
way or the other. In 1774 at Gloucester prison, Paul the governor, had tried 
to assuage those doubting that 'terror' and 'humanity' could be combined and 
people were similarly undecided over the regime at Millbank. Griffiths wrote 
fifty years later that the proceedings of the committee 'were more or less 
tentative, for as yet little was known of so-called prison discipline, and those 
who had taken Millbank under their charge were compelled to feel their 
way slowly and with caution, as men still in the dark'. 9 The fact that people 
were ignorant of the contradictory nature of these ideas does not imply that 
their influence is lessened in any way; their effect will often be experienced 
as severe precisely because it is unexpected. 
Millbank in some respects operated a less severe regime than other gaols: 
corporal punishment was not used for the first eleven years, in contrast to 
all other gaols and its diet was relatively plentiful. The diet in prisons was 
always susceptible to attack for being too luxurious and offensive to 
requirements of less-eligibility, that criminals should not enjoy a better 
standard of living than the worst-off ordinary person, a notion from which 
the case for a severely deterrent regime drew much of its support. Holford 
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himself admitted that to many 'the luxury of the Penitentiary was a standing 
joke. The prison was called my fattening house'. 10 Consequently the diet was 
reduced only for this reduction to be followed by a scurvy epidemic which 
resulted in thirty deaths. This illustrates the lack of certainty as to how the 
prisoners should be treated: the authorities were aiming at an equilibrium 
between deterrence and reform, but their efforts only showed how wide of 
the mark they were. 
The same lack of certainty was apparent in the administrative 
arrangements: the committee members involved themselves closely in the 
running of the prison and the first governor complained that he had little 
latitude. Griffiths believes that this was due to the fact that the committee 
believed that 'it was necessary to see from time to time how the rules first 
framed worked in practice, and what customs that grew up should be 
prohibited, and what sanctioned, by the committee, and adopted into the 
rules'. " Undoubtedly close supervision will attend the running of any 
establishment in its first few years but such control was exacerbated by the 
perceived need to ensure that there were no abuses of power. After the first 
governor aired his grievances before a select committee, there were no 
further recordings of excessive intervention. 
The inconsistent demands placed upon the staff at Millbank manifested 
themselves in the conflicts between the chaplain and governor. It was hoped 
that each would be supreme in his own department but this turned out to 
be a forlorn hope. The management committee abolished the remission of 
sentences in 1830, despite it being an effective disciplinary tool, as it was 
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believed that it constituted an incitement to hypocrisy. The reformatory 
beliefs were fully evident in their decision to amalgamate the two offices of 
chaplain and governor, hoping to 'put an end to the collision which has so 
frequently occurred between the rival departments'. 12 Only by recourse to this 
could'vigour and unity' be imparted to the whole system and the obstacles 
to reformatory discipline and religion overcome. The Home Secretary of the 
day succinctly stated the problem: the strict enforcement of discipline in a 
prison is a' duty hardly to be reconciled with the consoling and charitable 
offices of aminister of religion. 
In a prison, the necessity of treating the inmates brusquely and with less 
than full consideration of their dignity is almost inescapable but with the 
accession of the chaplain to the newly-combined post, increasing emphasis 
was put upon reformation. The prison staff were expected to participate fully 
in the attempts to reclaim the consciences of the prisoners, to be 'mild yet 
firm'. The effects of a necessary incompatibility become apparent: a practical 
synthesis which promotes hypocrisy. Some of the staff took to carrying 
bibles and even the prisoners put on a show of holiness. If the staff were 
suspected of less than uprighteous conduct (i. e. profane language) they ran the 
danger of being dismissed. No attempt was made to offer a re-interpretation 
of deterrence which might have jarred less with the obviously reformatory 
demands of the Millbank regime; this points to the inherently unstable nature 
of any such practical rapprochement and the demands it places upon the 
conduct of individuals who have to try to reconcile the two opposed 
injunctions. 
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Doubts over the effectiveness of the reformatory methods practised by 
Rev. Nihill (concerning the separate system with which I shall deal later) led 
many to question the usefulness of Millbank and conclude that it was 
neither deterring criminals nor contributing to the reform of prisoners. It was 
decided that its function as a penitentiary should be discontinued and that it 
should be utilised as a depot for prisoners awaiting transportation. Such 
disenchantment did not signal the end of government involvement with the 
prisons for an Act was passed in 1815 prohibiting gaolers taking fees from 
prisoners; this undercut their independence and encouraged magistrates to take 
more of an interest since the upkeep of the prisons would be met out of 
public funds. Peel's Gaol Act of 1823 was partly a result of lobbying by 
the Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline for changes according 
to reformatory principles, though it would be criticised for not providing 
'any machinery for compelling negligent or recalcitrant local authorities to 
comply with its requirements', 13 a complaint which eventually resulted in the 
establishment of a prison inspectorate. 
The main lesson to be drawn from the experiences of Millbank is that 
people may not be aware of the implications of the ideas they endorse, and 
this lack of knowledge may lead them to overestimate how easily they can 
be moulded together. When their effect begins to be felt, people have a 
choice of either soldiering on in an ad hoc manner or else trying to 
combine the opposed ideas in a novel way in an effort to less the 
contradictions. How soon this latter course is opted for depends, I believe, on 
two factors: how committed are those whose task it is to oversee the 
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operation of these policies to one or other of these ideas and so would 
shrink from any dilution of their efficacy, and how influential are those on 
whom the brunt of the contradiction falls. The prison staff would 
undoubtedly liked to have seen some reformulation of penal policies, as 
evidenced by the great number leaving the service, but lacked the power to 
instigate such a change. 
The problems associated with Millbank did not disappear or 
fundamentally differ as the prison service expanded and government control 
grew. There is a tendency to equate the happenings and influence of social 
structure with events at a macro-level and since I have designated culture as 
the ideational equivalent to structure in the material realm, there may be a 
temptation to believe that cultural problems occur on a similarly large-scale. 
This inference is unwarranted and the causal influence of ideas does not 
vary much depending on where the ideas are instantiated, be it in one single 
prison such as Millbank which could be classified as a micro-situation or 
throughout an entire system of institutions (a macro-situation). In the third 
period I shall be examining, I will show that the same problems of the 
correct mixture of reform and deterrence obtained with respect to the 
Borstals, the prisons for juveniles. This is not to say that various structural 
influences do not have an effect on how ideas enter into social life, but to 
admit that the influence of ideas can seep into all areas of social life, be 
they small or large-scale. I will now try to show that as the prison service 
grew in complexity, the problem of reconciling deterrence and reform 
remained as troublesome and pressing as before. 
101 
3.2 Competing models of confinement 
The authorities at Millbank were obviously unsure as to the best method 
of dealing with prisoners. It was a commonplace belief that gathering 
prisoners together only led to moral contamination, a conviction which a 
Select Committee strengthened by demanding a stricter seclusion of prisoners 
be established. But what was one to do about the practise of associated 
labour, since it seemed to undo the reform brought about by separating the 
prisoners? A commissioner was despatched to the United States in order to 
investigate American modes of discipline, the two most prominent being 
known as the separate and silent system. The former was based upon 
isolating prisoners from each other as it was believed that moral contagion 
of prisoners would occur if they associated with each other. The latter 
system was based upon prisoners working in association with each other, but 
in silence so that no plans could be hatched amongst the prisoners; this was 
believed to be a more natural state of affairs 
The commissioner Crawford seems to have chosen to have put the silent 
system to the sword before anyone could adopt it, though this may have 
been because it approximated more closely to current conditions in many 
local prisons than the separate system. His pre-emptive strike contains many 
of the features that would re-occur in debates through the years concerning 
the relative merits of both systems. He extolled 
the benefits of the separate system as being not only an 
exemplary punishment, but a powerful agent in the reformation of 
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morals. It inevitably tends to arrest the progress of corruption. In 
the silence of the cell contamination cannot be received or 
imparted. A sense of degradation cannot be excited by exposure, 
not reformation checked by false shame. Day after day, with no 
companion but his thoughts, the convict is compelled to reflect, 
and listen to the reproof of conscience. He is to reflect on past 
errors, and to cherish whatever better feelings he may have 
imbibed. These circumstances are in the highest degree calculated 
to ameliorate the affections and reclaim the heart. 14 
He was equally expansive in his denunciations of the 'silent system', 
noting that it encouraged abuses, since men placed in association were bound 
to communicate in some fashion or other and would have to be punished, 
perhaps excessively: 'the whip inflicts immediate pain, but solitude inspires 
permanent terror. The former degrades while it humiliates; the latter subdues 
but does not debase'. 15 
Crawford soon secured a position from which to advance his beliefs, that 
of the inspector of prison of England along with another convinced 
proponent of the separate system, Whitworth Russell, an ex-chaplain of 
Millbank. This inspectorate was conceived to be necessary, following a House 
of Lords Select Committee finding that 'entire separation.... is absolutely 
necessary for preventing contamination, and for securing a proper system of 
prison discipline'. 16 
Invested with the power of inspection they were able to publicise what 
they perceived was a shocking disparity between the 'principles of justice 
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and policy' and contemporary conditions in the prisons: 'the law enacts for 
the same crime the same penalty; whereas, the penalty varies according to 
the prison in which it is inflicted'. The separate system had the 'capacity of 
being administered with exact uniformity in every prison, unaffected by the 
diversity of character and disposition which must be expected in the keepers 
and subordinate officers of the various establishments' 17 unlike the silent 
whose administration depended upon the quality of staff. The tactic is 
familiar: developing an ideology to buttress its own claims (justice and right 
are on their side), while at the same time undercutting their rivals' legitimacy 
(punishment being merely local, it contravenes the associated principle of 
justice). Having seized the political high ground, the inspectorate now began 
to march towards the moral. But it was not enough for the government 
inspectorate to inveigh against the errors of alternative programs of 
punishment, they had to provide a viable substitute; monopoly of legislative 
machinery enabled the inspectorate to put forward restrictive policies which 
would weed out those prison regimes which were deemed undesirable, yet 
something had to put in their place. Might does not equal right but it can 
go some way towards convincing ones' opponents of the desirability of 
abandoning their position; this is a product of coercion rather than conviction 
and will not do anything to induce them to erect anything in place of the 
discarded project. Hence the separate system had to be promoted on its own 
merits. 
The realisation that there existed an alternative model not only induced 
the inspectors to detail how the separate system contained all the requisites 
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of a 'proper and efficient system of prison discipline', but also to rescue 
their project from any possible misunderstandings; a stratagem which can be 
likened to an inspection of one's defences, prior to an expected attack, to 
strengthen those areas which may be targeted. They wrote that 'they are 
anxious to guard against a very general mistake, by which separate 
confinement has been inadvertently confounded with solitary confinement'; an 
error since the one differs from the other both 'in its nature and in its 
design' (italics in original). Solitary confinement approximates closely to 
tunmitigated, uninterrupted seclusion from human society' whereas separation 
merely cuts the inmate off from deleterious influences but allows him 
regular contact with prison staff and secures for him religious services and 
education. Thus it is intended for the moral benefit of the prisoner whereas 
solitary confinement is meant purely as punishment. They admit that they 
'have gone into the discriminating features at a length and with a 
minuteness of detail, which the mistakes and misrepresentations that have 
been made on this subject have rendered absolutely necessary,. 18 Thus it was 
only due to the spur of competition that they have felt compelled to 
elaborate, not from any pressing intellectual disquiet. 
At the end of their report they called for the establishment of a prison 
upon the model of the separate system, which would be an example to 
every other mode of imprisonment. It would also put the system to its 
6severest test', a request which was realised with the construction of 
Pentonville Prison, which was to demonstrate to local justices the superiority 
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of the separate system, but it was as much an experiment as a finished 
model. 
But was there anybody to pick up the challenge, to further the debate? 
And if there was, how did they react to the criticisms of the silent system? 
The opposition was centred around Middlesex with the magistrate Peter 
Laurie and the governor of Cold Bath, G. L. Chesterton, among the most 
prominent opponents. Predictably they attacked what was thought to be the 
most vulnerable part of the separate system, namely its potentially 
detrimental effects upon the mental health of inmates. Laurie was scathing 
of the justifications offered for these occurrences at Pentonville, namely that 
those rendered insane suffered from latent insanity prior to imprisonment, 
and scornfully remarked that either the system was designed to incite latent 
insanity or else it had, among prisons, a monopoly of all cases of hereditary 
insanity. He was alert to the way that competitors would cobble together 
any old excuse, not so much in the belief that it would be sufficient, but to 
buy some time until they could devise a more adequate defence: 'every 
excuse and device, however flimsy, was pressed into service, at any risk of 
inconsistency to palliate these disastrous results'. 19 Returning to the fray two 
years later, he doubted whether the system at Pentonville was applicable 
throughout the country since its ininates were drawn from a specially 
selected class of prisoners, the weak and feeble being rejected, a procedure 
which could not be duplicated at all prisons. He again displays how a 
tussle of competitive ideas induces people to seek out the weakest part of 
the opposing idea and exploit it to the full. He showed that from the 
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prison's own records deaths per year were at the rate of 14 in every 
thousand, but this was reasonable, it was claimed, since average male 
mortality was at a rate of 13.35 per 1000. But 'to compare selected cases 
free all taint of disorder, under the constant care of a Resident Surgeon, with 
a general population' was 'proof of the desperate shifts to which these noble 
and medical Commissioners are driven in support of an untenable 
position'. 20 There may always be those who appear ridiculous, who gain the 
label of an extremist, to preserve their position. They also cast doubt upon 
what they perceived as the exaggerated hopes of reform of the separate 
system, and the futility of isolating prisoners from each other, to prevent 
recognition when they were to be released from prison. The great expense of 
constructing prisons in accordance with the separate system was also noted. 
How were such objections met? On the question of economy it was 
noted that the silent system necessitated an expansion in the number of 
prisoners employed, defeating the principle of economy, or else prisoners 
would have to be employed, rewarding those who were supposed to be 
punished. However Nihill conceded that within the separate system there 
was no 'trialof social of social qualities and so no discipline of temper as 
arising out of ordinary intercourse of life 921; that the separate system was 
artificial in cutting prisoners off from habitual social intercourse and left the 
prisoner unprepared for life after his or her prison sentence was to be 
acknowledged as one of its failings. But simply because defects were 
recognised does not mean that they were seen as fatal to the establishment 
of certain preferred options. Nihill was well aware that the separate system 
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must tend to produce insanity but argued that morals were no less a 
consideration than health. McConville notes that this outlook showed 
'astonishing single-mindedness and political naivete and it is hardly 
surprising that he was unable to persuade the committee to maintain the 
9 22 new regime [at Millbank] . As above, there may always be some supporters 
who cling desperately to their beliefs by simply shrugging off attacks and 
not coming up with any adequate refutations; such a tactic will not, however, 
win over the doubters and so marks the appearance of degeneracy within 
the body of ideas, which is not to say decline is inevitable but that its 
expansion has been checked. 
When a consequence can be labelled extreme and the label made to 
stick, this marks the beginning of the outline of a more modest program, 
as people are aware of what should not be entailed by any set of ideas. 
Thus those who ran penal affairs recognised that unmitigated intercourse 
between prisoners was damaging to their morals, so that it had to be 
checked in some way, but that separation was damaging to the health of the 
prisoners if extended over to long a period of time. 
Chesterton was an advocate of the silent system who recognised the 
force of the objections levelled at it. He admitted that the silent system was 
not one that recommended 'itself to universal adoption in Great Britain 23 
but he still wished to deal some blows to the separate system. Like many 
who wish to see their rivals vanquished, the temptation is to produce what 
seems like a decisive result; so his opponents asserted that 'the separate 
system ... is productive of all the benefits which the most earnest and 
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sanguine advocates of prison discipline have ever ventured to hope for'. 
Chesterton caustically commented that 'affirmations to this effect, of the 
most positive kind abound' and then proceeded to show that 'all this 
inflated pretension is disprovable'. 24 
And even though some points may be conceded, that does not mean that 
the game is up: on the question of communication, he argued much of it 
was peculiar to one group so that the 'uninitiated were ignorant of the 
import of their signs, and safe from contaminating signs'25 . He allowed that 
punishment was perhaps excessive but believed it to be 'a very great 
benefit' since many had been subject to it before, and having perceived 
how useless it was to maintain resistance they became 'penitent and 
submissive'. 26 But Chesterton was fighting a rearguard action, as when he 
was asked whether he had ever contemplated 'the possibility of a 
combination of the systems', he replied that 'it would be desirable to 
combine the system 27 , an inescapable conclusion once he had admitted 
separation for a short period might be beneficial. 
These arguments had been presented to the Select Committee on Prison 
Discipline in 1850 and it had to make recommendations on the basis of 
them. Unsurprisingly they opted for a compromise between the two modes of 
prison discipline, so that all prisoners should serve three months, and that 
prisoners under long sentences should not have separation enforced for 
longer than twelve months. Following this, 'the remainder of their sentences 
ought to be passed under a system of combined labour, with effectual 
precautions against intercourse'. 28 
109 
Though the separate system had been lauded for its capacity to combine 
both deterrence and reform, its deterrent qualities could only be pushed so 
far before unhinging the prisoners' minds; and the fear that it created an 
artificial environment, that it 'separates a man from all his usual habits and 
conditions, and so entirely takes from him all the responsibility of his own 
actions, rendering it almost impossible for him to do wrong', left it 
susceptible to criticism. Chersterton elaborated that 'the prisoner is not 
exposed to any temptation; his character is not tested; the only virtue which 
he is called upon to exercise is patience; he must endure but there is no 
conflict'. 29 The recognition of the defects of the separate system and the 
subsequent combination of the two penal systems meant that prison 
discipline was to develop in an explicitly reformatory direction. 
But how extensive were these debates or was it confined to a coterie? 
Though the inspectorate only gradually accumulated executive powers, their 
ability to chide and chastise spurred many local authorities to rectify 
deficiencies; this meant little if the local authorities were determined not to 
embark on costly alterations, which were as yet unproven. As the rationale 
behind the changes was that all prisons were a divisium imperium, it seemed 
reasonable that the cost of the desired changes be met by a Treasury grant. 
This was demonstrated by increasing financial intervention from 1835 and 
exemplified by the Finance Act of 1846, which met between a quarter and 
a third of the total cost of running local prisons. Prisons which were located 
in local boroughs, that were not included in the municipal reform of 1835, 
were not considered for this grant and all local prisons still had to meet 
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over half of the cost of the proposed changes themselves. Unsurprisingly 
there was still resistance to them. 
In Bedford it took ten years for a jail, along the lines suggested by the 
inspectorate, to be established; ratepayers beseeched magistrates not to add to 
an already 'heavy burthen' of taxes. In Warwickshire there was little 
inclination on the part of the tenant farmers to subsidise what had become 
an increasingly elaborate and abstruse question in which there was 'little 
common-sense distinction' between the varying positions. Similarly in 
Lancashire separation was only introduced in a piecemeal fashion and a 
total conversion to it was never effected partly due to the reluctance of 
ratepayers to approve increased expenditure. Thus not everyone was impelled 
to take sides; for many it seemed that the parry and thrust of the debate 
had become so complex that it left them baffled. Although the logic of a 
competitive contradiction promotes division, the very intensity of conflict 
may in fact work against that since less and less people may have the 
ability, patience and time to understand the intricacies of the debate. 
This unintended and unexpected consequence is due to each side being 
pressurised, in the face of competition, into coming up with ever more 
sophisticated and elaborate formulations of their own policies. For those 
who were not involved from the outset, such as most of the county 
administrators who were expected to pay for these increasingly elaborate 
ideas out of increased rates, there was less and less sense in the distinctions 
drawn between these two systems and precious little difference according to 
their eyes, which did not warrant greatly increased expenditure. The result is 
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that, initially, a compromise was worked out by a half-hearted conversion to 
the new ideas and full-scale renovation of local prisons would only come 
about from intense government supervision. 
What of the penitentiaries under central government control? Did administ- 
rative developments proceed apace with the continuing debates? The 
inspectorate seems to have persuaded the Secretary of State to sanction the 
construction of a new prison at Pentonville where convicts would serve part 
of their sentence before being transported to Australia and it was stressed 
that conditions, in which they would live, depended upon their conduct 
under the separate system. But following public criticism of the rate of 
insanity the period of separate confinement was reduced from eighteen to 
nine months; this failed to still disquiet and in 1849 all reformatory efforts 
were stopped and Pentonville was transfonned into a convict depot like 
Millbank. In 1848 Portland prison was opened so that prisoners could 
undergo a period of associated labour where, if conduct of an 'exemplary 
manner' was displayed, some remission of their sentence was gained. As 
transportation was winding down, more and more sentences were being 
served out in full at places such as these. 
This was a divergence from the theory of separation and was, in fact, a 
response levelled at it by people like Chesterton. Jebb, the Director of 
Convict Prisons, could say of associated labour that it had the advantage of 
'preparing the men, Whilst under control, for the temptations that await them 
when released from penal discipline; also, that- it affords an opportunity of 
inuring the men to useful labour and encouraging persevering industry'. 30 
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Although Jebb justified associated labour as having a 'more or less of a 
deterring influence on individuals', Forsythe is correct in stating that the 
system was being promoted on its reformist merits. Jebb himself took issue 
with those advocates of a purely coercive penal discipline and countered 
that 'the reward of the well conducted is as essential an element in the 
discipline as the punishment of such as persevere in misconduct'. 31 
Associated labour attempted to instil in the prisoners a realisation that 
reward would succeed work: granting a badge after six months and a 
gratuity with an additional one for an increased amount of work over the 
prescribed limit which was to be not only a stimulus to work but also due 
to the increase in work would effect a saving; hence prisoners would 
'contend against their propensities' to pursue immediate pleasure. It was 
hoped that such a process, repeated many times, as the prisoner played out 
his sentence would inculcate the habit of work, so that eventually prisoners 
would work diligently without hesitation. Separation was now seen as a 
preparation for association in which the chastened prisoner could gradually 
accustom himself to a new mode of conduct, in a controlled environment, 
before being released into public life where no such control was possible. 
So effective did it seem to be that Rev. Field, a hitherto staunch advocate of 
the separate system, expressed his satisfaction that his fears had proven 
groundless. 
The emphasis upon reformation was pushed a stage further by Alexander 
Maconochie who developed what was called the marks system, whereby 
prisoners, instead of serving a sentence based upon a passage of time, had 
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to labour in order to collect a certain number of marks and upon attaining 
these marks would be released. He believed that the 'real secret is to make 
the inside of prison resemble as much as possible the outside 32 and faulted 
the separate system within prisons for gathering prisoners together but 
endeavouring to ensure that they were uninfluenced by each other, which he 
believed to be impossible. He objected to the stage system because it did not 
engage the prisoners' own desires. The prisoner merely had to while away 
his time, knowing that he would be released in due course. There was no 
incentive to apply himself with great zeal to tasks since it would notmake 
an appreciable difference to his release, and so the stage system was said to 
encourage indolence. 
The prisoner could use the marks earned either toward his release or to 
purchase some comforts which the prison did not supply. Most choices 
concerning the prisoner would devolve upon him and so the marks would 
help stimulate those feeling which make 'men honest, industrious and 
prudent in free life 03 and would discount those which lead to vice. Before 
everything was done for the criminal, but now, instead of being treated like 
a child, responsibility would be thrust upon him. The most radical aspect of 
this program was to replace time with task sentences, with a minimum but 
not a maximum time to be served, but he and his supporter, Charles 
Pearson, claimed that they were merely fulfilling the biblical injunction that 
he who labours shall prosper. 
Like all those before him, Maconochie claimed that these proposals would 
reconcile deterrence and reform, 'it will adjust the controversy between 
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harshness and lenity which has long divided reasoners on the subject -the 
one impulse having authorised the most distressing cruelties, while the other 
has occasionally led to indulgences scarcely less injurious in their ultimate 
consequences to both criminal and society'. 34 But this was somewhat 
disingenuous, since Maconchie knew he was deviating from traditional forms 
of deterrence. He was offering a re-interpreted version of it, to fit with the 
emphasis he was lending to reform, as he believed that the deprivation of 
the prisoners' liberty was punishment enough. He argued that 'imprisonment 
is sufficiently direct punishment to be inflicted on criminals subjected to 
secondary punishment; and that beyond the restrictions necessary for their 
order and safe custody, every part of their treatment should be directed 
exclusively to their improvement'. 35 
Writing in 1850, Dixon could claim that there were five systems of 
prison discipline which had advocates: 1. The City System. 2. The Separate 
System. 3. The Silent System. 4. The Mixed System. 5. The Mark System. 
The City System was unreconstructed, regimes which the government 
inspectorate had failed to persuade to alter: Dixon commented that no one 
4openly justifies these evils; the bronze face of mammon is not equal to 
such a task'. 36 He is clearthat these prisons were 'unreconstructed' because 
those in charge had not been persuaded to find the resources to fund 
improvements, but also had not been able to develop an adequate counter- 
argument that would justify their recalcitrance, so that a stalemate had been 
reached. It would be regimes such as these that would justify the 
inspectorate's request for further coercive powers. 
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In 1834, Crawford initiated a process designed to install the separate 
system throughout the country and to suppress all disciplinary programs 
which conflicted with it. This could only be achieved by enlisting the 
support of central government which had the power to issue legislation 
concerning the state of prisons; but after 1835 this increasing rate of 
legislation was effective only if matched by grants which would go some 
way toward defraying new costs. The intention was that there should be 
only one type of penal discipline but the result was such that Dixon in 
1850 could claim that there were five distinct systems of prison discipline, 
each of which had their advocates. This proliferation was the unintended 
result of all the interested parties trying to establish their program as the 
dominant one, inciting their opponents to scrutinise it closely to uncover 
flaws. 
It is important to note how such a process came about. Not all 
development can be attributed to growing intellectual unease; many adopted 
the silent system or a modified version of it for very practical reasons. They 
were unwilling to countenance another hike in rates to pay for the complete 
reconstruction of prisons according to the separate system. 
3.3 The urge to unify 
If there was such diversity in models proposed for discipline, how could 
there be any uniformity in penal practice? This was not resolved at the 
ideational level alone, yet it would be an error to view it as a result arising 
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from whoever possessed the biggest stick. One of the greatest reasons for 
instituting the reform movement was the apparent disparity between crimes 
and punishment and between penal practices, as meted out to offenders, so 
that ideas did count. As I outlined in Chapter 2, the Quaker reformers had 
fashioned these incongruities into an effective call for change to both 
sentencing and prisons. It is a testament to the ready compatibility between 
punishment and justice that no-one thought to try to repulse these calls by 
developing a counter-thesis, but merely invoked reasons as to why this 
relationship was not yet being fully observed. 
I propose to examine the linkages that were made between the ideas of 
punishment and justice, a relationship I termed a necessary complementarity, 
which denotes a relationship whereby one idea automatically invokes the 
other, and cannot be construed apart from it. Since the connection is so 
obvious, few people will be able to come up with a counter-proposal that 
will refute this linkage. No-one disputed that punishment by the authorities 
was not just a private affair so that punishment would have to abide by 
principles of justice- it would have to seen to be approximately equal. As 
punishment was becoming a matter of concern for national government, it 
was frequently argued that punishment should not differ simply because of 
local boundaries, but as a matter of equity should be uniform throughout the 
country. As T. F Buxton admonished 
parity of crime ought not to meet with disparity of punishment. It 
is the chief boast and glory of Great Britain, that equal justice is 
administered to all, but it must surely be admitted, that an 
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exception to this exists, while imprisonment is relaxed or 
aggravated, not according to the degree of crime, but, in fact, 
according to the geographical situation of the place where it is 
37 committed . 
What is often overlooked in penal histories is that this principle was not 
only being carried out in the sphereof prison administration but also in the 
area of criminal law, where there was an attempt at codification. Certainly 
there were different individuals striving for uniformity in each area, but the 
practices of the courts had a great influence upon the operations of the 
prisons. The objective to be met by centralisation of the prisons, the 
standardisation of punishment, was only seen to be partially achieved, since 
the judiciary still determined the length of sentences passed upon 
prospective prisoners- an operation which seemed, to many, to lack any 
consistent systemic principles. Why, then, did the systematisation of the 
criminal law fail and thecentralisation of penal practices succeed? 
One of the first steps towards greater uniformity was facilitated by Peel's 
Gaol Act of 1823, which was the result of pressure from all sides to 
consolidate the criminal law. The Act required the local Justices to operate 
their prisons according to a prescribed plan and to offer quarterly reports 
concerning prison administration to the Home Secretary. Inspection was not 
contemplated and there was no mechanism with which to compel refractory 
local authorities; moreover it was restricted in scope, ignoring the London 
and provincial prisons which were most in need of reform. Rather the 
legislation was enacted in the hope of awakening a greater sense of 
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responsibility towards the prisoners under their charge. Before 18353, the 
Treasury only paid for the expenses of what were a few exceptional cases 
and the local authorities stumped up for the general maintenance of their 
prisons; thus little pressure could be exerted upon the local prisons to 
instigate changes. 
The failure to secure improvements in many of these prisons led many 
to believe that change could only be gained by an increase in governmental 
supervision. Bentham was quite clear that any such reform should proceed 
from the expectant utility that would be gained from a more uniform 
administration of the criminal law. He was also explicit in denouncing the 
judiciary for offering what amounted to their own interpretation of the law,, 
yet who seemed to be implementing decrees issued by the sovereign body 
of the land,, so covering their own partiality with the cloak of impersonality. 
Bentham's project to reform the criminal law was part of a wider attack 
upon the Common Law,, which was held to be both in accordance with 
natural law and expressive of the will of the people. Both these beliefs served 
to conceal that the Common law was nothing but 'private opinion in 
disguise'; but by being clothed with the appearance of public assent, no 
justification of judicial decisions was thought to be necessary. 
So that the law adapted to changing circumstances, it had become 'a 
complex thicket of technical rules, antiquated concepts and mysterious 
procedures 37 , which the ordinary citizen could only penetrate with the aid of 
lawyers skilled in such matters: 'he is reduced to consultations - he assembles 
the lawyers - he collects as many opinions as his fortune will permit', a 
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process which only serves to sow 'new doubts'. 38 Again the law is removed 
from public consideration and into a province frequented only by specialists 
who, due to their monopoly of such esoteric knowledge, could charge the 
general public whatever they pleased. The Common Law serves not the 
people, but a professional elite. 
The Common Law could not be legitimated by appealing to the consent 
of the people, but its very complexity blocks the possibility of their any 
reasoned compliance with the law. Therefore its exercise constitutes a 
tyranny over the people, what Bentham called dog law, since it is only 
possible to learn of thewrong done after the offence. 
The lack of any rationally considered principles at the heart of the 
CommonLaw leads to an oscillation between arbitrary judicial decisions and 
extreme rigidity in clinging to past decisions, the fiat justitia ruat coelum 
mentality. Since Bentham believes that one of the functions of the law was 
to provide stability, a steady adherence to established rules as he calls it, the 
judge will more often than not ignore particular circumstances and even if 
he chooses to attend to them, any solution can only be partial. The Common 
Law sought to derive its authority from an unwritten law, which Bentham 
claimed was loved by lawyers 'for the same reason that the Egyptian priest 
loved hieroglyphics, for the same reason priests of all ages have loved their 
particular dogmas and mysteries. They are a source of power, reputation and 
fortune'. 39 Only by giving the law an explicit verbal form could it be freed 
from obscurity and comprehended by all, understood without art; any estimate 
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of the meaning of an unwritten law Bentham professed to find 
metaphysical. 
Brougham, the Lord Chancellor, who was friendly with Bentham 
recommended to the King that a Royal Commission be established to try to 
bring order to what seemed a mass of unconnected elements of the 
criminal law. Though they shied away from the task of codification, their 
attempts to summarise all enactments touching upon criminal matters into 
one or two statues was often construed as such. That similar offences and 
that seemingly trivial offences could occasion disproportionate punishments 
caused 'great uncertainty in the application of punishment'. 40 Since the law 
seemed to offend against ordinary moral sense, it was often disregarded. 
Disparate judgements also resulted from the 'peculiar notions of policy 
entertained by different individuals, or their firmness or resolution of 
mind'41 , the point against which 
Bentham fulminated so angrily. This was 
held to be an injustice since the potential offender could not possibly 
calculate the consequences of his or her actions. The commissioners 
catalogued that the present administration of justice was indiscriminate, 
disproportionate, unsystematic, and 'ill adapted to the effectual prevention of 
42 
crime' . 
The Commissioners proposed to erect a system of criminal law which 
countenanced the existence of defined aggravations which would makegood 
'the scarcity of distinctions defining the gradations of guilt and annexing 
commensurate penalties'. 43 No longer would 'sweeping distinctions' run 
together crimes which were morally incomparable but which carried similar 
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penal consequences. Though they were classicists in their belief that crime 
was due to the exercise of the offenders' free will, they were less certain 
that all relevant circumstances could be encapsulated within a code. Thus 
some judicial discretion would have to be retained. 
This is not to underestimate the vast task which they undertook, and 
from which resulted what we should expect from the existence of a 
necessary complementarity, namely the extensive drawing of links and 
relations between offences and their punishment. Since the two ideas seemed 
made for each other, as each automatically invoked the other, this 
encouraged people to explore the extent of the relations between them. 
Punishment and justice represented a hitherto unscoured area, as previously 
the matter of just punishments had been left to local magistrates and 
authorities, so that the links between the two still remained to be forged. 
The Commissioners wished to draw up a unitary scale of punishments 
against which they could set particular types of offences. Indictable offences 
were collected into four classes according to the degree of punishment they 
incurred in their second report: 
1. Capital offences 
2. Offences punishable with imprisonment for 10 years or more, or trans- 
portation for life. 
3. Offences punishable by imprisonment with a maximum of 10 yrs. and 
a minimum of 2 yrs., or by transportation not exceeding 14 and not less than 
7 yrs. 
122 
4. Offences punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 2 yrs., or 
transportation not exceeding 7yrs. or a fine. 
By the time of the commissioners' fourth report, the number of classes 
had expanded to fifteen, each with a maximum but not a minimum penalty. 
Making ever more elaborate distinctions among crimes called for an even 
finer recasting of punishments 'in order to ensure the consistency of the 
whole system'. 44 One of the greatest obstacles to achieving consistency was 
providing for aggravations of crime, which the law then did not recognise, 
giving the example of three men breaking into a building and stealing 
E1,000, an offence which was treated as identical to a boy stealing an apple 
from a stall. Thus by their 7th report the number of penalties was 45, due 
to the desire to distinguish the gravity and moral depravity of an offence, 
and to further restrict judicial discretion. 
In 1845, new commissioners were appointed to review the consolidation 
of the criminal law. They were less enthusiastic about ensuring systemic 
consistency, reducing the scale of penalties to 13 and then increasing it to 
31 before finally settling upon 18. They were less keen on hedging in 
judicial discretion, abolishing those punishments that were mandatory and 
many of those which had a minimum punishment affixed, but still wished to 
define those aggravations which should carry a greater punishment. 
When the finalised report of the commissioners was being presented as a 
Bill, the Lord Chancellor sent it to various judges asking for their 
comments. Their hostile replies scuppered the whole process, as they 
revealed themselves hostile to the very principle of codification, claiming that 
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it was an unnecessary encumbrance which would restrict the freedom of the 
judges to adapt themselves to changing circumstances. They ridiculed some 
of the definitions and attempted to point out minor inconsistencies and 
imprecision in their formulation. This signal from the judiciary alerted 
opponents in Parliament, many of whom were county justices, magistrates or 
solicitors; when a select Committee concluded that it was 'inexpedient at 
45 present to press forward any Digest' , codification had come to a close, for 
the time being at least. 
The earlier Commission, having resolved that justice was being impugned 
by the great diversity in punishments, determined that judicial discretion 
should be restrained and came to the logical conclusion- judges should 
simply read off which punishment should be applied, the 'application of 
legal propositions logically derived from statutory texts 946 which Weber 
believed was the hallmark of rational law. He was also aware that a 
6systematic and comprehensive treatment' of the law was highly unlikely to 
emerge from the traditional practices of English lawyers, as it was oriented 
to the practical exigencies of everyday life; nor would any insertion of a 
more rational system of law be welcome, since the lawyers 'material 
interests are threatened by every interference with the traditional forms of 
procedure'. 47 But material considerations were not the only objection: the 
6 status of being confined to the interpretation of statutes and contracts, like a 
slot machine intowhich one drops the facts (plus the fee) in order to have 
it spew out the decision appears to the modem lawyer as beneath his 
dignity'. 48 
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The work of the law reform Commissioners represents a clear example 
of what happens when two ideas, necessarily connected, are brought together. 
Once it was admitted that justice should not admit of wide variations in its 
application, that punishments should not reflect a partial consideration, then 
the role of the judge was necessarily squeezed out, as the coda of law 
become ever more elaborate to reflect the complexity of everyday life. The 
logical result is something like the elaboration of 45 grades of punishment, 
each to be consistent with the other. But for those who were not ploughing 
this particular furrow, it appeared a particularly barren exercise, growing as it 
did in complexity, seemingly far away from ordinary concerns. It was 
rejected for 'substituting new fictions for old realities'. 49 It should be noted 
that both the traditionalists and the reformers levelled a similar accusation 
against each other: each side's method of divining the essence of the law 
represented a step away from reality into a realm of abstract complexity, 
which betrayed the notion of equity that was the heart of the law. 
Unfortunately, the frigid reception ensured that no part of the codified 
criminal law would be enacted, depriving us of the opportunity to see how 
itand its proponents coped with its interface with unforeseen circumstances. 
What is particularly interesting is that this effort should fail whilst great 
strides were being made to develop a more uniform manner of punishment 
within the prisons. Thus the effects obtained by the link of punishment and 
justice were not an all-or-nothing affair, but were achieved piecemeal, 
progressing here and being stunted there. 
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The knowledge scenario here has the greatest affinity with the 
Foucauldian notion of knowledge leading ineluctably to power but is distinct 
from it for two reasons. They are: (1) There is no way of knowing how long 
it will take to fill out the initially promising connections between the two 
ideas; until this is done the ideas will remain in an unworkable state; (2) 
even if this is achieved there is no guarantee that it will automatically result 
in power. There may be other obstacles, such as opponents possessing a 
wealth of material resources, so that they have no need to turn to ideas for 
legitimacy; and even if this is not the case and the connections between the 
two ideas are fully implemented, there is no guarantee that this will not 
create further problems. I will argue that this was the case of a uniformly 
deterrent prison regime, which, by insisting on similar treatment for all 
prisoners, incited agitation among those prisoners who saw themselves as 
distinct from others. I will now turn to the reasons for there being a swing- 
back toward deterrence. 
3.4 A backlash beckons 
Writing in 1837, one of the inspectorate expressed his fear that with so 
much emphasis being placed upon reform that the deterring effect of 
prisons would be neglected. This problem is one of the concerns of this 
thesis: how to carry out two contradictory proposals and ensure the efficacy 
of both. The prison authorities gave it little consideration, a lack of foresight 
which contributed to a mood against reform. 
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In the 1850s fewer and fewer prisoners were being transported to 
Australia, due to objections from the settlers themselves and concern about 
its deterrent qualities. The prisoners being transported in 1850 were said to 
be of a very different class from those who had preceded them, having 
passed through an intermediate stage at Portland, but most importantly labour 
was in demand, regardless of its guise. When transportation was discontinued 
to Van Diemen's land in 1852, the problem was how to cope with those 
prisoners released early in England. There was far less of a demand for 
labour and consequently a 'fastidious rejection of all those whose character 
[was] tainted'. 50 There was a fear that if the prisoner failed to secure 
employment soon after his release, he or she would turn again to crime but 
close supervision by the police was ruled out, lest they be branded as 
criminals. As Jebb put it: 'the theory of protection to the public would have 
been destruction to the convict'. 51 Though this was justified as preventing 
the growth of a refractory criminal class, many did not take such a long- 
term view and it seemed that the interests of the prisoners were being 
placed above their own. 
The 1853 penal servitude act abolished transportation except for those 
who had received a sentence of 14 years or life. Before the 1853 penal 
servitude act those who had exhibited good conduct, whilst awaiting 
transportation, could gain a remission of their sentences, so that, for example, 
a conduct serving seven years could be released after four years. But as 
transportation had ceased, so did remission, causing disquiet among the 
prisoners. Jebb remarked that 'a feeling of recklessness is beginning to 
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pervade the whole body of frustrated convicts'. 52 The Home Office was 
reluctant at first to approve of wholesale remission but after negotiations 
agreed to grant 'tickets-of-leave' to many of those who were to be 
transported overseas. 
Those convicts in the 1853 batch were not eligible for remission but to 
encourage them, they were granted privileges on the basis of the progressive 
stage system. Some contemporaries were incredulous at the notion of 
persuading the prisoners to behave well, rather than punishing them if they 
did not. They believed that rewarding prisoners contravened the principle of 
less eligibility, that prisoners should not be better-off than the least well-off 
person in society. 
The organisation of the ticket-of-leave was extremely haphazard since it 
required the holder to remain in a particular district and return home by 10 
o'clock and to report periodically to the police. There was no means of 
checking on the released prisoner, since the Home Office was unwilling to 
recommend police surveillance. They believed it would amount to harassment 
and would make it much more difficult for the ticket-holder to secure 
employment, although it was also argued that the conditions facilitating its 
introduction in Ireland did not pertain to England and Wales. 
Since supervision was so rare, these people were easy scapegoats for any 
supposed increase in the crime rate, with one Lord stating that 'the safety 
of society would soon be at an end' 53 Towards the end of 1855 several 
newspapers dismissed the practice of early discharge as a sham, since it 
released unreformed prisoners who had not served their full sentence. Jebb 
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tried to defend the system, claiming that the failure rate amounted to little 
more that 3% a year, but this was said to be because of the complete lack 
of supervision and knowledge about them. 
A select committee pointed out that many of the public may have been 
confusing discharged criminals and ticket-of-leave men but expressed 
concerns about the lax supervision and the failure to enforce licence 
conditions. Bartrip tentatively writes that 'Parliament and the national press 
were, on the whole, though not uniformly, inveighing against ticket-of-leave 
evils and, arguably in doing so, they were reflecting more general, though 
unquantifiable, public concern'. 54 
If public opinion was so opposed to the reformatory treatment of 
criminals, how did such an extensive penal regime based upon these 
principles ever come into being? The Times offered an explanation in an 
editorial : 
The philanthropists.... have got control of penal administration, 
and as long as the public mind was not forced to think of 
convicts, it willingly acquiesced in an arrangement which was 
supposed to be equally beneficial to the sufferer under criminal 
law and society at large. 55 
It is true that the demise of transportation brought home to many that 
mishaps in penal policy would no longer be borne by the colonies, and that 
prison discipline would become more than ever material to the elite of the 
country. Though it is difficult to pinpoint those events which were decisive 
in swinging opinion against reform, the garrotting scare of 1862 is often 
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depicted as the straw that broke the camel's back, though others argue that 
changes were simply the result of people slowly getting to grips with the 
problem of serious and persistent offenders who remained in the country. 
Certainly by 1863 there was a belief that crime was on the increase and 
that some of the blame should be apportioned to a lax regime in prisons. 
This laxity was partly due to 'well intentioned theorists' 56 who thought it 
best to promote moral influences above deterrent labour, and also to a lack 
of uniformity in prisons throughout the country. This led to the appointment 
of a Royal Commission to enquire into penal servitude, which concluded 
that it was not a sufficient deterrent, either to those who had undergone it 
or to prospective criminals. Criticism was also expressed of the ticket-of- 
leave system on the basis that it induced hypocritical behaviour in the 
prisoner, and any assessment of genuine reformation by the prisoner was 
practically impossible. It was asserted that it was the most dangerous and 
cleverest type of prisoner who was able to hoodwink the prison staff into 
granting him remission. 
Also in 1863 a select [the Carnavon] committee was convened to enquire 
into the state of county and borough prisons, and it was particularly 
interested in two aspects of the system: 'the degree to which it was 
administered symmetrically throughout the realm and the amount of severity 
felt by prisoners subjected to iti. 57 The sentiments which were expressed 
most strongly, were frustration at the diversity still existing in prisons and 
scepticism at the effects of reformation. The separate system was praised by 
a few witnesses for its reformatory effects but many prison staff were 
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exponents of its potential for deterrence, believing that it was impossible to 
ascertain when a prisoner was reformed or not. Jebb agreed that reformation 
was impossible in local prisons, owing to the brevity of sentences, and that 
the aim should be to deter. This would involve separate isolation combined 
with the enforcement of distasteful hard labour of a penal character . 
58 This 
model should be along the lines of a military prison, in his famous phrase 
of 'hard labour, hard fare and a hard bed'. 59 
The recommendations reflected this aspiration toward severity as well as 
a resolve to eliminate asymmetries within the penal system. Uniformity of 
labour, diet and treatment which were necessary to overcome the inequality, 
uncertainty and inefficiency of punishment, 'productive of the most 
prejudicial results' 60 were also recommended. Hard labour was thought to be 
the best means to deter, so the crank and treadmill were introduced in place 
of vocational training, and scepticism was reiterated about the efficacy of 
reformation and that punishment by itself was by means prejudicial to the 
prisoner or useless to society. 61 This was to be carried out for the first 
three months, with elevation to a higher class obtainable for those whose 
sentences exceeded this time. Greater powers were sought for the Home 
Secretary to obtain the desired uniformity of practice within the prisons, but 
rather than antagonise the magistrates by setting down statutory definitions 
which would have to be complied with, some broadly defined regulations 
were introduced. The inducement towards uniformity was provided by the 
threat of withholding the Treasury grant from local authorities and in the 
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face of a persistently refractory attitude the Home Secretary had the power 
to close down prisons. 
Though the Royal Commission was not as pessimistic as the Camavon 
Committee on the possibility of reformation, they still suggested that penal 
servitude be made more rigorous by increasing the total amount of time 
spent in prison, with the minimum sentence being increased from three to 
five years. Reconvicted felonists were to receive a prison sentence of a 
minimum of seven years and restrictions were placed upon those convicts 
granted a ticket of leave; a breach of these regulations left the convict 
liableto serve the rest of his sentence or three months imprisonment. 
Any exercise in historical reconstruction inevitably involves selection and 
here I have concentrated on the relationship between deterrence and reform. 
Ideas do not stand in a single relationship with one other idea, apart from 
all others; thus the idea of deterrence was bolstered by the prevalent notion 
of less-eligibility, that prisoners should not enjoy a better standard of living 
than the most common citizen. Since this was so low, it was inevitable it 
would be breached in some respect, and some prisons possessed facilities 
not even enjoyed by hotels. The prisons were then vulnerable to the 
requirement that they should find means of devising a more deterrent 
regime to compensatefor these perceived failings. 
The prison reformers were always in a minority though they 
did work themselves into position of influences but never 
succeeded in convincing either Parliament or many in the regions 
of the need to reform prisoners. Far from being seen as brutal 
132 
or repressive it was feared that they [the prisons] would give the 
criminal classes a taste for luxury and accustom them to 
standards they could never attain by honest means. The discipline 
enforced inside prison with its stress on learning and religion 
was deemed soft and ineffectual .... Those who cried out against 
the measures of the 1860s because they feared the further 
brutalising of the prison population were shouted down by the 
majority who feared forthemselves. 62 
I have outlined a period when reform was favoured but this does not tally 
with the Foucauldian account. For one, the agreement about ends did not 
extend to means, as some put forward models from conviction, others from 
indifference, with the result that there were five distinct models by 1850. 
This proliferation was partly checked by one group taking hold of the 
machinery of government and issuing restrictive legislation, which favoured 
its own particular model of prison discipline; although it was a frustratingly 
slow business for those who were trying to imprint their own system of 
discipline upon the local prisons. What aided the government inspectors was 
their being able to legitimise their enterprise by linking punishment in the 
prisons to the question of justice, a knowledge scenario which is the closest 
to the Foucauldian notion of knowledge leading to power, but is not 
completely akin to it. This linkage lent legitimacy to their enterprise but did 
not place them immediately in a position of power. 
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Reformatory efforts succeeded in the prisons for a time because events 
there didnot impinge upon the affairs of those who had the power to call 
a halt to these efforts. The reason why a contradictory pair of ideas was 
able to survive was that it was peripheral to many people's lives, until 
released prisoners were deemed to be responsible for the assaults that spread 
fear amongst the well-to-do. After this, sterner action was demanded which 
would reassure those concerned that these assaults would not reoccur, which 
meant that deterrence was favoured since it seemed to offer the requisite 
punishment. Unlike the power/knowledge approach, the method that I outline 
allows for the possibility that emphasis may swing from reform to 
deterrence and back again, and can scrutinise the means by which one or 
the other is accentuated. This raises the question why and how is one or 
other emphasised for the period it is? It is to this emphasis on deterrence 
that I will now turn. 
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4. Upholding Deterrence 
The emphasis will now shift to how policies of deterrence were 
maintained at the expense of reform. Attention will focus on the tactics, 
employed by those in charge of the convict prisons, to conceal the extent to 
which they were favouring deterrence and how the repercussions of this 
policy impacted upon various sets of prisoners, who were not amenable to 
its implementation. I will show how, despite the massive imbalance in 
resources between the penal authorities and proponents of reform, the need 
to maintain some measure of reform gradually told against the attempt to 
favour deterrence. I will also show how the apparent success of deterrent 
policies (indicated by a drop in the crime-rate) focused attention on those 
who were unaffected by a deterrent regime and led to calls for policies of 
reform. 
Although reform had not been completely discounted post-1865, it was 
clear that it was being shaped to fit the contours of deterrence. This second 
episode represents an interesting contrast, not only because deterrence was 
the favoured policy, but also the means by which this exclusivity was 
defended. In the period up to 1865, it could not be said that Power was 
exercised to maintain the prominence of reform, even when it came under 
attack in the late 1850s, unless we labelled the inspectorate's efforts to 
persuade as a manifestation of power. The succeeding period shows a 
marked departure from this relatively quiescent era, as the prison 
commissioners made concerted efforts to conceal the true nature of their 
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activities, so that information, which might have incited tentative reformatory 
campaigns into bolder action, would not leak out. The contrast is captured in 
the claim that 
whilst Jebb was in charge, reports had been published annually; 
they had included comments on the great debates of the day and 
brought into the open internal differences of view between 
chaplains and governors. Under Du Cane, they underwent a 
marked change in tone and content. The accounts from governors, 
medical officers and chaplains became shorter and shorter and, 
from 1878, no longer carried the signature of their authors. They 
also became stereotyped, with the same information appearing 
over and over again. Statistical tables improved, but any evidence 
of intemal criticisms or doubts had disappeared. ' 
It should be remembered that this stricture applies to the local prisons 
only after 1877, when central government assumed control of them to 
establish a regime of secrecy and censorship. Since the prison directors 
enjoyed far greater control in the convict prisons, they were able to act in 
ways that were not possible in the local prisons (at least not until after the 
assumption of control by central government). Within the convict prisons, 
actions were intended to suppress or drastically curtail any reformatory 
efforts as these would impede attempts to implement a policy of deterrence 
within the prisons; hence the complaints that the directors were only paying 
lip service to education within the prisons and the disaffection exhibited by 
the clergy over their increasingly marginal role. It is evident why such a 
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policy was doomed to failure, primarily because what was at issue was what 
we termed a necessary incompatibility, so that one of the ideas could not 
simply be discarded, desirable though this may have seemed. Since reform 
could not be eliminated, then there arose the question of just how much was 
enough or how little could the directors get away with retaining. 
So the idea of reform could not be completely discarded even if some 
did so wish, but there were also willing advocates of its indispensability 
within the prison walls, the most obvious being the prisoners themselves, but 
also the clergy. Since many of the first group could never be convinced of 
the legitimacy of the actions meted out to them (particularly those self-styled 
political prisoners, who were mostly Irish), it was necessary to prevent them 
from airing their grievances. 
This raises the obvious question that since reform could never be simply 
'ditched', then who could be sufficiently trusted to ensure that its presence 
did not dilute the efficacy of deterrence? This entailed the second strategy 
(the first being the use of power to conceal the exact nature of the prison 
regime), taking control of the prisons away from those who entertained 
differing ideas about the place of reform within a penal strategy, and 
concentrating power in the hands of the few who could be trusted to 
operate a policy of deterrence without paying obeisance to reform. Hence 
the policy of nationalisation was a reasonable extension of the move to 
place so much emphasis on one of the two elements of which punishment 
was composed; it was not simply due to an implacable desire for control by 
a small band of prison directors. Whether this singular policy succeeds or 
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not, depends, in part, on those proponents of reform being determined enough 
to surmount the barriers placed before them, to instigate their own favoured 
policy. 
There is a paradox at the heart of such a policy of concentration (or 
nationalisation here) in that it seeks to wrest control of the prisons from 
those who cannot be trusted to favour the desired policy and place it in 
the grasp of the faithful. This extension from the centre depends upon a 
continuing supply of personnel who can be so trusted, a task which 
becomes all the more difficult the wider the ambit of centralised control, as 
more andmore people are required to carry out the delicate balancing act. 
The fruitfulness of distinguishing these two aims can be seen by asking 
ourselves a counterfactual question: what if those in charge of the local 
prisons had been committed to operating a policy of deterrence? It would 
still have been necessary to erect a barrier to ward off those 'lay 
commentators' who would have been concerned at the paucity of the efforts 
at reform, so as not to expose the single-minded policy to the public. And 
likewise if there were no prisoners agitating for reform but many local 
prison authorities hadbeen recalcitrant in imposing a program of deterrence, 
the drive towards centralisation would still have been necessary, to ensure 
that the desiredregime would be established. 
4.1 The Convict Prisons 
Du Cane, Chairman of the Directorate of Convict prisons, was adamant 
that punishment was inflicted primarily to ward off potential criminals, so 
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that punishment was 'much more for the purposes of deterring from crime 
the enormous number of possible criminals, rather than for any effect on the 
criminal himself '; 2 thus any change effected in the individual prisoner was 
considered an incidental benefit. The inmate was a means towards securing 
the end of a reduction in the general rate of crime, and little concern was 
evinced to induce a voluntary change in the individual. 
This is not to say that the prison authorities were given carte blanche to 
mete out any treatment which they saw fit; their actions were (theoretically) 
circumscribed by the sentences of the courts, a restriction partially inspired 
by utilitarian beliefs, that no more pain than was necessary should be 
brought about to achieve the desired goals and also by the desire to bring 
about a greater degree of uniformity. 
The era of deterrence was ushered in under a mood of pessimism 
concerning the very possibility of transforming individuals according to a 
reformatory program; indeed, there was a growing consensus that there were 
many prisoners incapable of transforming themselves as criminal behaviour 
was becoming synonymous with mental deficiency. This point was expressed 
by Edmund Du Cane when he spoke of a large number of prisoners 'whom 
it is impossible to influence and who must be dealt with in course of the 
law, not for much result in themselves, but to carry out the principle of 
justice and mainly to deter others. Such characters may probably be set 
down as in a certain sense mentally deficient'. 3 This lack of faith in the 
ability of manycriminals to reconstitute themselves and a wish to eradicate 
regional variations, made the adoption of a deterrent regime the more 
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sensible option. How did those with most at stake react to the change in 
regime and what were they reacting against? 
A convict, upon being introduced into a convict prison, was placed in a 
cell for nine months during which he received religious instruction from 
behind a locked door, in contrast to its associated nature in the previous 
regime. Following this, the inmate would be sent to labour in a public 
works prison, where he could earn marks for work performed; if a certain 
number of marks was obtained then the convict could move on to a third 
class, thence to a second and eventually to a first. If a prisoner attained the 
maximum number of marks then he could get one-quarter remission of his 
sentence. Each was distinguished by a greater presence of gratuities and 
rewards, though these were meagre relative to what had obtained before. 
Rewards were reduced drastically as these were believed to be an 
inducement to hypocrisy, and so it was decreed that prisoners could only 
speed their progress through prison by toil. Little of it was designed to 
teach them anything of value other than trying to instil a great aversion to 
prison and its operations; it was described by one official as 'incessant, often 
arduous and painfully harassing'. 4 The Howard League went further claiming 
that most of the longer-term prisoners were 'ruined for life by being 
rendered permanently bedridden invalids'. 5 
Diet was another matter which came under assault: a committee was 
established to examine it; at the outset the chairman iterated that the diet 
'should minister to their correction by being as unattractive and 
monotonous', and since they were being incarcerated at a cost to the 
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community, 'it ought to be as economical as possible', 6 two objectives which 
neatly dovetailed together. The amount of food was cut by 20%, and all 
luxuries such as beer and tea were forbidden, with the food itself being 
rough fare. 
Punishment, above and beyond the daily routine, also saw an increase, 
though it should be said that the option of sending continually refractory 
prisoners overseas no longer existed. Corporal punishment increased, as did 
the less severe punishments, such as forfeiture of marks earned which meant 
a loss of time gained toward remission. A common complaint was that 
disciplinary measures were incurred for actions which it was not realised 
were infringements. The afore-mentioned official noted some of these as an 
'untidy cell', and 'hesitating to obey orders 0, amongst others; Radzinowicz 
and Hood estimate that about 40% of prisoners were punished each year. 8 
The simplest and shortest path to uniformity was to treat all convicts in 
a similar fashion; yet there were many categories of prisoners who could not 
be pigeon-holed so easily. The Fenian prisoners were the most vociferous in 
protesting at what they believed to be ill-warranted and degrading treatment, 
yet there were others, such as women and juveniles, whose very presence 
within the prisons disrupted any attempt to apply a policy of uniform 
deterrence, since it was believed that these groups should not be subject to 
such treatment. 
In 1848, following an insurrection in Ireland, it was decided that not 
enough Irishmen were being imprisoned for such disruptive behaviour; they 
could either be beheaded or charged with the misdemeanour of sedition and 
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thus be granted bail. The Treason-Felony Act of 1848 was designed to strip 
from those, who had been disloyal to the crown, the dignity customarily 
attached to the status of traitors and so denigrated them to the position of 
felons. When the leaders of the Fenian movement were arrested in 1865, 
they were convicted of treason-felony and most of them were sentenced to 
15-20 years penal servitude and transferred to English convict prisons from 
Ireland. The Fenians protested against being classified as ordinary felons , in 
common with the 'garroters and Sodomites of England' (0' Donovan Rossa), 
since they believed they represented a special category of 'political 
prisoner' and argued that they should receive special treatment which 
distinguished them from common convicts. This was incompatible with the 
policy of uniform treatment of prisoners but there was no possibility of 
persuading the Irish to accept their newly-assigned status. Since the 
legitimacy of prison regime partly depended on impartial treatment, the 
prison authorities had little choice to implement their program without 
prejudice. The Irish continuously agitated for better treatment using their 
connections with the Irish members of Parliament, though it is unclear to 
what extent the prison authorities tried to obstruct them. 
Certainly some of the Irish believed that those in control of the prisons 
did as they saw fit and had embarked on a policy of what we might call 
cultural repression, which puts the best face forward by removing any 
apparent blemishes, if not by radical surgery, then at least by a judicious 
application of make-up, making things appear better than they really are. Yet 
radical surgery in the form of transportation or execution were ruled out, 
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since the Fenians were to be treated as ordinary criminals. Thus recourse 
was had to efforts to portray them as men of lowly character, not of moral 
integrity; this tactic was of limited effectiveness since it was primarily 
intended for domestic consumption. That they were regarded by many of the 
Irish as heroes shows how difficult it is to eradicate ideas once they gain a 
foothold; the idea of equating the Fenians with petty thieves cut little ice 
with those who thought they knew them best. This shows that efforts to 
further a particular favoured interpretation of events through the use of 
power may often backfire, if the intended message is incongruous with 
previously-held beliefs and so may exacerbate the problem by encouraging 
the unconvinced to put forward their own beliefs, in an effort to put the 
record straight. 
At first, attempts to gain a sympathetic hearing for the Fenians were 
greeted with derision, yet a campaign continued as the Irish were convinced 
of the injustice of their treatment. In 1867, the Home Secretary appointed a 
commission of inquiry to investigate such complaints and they were 
9 dismissed as 'a tissue of falsehood and misrepresentation' , concocted 
by 
troublemakers. Plaudits were handed out to all involved in the administration 
of the prisons and any relaxation in discipline was discounted since 'the 
convict authorities .... must do their duty to all alike- even though insistence 
on equality produced inequality' 10 ,a revealing aside since it showed that the 
prison directors were aware that applying a uniform policy meant that 
certain circumstances went unheeded. 
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Charges of malicious treatment persisted and public support for an 
amnesty grew: the Amnesty Association was founded on 28 June 1869 to 
work towards the release of all Fenian prisoners, an object its President 
claimed, 'on which the whole heart of Ireland was so earnestly and 
passionately set'. 11 This object was partly realised when in March of the 
same year 49 prisoners were released, which only incited the Association to 
a forceful restatement of its original end. A demonstration was organised on 
24 Oct. 1869, composed of political bodies of the left and others connected 
to Irish nationalism, whose size, according to one estimate was put at 
100,000. Pending the release of the prisoners, humane treatment was 
demanded of the prison authorities. Further credence was given when a 
pamphlet was detailing the treatment accorded to the Fenian prisoners, 
whereby 'an external semblance of civilisation is preserved, but only as a 
mask for a system of degradation and cruelty rarely paralleled'. The 
prisoner went on to claim that 
commissioners have dealt freely in suppressio ver! and suggestio 
falsi in order to blacken our characters and justify cruelties 
practised on us by our gaolers. Most men could make the worse 
appear the better by suppression of truth and suggestion of 
12 falsehood . 
The government of Gladstone succumbed to such pressure and established 
another Commission to see if the Fenian prisoners had suffered any 
hardships beyond the normal lot of a convict. They did uncover particular 
instances of ill-treatment, especially in the case of 0' Donovan Rossa, who 
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stated that, amongst other injustices, his 'letters had been suppressed because 
they contained accounts of his and his companions' ill treatment'. 13 It was 
found that in some cases the prison authorities had relaxed regulations to 
pre-empt such ferment as was now occurring, but this obviously affected the 
policy of uniform discipline and stirred resentment amongst the ranks of 
ordinary prisoners. The Commission was forced to conclude that 
We cannot be insensible to the difficulty, not always unattended 
with danger, of allowing exceptional indulgences to a few 
individuals in the midst of a larger prison population .... We are 
led to the conclusion that the difficulties attendant on the 
location and treatment of political offenders may perhaps bemost 
readily and effectually overcome by setting apart, from time to 
time, a detached portion of some convict prison for prisoners of 
this class. 14 
Two members of the committee dissented from this recommendation, with 
one adding that 'a conspicuous and successful defiance of prison life is in 
itself a scandal of prison life, and a most dangerous example to other 
prisoners'. Clearly the fear was that other groups of prisoners might grapple 
for special status which would have put paid to the notion of a uniformly 
administered prison service. It was obviously an issue which was vexing 
and dividing all those concerned with the smooth running of the convict 
prisons and those at the coal-face were seeking for some means to allay the 
perennial disquiet concerning the convict prisons. 
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The chairman of the Directors of Convict prisons, in a minute about the 
Devon Commission, expressed his worry about the 'agitation kept up by 
their [the Fenians] friends in Parliament and the Press, which was carried 
on largely by means of unscrupulous assertions of misconduct and ill- 
treatment on the part of the prison authorities'. He further noted that as a 
'result of these long continued attacks the officers themselves became 
somewhat demoralised and afraid to do their duty'. As a solution to this 
seemingly intractable problem, Du Cane mooted the possibility that such 
prisoners 'be treated under special regulations of less penal character than 
those which apply to ordinary prisoners'. 15 
In the meantime, there was no let-up in the campaign to have the 
prisoners granted amnesty and pressure seemed to have paid off when 
Gladstone announced a conditional release, the condition being that they go 
into exile. It seemed to be the only way of cutting the Gordian knot of 
how to treat some prisoners differently in a uniformly administered regime. 
After this amnesty of Jan. 1871, public demonstrations continued to gain the 
release of those prisoners still remaining in prison, highlighted by a series of 
meetings in Ireland in the Autumn of 1873, with some gatherings numbering 
in the hundreds of thousands. However all these efforts came to nothing 
when the Conservatives came to power in the election of 1874, and they 
refused to do anything for the Irish prisoners. Though they gained the 
support of the Irish parliamentary party, in truth public interest was on the 
wane since those who were seen to be most deserving of release had 
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already obtained it and those remaining had been convicted of serious 
crimes involving weapons and endangering life. 
In the midst of trying to secure some manner of agreed conduct toward 
the Fenian prisoners, Parnell called for the establishment of independent 
inspection of the convict prisons since he believed that this was the only 
way to safeguard the prisoners contained behind the walls and restrain the 
conduct of prison officials. Was such a call warranted apart from the 
obvious infractions in the case of a few Fenians? 
The Fenians were the most vocal in railing against what they perceived 
as abuses of power, though they were not the only ones to so suffer. A 
petition could be sent to the Home Secretary but most of these had to pass 
before the scrutiny of the governor who could block any unfavourable 
reports. It was stipulated that a director would visit a prison every month to 
whom the prisoners could complain but this was regarded by many of the 
ininates as a only providing a facade of propriety. Even if the Director was 
conscientious, it was alleged that the prison officials Put everything in order 
for his visit so that nothing amiss would be apparent. 
Many questions were raised concerning these matters during a sitting of 
another (the Kimberly) Commission, the origins of which are not clearly 
evident though it seems to have owed its existence, in part, to a sense of 
public unease over the prison regime. This uneasiness can be partly 
attributed to the active hectoring of the Irish politicians but also as a result 
of an inevitable seepage of information in spite of the censorious regime 
that was in operation. Prisoners could not be held in perpetual confinement 
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and some would inevitably disseminate their experiences once they had been 
released, and there were various personnel (especially the clergy ) involved in 
the day-to-day running of the prisons who were dissatisfied with the 
direction of policy and who leaked information to interested parties. 
All this came out in the evidence given to the committee who were, 
however, sceptical of unattributable information; they did express their 
concern about the lack of an inspectorate for the convict prisons that was 
independent of those concerned with policy decisions and 'without a strong 
interest in the success of the department'. The committee members thought it 
normal that a suspicion could arise 'in the public mind, that such officers 
would have a natural tendency to hush up .... complaints rather than bring 
16 them forward'. It was to allay such suspicions that it was concluded that 
it would conduce to public confidence in the system and would 
be a valuable safeguard against many abuses creeping into it, if 
means were taken to secure the inspection of prisons from time to 
time by persons appointed by the Government, but unpaid and 
unconnected with the prisons department. 17 
The prison directors protested that such a move would bring about 
organisational confusion since it would lead to a form of 'dual authority' 
notwithstanding the fact that it was evident that this inspectorate would 
have no powers of interference but simply the opportunity to investigate and 
report any suspicions to the Home Secretary, a copy of the situation which 
obtained in the local prisons. Like their counter-parts in the local prisons, 
they seemed to have had very little effect upon the prison service. The 
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general tenor of complaint against them, by bodies like the Howard 
Association, was that they approached their task with little real diligence or 
scrupulousness and made no great effort to distance themselves from the 
prison service. This failure to exercise any independent control upon the 
convict prisons would be replicated in the case of the local prisons, as we 
shall now see. 
4.2 Local troubles 
The strategy that was adopted in regard to the local prisons was different 
from the handling of affairs in the convict prisons for the very simple 
reasonthat the prison commissioners' influence and control were contested. 
Whereasin the convict prisons therewasa policy of secrecy and suppression 
of incriminating information, the commissioners could not trust the local 
operatives to do such a thing; therefore control had to be taken out of their 
hands to ensure that variations would become a thing of the past. 
The Camavon Committee had expressed its hope that there would be 
some move towards uniformity in matters penal; direct control from the 
centre was not envisaged, rather magistrates would be offered grants-in-aid to 
conform to Home Office standards, whilst being free to refuse and beat their 
own path. Several inspectors disagreed with the report's recommendations, 
particularly with a nationally enforced uniform dietary scale and a statutory 
definition of hard labour, as any variation would involve an application to 
Parliament, an objection with which the Home Secretary concurred. A bill, 
springing from the report, was drawn up. 
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Parliament itself was unwilling to invest in the Home Secretary the wide 
discretionary powers which were needed to implement a uniform policy, 
once it was admitted that hard labour could not be defined in law. The 
objections of the Bill's opponents were noted as Grey confessed that if the 
gaols wereto be left in local hands then 'you must be prepared to sacrifice 
something of that absolute uniformity which it may be desirable to attain'; 
equally, if sentencing was to remain a province of the local judges, then 
6you must submit to some inequalities and anomalies'. 18 The problem was 
resolved with a new Bill the following year which offered some broad 
based regulations, from which the local justices could choose and would be 
able to supplement them with variations of their own, as long as these were 
not at variance with the already outlined principles. 
Everyone was not satisfied with the 1865 Bill: Du Cane argued that the 
Home Office could do little with recalcitrant local authorities. The threat of 
withholding money existed but very often this was circumvented by what 
was believed to be special pleading; even if this was ignored and the local 
prison had to be closed, there was no means to oblige another gaol to 
accept these displaced prisoners. Furthermore, he contended that there was a 
surplus supply of prisons but the pride of various local regions prevented 
them from amalgamating. If all the local prisons came under national 
control, then major savings in expenditure could accrue. It was opportune 
that Disraeli's conservatives had been elected, borne along on the pledge of 
reducing the burden of rates-payers, so that the offer of economising on the 
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prisons whilst improving the quality of administration proved to be 
tantalising. 
To the surprise of all, many local authorities accepted the transfer of 
power and closure of some gaols quite willingly though occasionally there 
were struggles as 'the gaols were a major source of protest. All of this was 
dressed up in the clothes of civic dignity, self-sufficiency and tradition, but 
trade employment and political interests were the truer sinews of protest I. 19 
It had been promised that L100,000 a year could be expected but when 
this failed to materialise quickly it was remarked in Parliament that 'there 
was really no saving at all; neither was there any compensation for the great 
loss of independence and general supervision which the counties formerly 
exercised in the management of prisons'. 20 It was pleaded that it was 
impossible to draw comparisons between local and national accounting, and 
that once-off transitional costswould be involved in the changeover. 
The fragility of the finances made it all the more imperative that the 
prison service not be subjected to keen scrutiny so that scandals concerning 
excessive punishment and disquiet amidst prisoners would either have to be 
eliminated or hushed up. 
Prior to nationalisation, penal discipline had been a topic for 
widespread debate among the thousands of magistrates who 
operated the local prisons. It had, in addition, attracted the 
attention of lay commentators such as reform organisations and 
journalists, while the annual reports from the Inspectors of Prisons 
publicly catalogued prisons' strengths and weaknesses. Penal 
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administration was very nearly an open book. With an average 
daily population of some twenty thousand, an annual turnover 
exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand, and a large 
establishment of staff, opportunities for mishaps and complaints 
were omnipresent. These could easily be fanned into campaigns of 
public criticisms which could undermine the Commissioners' still 
fragile reputation. For this reason.... Du Cane sought a high level 
of confidentiality in his operations. And since he controlled 
access to the prisons, he succeeded in interposing a near 
impenetrable barrier between prisons and the community. 21 
The prison commissioner explicitly committed themselves to a reduction 
in the number of prisoners since they believed that a more uniform mode 
of managing prisons should bring with it a reduction in the number of 
punishments. 22 Very soon after nationalisation, it was claimed that there had 
been a drop in punishment from 60,000 to 42,000, but often punishments 
were simply omitted from the records, or combined and recorded as a 
single punishment and the forfeiture of marks was also passed over. 
The notion of education within local prisons received very little support 
from the commissioners and provoked clashes with the many local justices 
who had pioneered various educational schemes. The biggest change was 
that of cellular instruction, which drastically reduced the time the teacher 
could devote to the pupils as compared to the previous system of teaching 
in a class: one committee estimated it as a drop from three hours a week to 
six minutes. It is interesting to note how this issue would be resolved; 'Du 
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Cane resorted to what was now his favourite device for getting his own 
way- a departmental committee to which he made the nominations and 
dictated terms of reference', 23 in short a perfect example of what Lukes 
called two-dimensional power, organising the agenda so that issues inimical 
to one's own concerns are never broached. Thus whilst it had the 
appearance of deferring to a neutral arbiter, in reality the pitch was skewed 
before the other party ever even appeared on the field. The outcome 
reflected how the committee had been established and a report was 
produced which proved congenial to the Commissioners' desires. Only the 
absolutely ignorant would enjoy communal teaching and once a minimum 
standard had been reached, the prisoner was consigned to cellular 
instruction. 
This outcome enraged many visiting committees and at a general meeting 
one representative fulminated that 'what we want now is a good 
reformatory influence. There was something like a reformatory influence 
before the prisons were handed over to the Government. At the present 
moment there is nothing of the sort. It is all strict discipline which is 
carried out. Discipline is very good; but we want more than that. What is the 
good of sending a man to prison unless it is to reform him? 24 The Visiting 
Committees could, in fact, dovery little since control had passed out of their 
hands and they were met with arguments about the need to maintain 
discipline. 
How did the magistrates react in general to their emaciated role? 
Originally, a form of dual control was proposed whereby the justices would 
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have powers of patronage over the minor posts within the prisons. This was 
discounted after objections from several quarters, the principal one being that 
this would encourage cronyism but also it might well have placed, within 
the prisons, two distinct groups, each marked by its own esprit de corps and 
ideas on how the prison should be run. In the end, the 1877 nationalisation 
Act stripped justices of any executive powers that they had and relegated 
them to the role of inspection, for which they would be responsible to the 
Home Office, not to the Quarter Sessions. 
it was up to the individual visiting committees themselves to make the 
best of their circumscribed role; the commissioners were still fearful lest 
something untoward be discovered and brought to light. Du Cane suggested 
that rather than the visiting justices reviewing all the records themselves, 
they should pass on any suspicions concerning violations to the Home 
Secretary. This was an attempt to rig the system so that no serious abuses 
would ever be uncovered: how would the justices ever glean any trace of 
abuses if the records were never open to them and even if they did and 
informed the Home Secretary, he would presumably order the Commissioners 
to investigate the matter, for which they had been responsible. A reassurance 
was issued that the justices would be facilitated as much as possible, but in 
the obvious hope that they would not rock the boat too much and impede 
the executive authority of the governor. 
Prior to nationalisation, the magistrates had the power of admitting 
whoever they liked into the prisons, but the commissioners insisted that this 
indiscriminate stream of visitors should cease. A complaint was raised 
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concerning the reporting of floggings and executions; it was believed that 
people could only have become privy to these events through the local 
justices allowing them to visit the prisons; to prevent these reports, such 
visits were stopped. Although the privilege was continued in a truncated 
form, the committees had to be judicious in its exercise, since the Home 
Secretary threatened to remove this power from them if the prison 
administration was discomfited. 
The visiting committees had been trumpeted as a safe-guard against 
abuses; it was thought that ill-treatment would become easier to conceal 
once the national government had taken control of the prisons. However in 
many cases, they proved ill-equipped to adapt to their new role and failed 
to prevent serious abuses, even deaths, from happening in their jurisdiction. 
Though some were uncovered, it was usually left to an exculpatory 
committee to apportion out the blame. 
What had been striking before nationalisation was the timidity with 
which the Home Office confronted the local justices; how had there been 
such a striking turnaround in their relationship? The justices were, in the 
words of a contemporary, 'men of large property and great influence'. 25 
Though they were united in their repugnance of the new form of prison 
administration, they were in several minds as to what should be done about 
it. Some hoped to regain former powers and past glories, others wished to 
dedicate themselves to attacking specific policies with which they disagreed 
through concerted, detailed criticism and still more had no agenda other than 
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antipathy. Generally, reactions swung between an outright rejection of 
nationalisation and an acceptanceof acritical position within this framework. 
McConville writes that there were two possibilities facing this conference 
of committees: 'they could have chosen to see themselves as prison welfare 
committees; or they could have followed the path that had been laid down 
for them, and acted as inspectors and reporters'. As to the first option, there 
were already societies catering for the discharged prisoner and the visiting 
committees were eventually absorbed into them: 'concern with the released 
prisoner had swallowed concern with the prisoner in captivity'. 26 Regarding 
the second, it seems that the justices were too concerned with gaining some 
sort of executive position to deign to take up the role of inspection. They 
were urged to by several parties, since nationalisation had granted the 
commissioners control over the inspectors, a scenario which the Howard had 
complained was very objectionable. The justices had been sidelined and 
believed that any critical advice would be ignored and could not begin to 
accommodate and devote themselves to their new role. 
It was not simply a matter of the resources or influence that the local 
justices could or could not fail to summon up which explains their failure 
to effectively challenge the new prison regime; it was their inability to 
become unified in anything other than in a negative way, which facilitated 
their fall from a sphere of influence and precluded them from regaining any 
significant role within the new administration. 
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4.3 Special cases 
Many would concede that change is often not engineered but rather 
comesabout as an unintended consequence of two parties seeking to pursue 
their own distinct agendas without consideration for the aims of others. Yet 
this would still be too 'activist' a version of history if this is believed to be 
the sole engine of change. Often, change can be pressed upon one party 
simply through the existence of another, without this latter group entertaining 
any thought of change, perhaps without realising that they form a distinct 
category of people who have certain common characteristics and perhaps 
interests. The most obvious example today would be the effect of pensioners 
who through very little concerted action are wreaking the most profound 
changes upon the state as action is undertaken to cater for this expanding 
legion of people. 
Similarly, change was effected upon the prison service through the 
existence of both children and women, both of whom, it was thought, could 
not be subjected to the full rigours of a regime of uniform deterrence. This 
represented the greatest challenge that faced the prison service: how to cope 
with the need for specialisation (different treatment for different categories 
of people) whilst preserving some degree of uniformity throughout the 
service? The simplest way was to deny that these categories actually 
existed, which was the tactic employed in the case of the Fenians and that 
in turn was fiercely contested by them and their supporters. It was much 
more difficult to argue that there was no difference between adult male 
prisoners and women and children. This is not to say that there was any 
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great amelioration of their conditions but two differing policies can be made 
out which were deployed to deal with these respective groups. 
Prison officials tried to hive off the females from the rest of the prison 
population : 
females could be separated from the criminal mass, since even 
the most hardened and troublesome amongst them could easily 
(and comfortably) be seen as victims of vice, drink and aberrant 
femininity, rather than as calculating criminals. In need of a firm 
hand, certainly, but their nature and condition made them 
unsuitable for the male regime of regimentation and pervasive 
bodily discomfort and exertion. This reasoning made it both 
equitable and scientific to deal with female prisoners more as 
medical than legal cases. 27 
This policy of concentration was easiest in urban areas, since there would 
have existed several prisons so that one could have been set aside for its 
exclusive use by females. When this was impossible, women were said to 
suffer due to the lack of provision of educational facilities, which generally 
required a minimum number of people. Women were, however, excused from 
heavy labour and could not be whipped and the use of chains to restrain 
them was forbidden. 
Generally this policy of separation seemed to have worked and the 
women were not badly treated. Testimonies as to their conditions was 
sometimes hard to come since their right to a lady visitor was often 
resented and restricted by the prison authorities but common sensibility saw 
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that they did not unduly suffer. It was thanks to the paternalistic outlook 
which generally disadvantaged women, that female inmates experienced less 
of the rigours of penal life thantheir male counterparts. 
In some ways, children represented less of a problem since the agreed 
upon policy was one of exclusion: following nationalisation, the imprisonment 
ofjuveniles fell by more than 50%. Reformatory and industrial schools had 
been established, the former being intended for definitely criminal juveniles 
and the latter for vagrant children, though it was becoming increasingly 
difficult to hold to this distinction. Probation for first offenders, fines and 
sureties were also in use in an effort to guarantee that children would not 
have to be sent to prison. However, prison was still witness to a substantial 
influx of children; sometimes fines and sureties could not be provided, some 
children were repeat offenders and so could not be placed upon probation 
and there existed a stipulation that prior to being sent to a reformatory, a 
child had to spend 10 days in prison. 
Their presence posed a major obstacle to the objective of deterrence: 
sincethey could not be treated as severely as adults what was to be done 
withthem? The major initiative was separation, whether within the prison or 
removal to another. There were other changes but they were incidental 
toward any potential transformation of the regime. The prison commissioners 
were clear that their presence represented an unwelcome preoccupation 
which they could well do without. 
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There were other cases in which rules were relaxed in order to take into 
account special circumstances though this was a precarious business: 
occasionally there would occur a case in which it was felt that the law had 
been too harshly applied and equity demanded that there be some 
intervention against the processes of the law. Yet if there was a lapse from 
the strict letter of the law at one time, there may well have been a demand 
as to why a precedent had not been set. Such was the case with the 
Transvaal Raiders to whom a light sentence was handed down (first class 
misdemeanant) of which only the first part had to be served and then a 
Royal Pardon would come into effect. After this, the Irish demanded to 
know why their countrymen could not be accorded similar leniency in what 
seemed a similar situation. The prisons authorities were loath to interfere 
with the operations of the judiciary and only did so with extreme reluctance 
but - as in all the cases reviewed above - 'by heading off a public sense of 
outrage, [they] helped preserve support for the severe penal treatment of the 
residuum'. 28 They were well aware that by introducing a special category for 
one group of people might have had reverberations as another group 
demanded why regulations were being contravened in one instance and not 
another. 
4.4 Extending uniformity 
It should not be supposed that the aim of any group is to extend their 
views as widely as possible. Though it may seem that it was the intent of 
the prison directorate to ceaselessly extend control, this was not its prime 
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objective. It was rather the reduction in disparities of punishment between 
different Prisons and the accentuation of deterrence as the principle behind 
punishment. I have shown that the first did not necessarily entail 
centralisation but the second did, since those manning the local prisons could 
not be relied upon to place enough emphasis upon deterrence. Thus it was 
not the situational logic of what I termed the necessary complementarity, the 
connection between punishment and justice, which induced centralisation and 
further extensive control by the government but the prominence bestowed 
upon deterrence. We shall see that pursuing the links between punishment 
and justice (or equity) led to a reduction in the numbers of prisoners under 
the control of the prison authorities, once all prisons were answerable to the 
Prison Directors. 
Discontent had rumbled on throughout the century over perceived 
anomalies in sentencing with the main grievances being reserved for the gap 
in punishments between offences against the person and property which 
reflected the outlook of the presiding magistrates. This brewing unease was 
fortified bythe entrance of the Chairman of the Prison Directorate into this 
conflict, when he outlined his discontent concerning the anomalies within the 
sentencing system and particularly the lack of any intermediate sentence 
between a maximum of two years imprisonment and five years penal 
servitude. It was estimated that savings of over E43,000 a year could be 
collected if the average length of sentence fell by one year. He further 
enjoined a more careful study of the principles of sentencing policy which 
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he believed could be achieved through greater collaboration between the 
executive and judiciary. 
These claims were rubbished from one quarter precisely for this reason 
that 'the Secretary of State would be appearing to dictate how they [the 
judiciary] could exercise their discretion'. 29 The Home Secretary himself 
weighed in stating that one of the objects of the centralisation of the local 
prisons was 'to secure greater uniformity in the administration of prison 
discipline and consequently greater equality and identity in the punishment 
of crime'. There still remained a 'greater difficulty, viz. the means of securing 
somewhat more of harmony and uniformity in the extent of punishment, and 
the amount of sentences pronounced in similar cases'. A potential solution 
was that 'general rules... subject of course to the necessary exceptions in. 
particular cases ... should be safely laid down so as to lead to greater 
uniformity in practice'. 30 
Again the judges bucked under the thought of being circumscribed by 
some sort of statutory legislation. They raised the familiar objection that 
there was little to choose between abiding in utterly rigid fashion to a code 
and exercising some sort of discretion in applying the law. There was no 
way to foresee all the particular circumstances that would enter into the 
consideration of individual cases so that judges would have to be allowed 
some leeway. It was a oft-used defence that the shocking divergences failed 
to appear because all judges were bound by common norms and that such 
affinity could not be replicatedby any code. 
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It was obvious that attempts to tackle the lack of systernatisation in 
sentencing would incur opposition but it was also clear that failure to 
probe this matter would be to leave a task half-completed, a link noted by 
the Home Secretary but also by others. This connection was one of mutual 
benefit since the ideas were equally complimentary which is not to say that 
their implementation was any easy matter. Paradoxically if this connection 
was to be accepted, it would have the effect of cutting the reach of the 
prison service since inmates would dwell under its influence for a shorter 
period of time. Perhaps this should not be such a surprise, but following 
recent theorists who have contended that the prison is an important locus of 
social control, it is necessary to undercut the contention that those in charge 
of prisons sought to ceaselessly extend their influence. One of the great 
objections to this account is that it posits the inculcation of certain moeurs 
within prisoners as the primary end of the prison, regardless of any other 
considerations. This was not the greatest area of concern for the prison 
service in the period that we are investigating, intent as they were on 
making the system as efficient and economical as possible. 
The social effect of the ideational relationship that we called a necessary 
complementary was to encourage the promulgation and reproduction of the 
connection between these ideas. This is because few deny the obviousness 
and utility of the connection and so all get to work on ensuring that it 
comes to fruition. But did not the attempt to forge further connections 
between punishment and justice invoke opposition from the judiciary and so 
introduce divisiveness where there was none before and so disproves this 
163 
thesis concerning the social effects of a necessary complementary? The 
judiciary certainly objected to statutory legislation affecting their decision- 
making but they did not disagree with this connection but only argued that 
their present mode of sentencing represented the most appropriate fit 
between these two ideas and that common binding sentiments, not elaborate 
and abstruse legislation, would ensure that the principles of equity would 
prevail in sentencing. They did not reject the 'fit' between punishment and 
justice but claimed to have substantiated it as best as possible; this did not 
prevent them, at a meeting in 1892, from recommending the establishment 
of a court to review sentences which were thought to be 'wrong' and so 
procure greater uniformity in sentencing. This came to nothing as it was 
thought the problem of wrongful convictions was more serious but the 
judges were reluctant to interfere with the workings of the jury system. In 
1901 a committee of Queen's Bench judges met and though they were 
convinced that the purported disparity was much exaggerated, they did 
attempt to draw up certain standards of punishment which would be 
applicable unless some special circumstances applied since it would be 
convenient and of public advantage. It has been said of them that they were 
'remarkably moderate when compared with current practice. Never before had 
the judges of England made such a concerted effort to lay the foundation 
for a consistent sentencing policy. It might have been expected that their 
memorandum would have been made known to the quarter sessions, the 
chronic breeding ground of inequalities, but it never reached them'. 31 
Whatever about the success of this procedure, the judges tried to do more in 
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the eyes of the public to achieve greater uniformity, thus accepting the 
necessary complementary of punishment and justice. So it is evident that 
even the judiciary had accepted the rectitude of the connection between 
equal punishment and were simply disagreeing about the most favourable 
means to ensure that this link was clinched. 
4.5 Problems within 
The prison authority had proven to both a resourceful and powerful 
body; it had not come through the period of deterrence without mishap, but 
at the beginning of the 1880s it seemed to have weathered various squalls 
and was sailing serenely on. Crime would continually drop throughout this 
decade, which made the closure of uneconomic prisons all the easier and 
gave the impression that the boon of savings was being substantiated. Most 
of the Fenians had been released, there was no great uproar over the 
treatment of women and fewer youthful offenders were entering the prisons. 
There was little agitation on the part of the prisoners, so many of the 
elements which might have introduced unpredictability or the need for 
specialisation had been excluded or were already being catered for. The 
prison staff did wish to see their conditions improved but they had no 
disagreement with the broad thrust of policy. Even a body such as the 
Howard Association did not offer a radical critique of the prison service; it 
had guardedly welcomed the nationalisation of the local prisons and 
approved of the emphasis upon separation in penal practice. It did clash 
occasionally with the prison authorities but offered no alternatives to 
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prevailing penal practices; its tacit acceptance of the status quo provoked the 
Humanitarian League to denounce it as no longer being a progressive but a 
reactionary institution, affording no aid to novel ideas of a reformatory 
nature. Why then did there occur, 15 years later, a call for the whole 
ideological approach of the prison service to be changed? 
I alluded earlier to the problems inherent in the tactic of concentrating 
power in the grasp of those select few who could be trusted. As the remit 
of the Prison Commissioners spread, more and more gaols came under their 
control and had to be administered. This transferred the problem from the 
localities to the centre but did not change its nature. Civil servants from the 
Home Office were concerned about the administration of the prisons 
following nationalisation and' it was not definite that they would share the 
same beliefs as the Commissioners; nor were they to be as pliable as the 
Commissioners would have liked. One commentator writes that 'by the early 
1890s, there was a larger number of persons both at a senior level in the 
civil service and in parliamentary and government circles who would be 
sympathetic towards emergent ideas about the reform of criminals'. 32 There is 
no guarantee that such a group would be sympathetic toward the emphasis 
placed on deterrence and it is an open question which side they will 
support. It should not be presumed that such attempts to amass power, 
through centralisation, will always succeed. 
A succession of cases arose, where civil servants queried the harshness of 
a prisoner's circumstances and wondered if they could be alleviated: refusals 
to allow a prisoner be moved to a gaol nearer his family, delay in 
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examining a petition of complaint from a prisoner, close scrutiny of the 
circumstances under which an inmate died. These are all examples in which 
the prison commissioners were being subjected to scrutiny of a type which 
they had never experienced before, and they were slow to adapt to the new 
environment. 
When the Howard Association submitted a critique of various aspects of 
the prison service, it was treated with contempt by Du Cane, who memoed 
that 'this little peddling Assoc. [iation] is like the frog which tried to 
persuade itself and its neighbours that it was a bull- but it has considerable 
powers for mischief '. This was rebutted by a senior civil servant who noted 
that 'it is very difficult for any outsider to criticise successfully what goes 
on inside Prison Walls. He is sure to make mistakes from imperfect 
information & generalise too freely. Nevertheless if the criticisms are offered 
bona fide .... they should 
be respectfully considered, & occasionally they may 
be found to be of use'. 33 
What made the chairman so apprehensive was that the criticism touched 
upon staffing matters, an area where he had accumulated total control to 
himself and did not even consult his fellow commissioners, which one 
confessed later was very anomalous. Once the civil servants had been alerted 
to this anomaly, efforts were made to curb this dubious power of patronage. 
There was a continuing tussle with the chairman of the commissioners, 
unwilling to surrender this prerogative, but eventually ministerial privilege 
won out. A complaint was minuted that 'they [the Commissioners] are unable 
to understand why, after the many years in which they have conducted these 
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matters to the satisfaction of successive Secretaries of State .... they should 
now be repeatedly reminded of their position'. 34 Benign neglect had ensured 
that vacancies were filled by personnel which fitted his criteria, a policy 
which many had come to find peculiar. An increasingly large organisation 
found it difficult to function according to arbitrary whims or unstated 
assumptions; what the mentality of the civil servants demanded, was a set of 
clearly defined regulations which articulated the particular powers and 
responsibilities of everyone. 
Change was not brought about solely by a cadre imbued with beliefs, 
distinct from those formerly held in the prison service; their mentality also 
made them more receptive to external criticisms of the prison service. Some 
had always been sceptical of the possible results that might be achieved by 
a severely punitive regime and several articles in the Daily Chronicle 
testified to this lack of faith in the prisons. The author of these articles was 
almost certainly influenced by two other individuals, one of whom had spent 
some time in prison and the other had been an assistant chaplain at 
Wandsworth. The articles condemned the prison service for being inflexible, 
militaristic in outlook, inefficient, overcrowded and destructive of whatever 
character the criminals possessed upon entering prison. These articles, in turn, 
drew both approbation for their realistic depiction of life within the prison 
service and condemnation for its ill-founded arguments and personal abuse 
in the press. Other articles appeared, drawing attention to defects in the 
prison system, like its failure to prevent recidivism and the Humanitarian 
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League called for a full-scale review of the criminal law and a full and 
impartial inquiry into the system of prison government. 
The subsequent committee that was established enjoys the privilege of 
being the most cited in the literature of British prisons and its 
recommendations are often represented as a pivotal point for the service. Its 
terms of enquiry were loosely connected and susceptible to a extensive 
interpretation which reinforces the idea that it came about not due to 
departmental foresight but as a result of perceived public pressure. 
Whether with fore- or hindsight, the committee were unanimous on one 
general issue: that the prison service would have to dedicate more care 
towards the individual. Several aims flowed from this undertaking: 
1. Deterrence and reform were to be 'primary and concurrent objects' of the 
prison service. 
2. In order to facilitate the introduction of reformation, uniformity on 
treatment would have to concede some ground toward specialisation 
3. Criminals would be split up into similar categories so that specialised 
treatment could be devoted to each, and to prevent a malign development in 
first offenders. 
The 'contumacious' - the habitual criminals and drunkards and the weak- 
minded would be dealt with in a special fashion. 
4. There would be less emphasis upon separation and more training carried 
out under controlled association. 
It has been argued that the evidence received before the committee in no 
way justified these vastly significant and influential conclusions. Be that as 
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it may, the committee members obviously believed that there was some 
warrant for their departure from the classical model of deterrence; what were 
the underpinnings of this attitude and how strong were they? 
There has been considerable puzzlement over the decision to convert the 
basis of the prison system which relied almost exclusively on deterrence to 
that of a mixed system incorporating both deterrence and reform, especially 
since it had been as apparent success. The call for a more deterrent regime 
had received a spur in the decade after 1855 following the abolition of 
transportation and the subsequent proliferation of stories about convicts 
roaming the streets on ticket-of-leave licences, searching for victims. This fear 
did not faithfully reflect reality and there had been a downward trend in 
crime relative to population since the mid 1840s. This is no retrospective 
judgement; by the 1870s contemporaries proclaimed their satisfaction that 
'there never was, in any nation of which we have a history, a time in which 
life and property were so secure as they are at present in England' . 
35 This 
diminution of crime was accompanied by a drop in the number of 
committals to prison: the numbers in the convict prisons had dropped by 
more than half, from 12,000 in 1871 to under 5,000 in 1894; likewise there 
had been a fall of more than a third in the numbers of people in local 
prisons by 1894. Of the crime that was committed, much of it was not 
serious: 85% of people brought to court were guilty of theft, most of it 
petty and only 4% of convictions were for offences against the person. 
All of the above measures are consonant with an increased rate of 
recidivism, of crime being increasingly confined to a small group of people, 
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which was interpreted by some as a sign of success. The aim of penal 
policy had been one of general deterrence and if prisons were being swollen 
by a larger proportion of recidivists than before, then less and less people 
were being tempted to commit first offences. Obviously, this still leaves 
unanswered the question what was be done with those people who could 
not forebear from committing crimes. Advocates of a deterrent regime were 
unable to offer an answer to a problem which seemed to be immune to the 
deterrent effects of the prison regime. 
At the inception of the period of deterrence, all the cards seemed to be 
stacked in the favour of the prison authorities; it was subjecting independent 
prisons to increasing control, chiefly through insisting that certain standards 
be met and offering grants-in-aid for those prisons unable to cope 
financially, so binding them ever closer to the political establishment. The 
prison service was not an entity which existed to serve vital needs such as 
education, which did affect economic well-being; the only group which did 
negotiate in such a manner was many trade union bodies, whose profits 
could have been undercut if the prisoners had been allowed to engage in 
productive labour. The service demanded of it was more of a negative 
nature, that it control its inmates and ensure that they did not hinder the 
law-abiding citizen. If this goal was met, most people were not terribly 
interested in agitating for change. Most people did not include the prisoners 
themselves, yet even this should not be treated as an undifferentiated group; 
different groups of prisoners affected the prison service in different ways. 
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Change did not occur quickly since there is an obvious structural 
incompatibility between running auniform prison service and being able to 
respond to diverse needs, most often posed by the prisoners themselves. The 
slow pace of change very often means that frustrations will be built up as 
the political structure fails to respond to demands and change will occur 
after a critical point has been reached and frustrations boil over. It remains 
to be seen whether and how the structural incompatibility would be 
overcome. 
It should be noted that the structural arrangements of both centralisation 
and decentralisation bring their own respective problems, so that one is not 
clearly superior to the other. In this chapter we have noted some of the 
tensions inherent in a policy of centralisation, namely an inability to 
respond quickly and adequately to internal exigencies and to changes in the 
surrounding environment. It might seem that by loosening the reins and 
ceding some control to the units that made up the penal system, these 
problems could be overcome but this ushers some novel problems. Among 
these is the difficulty of retaining coherence among the parts so that they 
run in harmony and do not hinder each other's operations. This can only be 
done by the political centre retaining enough control to dictate the pace of 
change. Thus the unarticulated aim of the prison commission was to permit 
enough specialisation to deal with the different categories of prisoners but 
not enough to threaten the overall systemic shape of the prison service. The 
revisionist history is caught out by this structural incompatibility: either it 
admits that specialisation and hence reform carried the day but this would 
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be to concede that the reformatory program was the unintended result of the 
interaction of many different groups or else they argue that the government 
retained enough control to check some reformatory programs. As we will 
see, events were not so clear cut either way. 
I argued, at the outset, that once the link between punishment, as 
undertaken by a state agency, and justice was seen to be a necessary one, 
then the conclusion drawn was that there could not exist great anomalies 
between various practices of punishment. This was one of the chief 
conclusions of the Carnavon committee which wished to see less regional 
variation; later, much was made of the potential benefits that would accrue if 
control was exercised from the centre such as efficiency and economy. An 
assumption existed that once a uniform regime was in place the 
effectiveness of deterrence would increase. 
It is probably impossible to estimate the influence of the prison service 
upon the crime rate, but certainly some of the credit was apportioned to it. 
Like any intellectual enterprise, attention is first fixed upon resolvable 
problems, according to the accepted axioms, and only later does attention 
turn to the more recalcitrant problems. The policy of uniform deterrence, 
operating according to the principles of classical justice, which were based 
upon the notion of free will and the capability of every individual to 
abstain from an illegal act so that all criminals were equally responsible for 
their actions, seemed less able to cope with a solid mass of recidivists. It 
was believed that it was not a matter of changing personnel but of 
changing the whole approach of the prison service since 'the retention of a 
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compact mass of habitual criminals in our midst is a growing stain on our 
civilisation'. 36 
The recommendations of the Gladstone committee represented an 
awareness of a pause in the amelioration of crime but also a lack of 
certainty about how to resolve this problem. There was a reluctance to 
embrace all the implications of the new science of criminal anthropology. 
How much of a departure would adoption of this novel science from the 
classical principles of justice mean and what would be the effect of 
endorsing the findings of criminal anthropology? 
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5. Avenues of enquiry 
As we have seen, there had already been concessions made to both 
expediency and sensibility, by partly withdrawing from the model of uniform 
deterrence: women, children, Fenians, first class misdemeanants and members 
of the armed services did not share a common experience with the great 
number of the inhabitants of the prisons. During this period, advances were 
being made in science which would advance stronger reasons for 
discriminating amongst prisoners than political pressures or public 
sensibility. 
In 1859, Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species was published and soon 
after its ideas were being put to use in other fields of research. Francis 
Galton published Hereditary Genius in 1869 and fifteen years later Inquiry 
into Human Faculty. These two works fin-thered the idea that human 
characteristics are largely inherited and the former work suggested 
interfering with evolution to improve the stock of humankind; the latter 
work spoke of the criminal and his various pernicious qualities. Social 
Darwinism, of this kind, represented a great challenge to previous evangelical 
approaches used in prisons, because it seemed that human nature could not 
be changed for the better, through any sort of argument or inducement, since 
human characteristics had been largely determined at birth. 
This was the era of such sciences as phrenology which attempted to read 
off the characteristics of an individual from the shape of a person's skull; 
everyone was not equal for 'in the case of persons possessing the lowest 
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class of brains, we are presented with beings whose tendencies to crime are 
naturally very strong and whose powers of moral guidance and restraint are 
very feeble'l. This soon led to the (in)famous measurement of criminals' 
skulls within prisons to ascertain if there was any discernible difference 
between criminals and so-called ordinary citizens. Speculation soon arose 
whether the criminal not only possessed a distinct head type but whether he 
might not represent a completely different type of individual altogether, a 
Spenciarian throwback who had failed to evolve at the same rate as the rest 
of society. 
5.1 The Birth of Criminology 
The development of a 'science' like criminology depicts in classic 
fashion the process of what we would expect from a contingent 
complementarity. The archetypal lone scientist is suddenly struck by a 
moment of inspiration and ploughs ahead in an unthought-of direction, 
following up on his intuition and hunches. Thus Lombroso, speaking of his 
inspiration as he was conducting a post-mortern examination and opening his 
skull, said that 'this was not merely an idea, but a revelation. At the sight of 
that skull I seemed to see all of a sudden, lighted up as a vast plain under 
a flaming sky, the problem of the nature of the criminal - an atavistic being 
who reproduces in his person the ferocious instincts of primitive humanity 
and the inferior animals'. 2 There had certainly been precursors who had 
speculated upon the possible links between mental and physical states, but 
Lombroso was undoubtedly helped by a more receptive intellectual climate 
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which had recently been exposed to Darwin's hypotheses about man's 
connections with the animal kingdom. Intellectual development is not always 
a matter of an affinity of ideas but may be helped or hindered by structural 
factors; in this case it is difficult to envisage the rise of criminology, without 
there having been a large prison population on which observations and 
experiments could be based. Once the possibility, that criminal behaviour 
might not rest upon some entity labelled 'freewill', but upon something like 
a physical state of affairs had been mooted, the opportunity was there for 
people to indulge their wildest hypotheses, unconstrained by any logical 
connections to other ideas. This is not to say that there may not be 
allegiances and prejudices at the social level, which may militate against 
such innovation and cause people to shrink back from entertaining 
uncomfortable thoughts. 
By looking at the changes in the editions one can see how rapidly a 
new body of thought can accumulate, if not totally assimilate information. 
The first edition of L' Uomo delinquente was published in 1876 totalling 
252 pages but twenty years later, it had evolved into a three volume work 
of over 1,900 pages. New measurements and theories all helped to modify 
and expand his original thoughts upon the atavistic criminal type. In his 
later work the degeneracy of the criminal was stressed and the connections 
between thecriminal, the insane and the epileptic were explored. 
Lombroso believed he could recognise the criminal 'type' through 'the 
small skull, the developed jaw ... the retreating forehead, the voluminous 
ears ... low cranial capacity.... thickness of the bones of the skull 
3 as well as 
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various animal characteristics and believed this type represented a special 
sub-species. Lombroso had come to see that there were many characteristics 
shared by criminals which could not be explained by atavism so he argued 
that 'the fusion of criminality with epilepsy and with moral insanity could 
explain the purely pathological and non-atavistic phenomenon in the 
delinquent'. 4 If progress seems blocked, there is always a temptation to build 
up ever more fanciful theories to explain away anomalies. Lombroso 
believed that the 'facts, regardless of their apparent unrelatedness at the 
moment, would eventually accumulate into an emergent theory of universal 
applicability'5 but there is always the suspicion that some theory might be 
arbitrarily invoked to impose some sort of order upon this relentless fact- 
gathering. This sort of hasty repair-work might seem attractive in the short 
term, arresting as it does the flow of awkward anomalies which threaten to 
swamp the incipient theory but fails as a long-term remedy: the affinities 
might be superficial and prove to be fleeting, under any kind of controlled 
scrutiny. This was the course of events, as later criminologists examined 
Lombroso's work objecting, to his way of 'perceiving intuitive analogies, 
[as] his lively imagination led him to falsely to regard them as identities'. 6 
Perhaps the most telling criticism was his failure to provide definitions of 
the categories he was investigating and the lack of any control groups, with 
which to compare his results. All this is a common occurrence in the 
consolidation of a new school of thought whereby only the survival of the 
intellectually rigorous is assured. Often the following wave of researchers 
are not remembered for their positive formulations but for their negative 
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injunctions as they display scant disregard for the findings of the founding 
fathers of their disciplines and so prevent their ever being anything like a 
canon, which sets the standard for generations to come. This is not to say 
that the institutionalisation will always be accompanied by a debunking 
process; Ferri, for example, expanded the classification of * criminals to 
encompass many more subjects than Lombroso's original categories. 
Thus, Gabriel Tarde observed three patterns of repetitive behaviour in the 
activity of criminals and formulated three laws of imitation which he 
believed accounted for these regularities. Hardly anyone today would consider 
these worth disinterring but his criticisms of Lombroso are noted by all. He 
dismantled Lombroso's theories by noting that primitive societies were often 
law-abiding and moderate in their behaviour. The analogy between the 
savage and criminal was invalid; the criminal could not be compared to the 
madman since the criminal often thought in a logical fashion; and the 
criminal could not be reckoned to be an epileptic since fewer than 5% of 
prisoners had such a condition. 
Garofalo asserted that 'what criminal anthropology really lacks .... is 
convincing proof that a given character of the skull or skeleton is found 
more often among criminals than among persons presumably honest'. He 
then tried to make good this deficiency by supplying his own theory of a 
moral anomaly, which shows itself in a person possessing no altruistic 
qualities, whose selfish actions offend against the moral sentiments of pity 
and probity, without which no society could function and are indeed 
common to all. He believed that this moral anomaly was passed on by 
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hereditary transmission, 'established by unimpeachable evidence'7, but was 
always unable to unearth the precise physical mechanism of this anomaly. 
What we witness here is the situational logic of the contingent 
complementarity: a proliferation of knowledge-items and a consequent 
specialisation, in many different directions, as people concentrate on proving 
the validity of their own particular theories. Even if the accumulation of 
previous theories yields little of positive value, this is not necessarily a 
dead-end, since it may offer hints to further paths of research. There are no 
fixed boundaries which circumscribe the legitimate area of investigation; 
once it is admitted that factors external to the individual may be influential 
in the cause of crime, there are a bewildering variety of factors (social, 
genetic, climatic etc. ) which can fit this role, in isolation or in combination. 
Furthermore each of the possible variables can be pared down to give ever- 
finer distinctions, all of which is fully intelligible only to the resident expert. 
This lack of prohibition on investigation is perhaps the greatest stimulant to 
the increase in variety and specialisation that is a hallmark of this complex 
of ideas. 
If all these theorists were divided by what might serve as a reliable 
indicator of a criminal, they were united by a lack of faith in prisons and 
they had even less time for any reformatory approaches within them. I'or 
Lombroso the knowledge that there existed bom criminals steeled him 
against any pity; as his daughter wrote, reviewing his work: 'imprisonment 
does not serve to intimidate instinctive criminals, [since they are congenitally 
inclined to this sort of activity] still less is it a means of rehabilitation'. 8 
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For Garafalo, the existence of the criminal signified a failure to adapt to the 
level of behaviour demanded by society, and just as in the animal kingdom, 
the price to be paid for this lack of malleability was to be elimination, if 
not by death then by removal to an overseas colony. Ferri did not endorse 
such measures but certainly advocated that criminals should be assigned to 
one of the five classes he had discovered, to ascertain the proper measure 
of punishment, among which were indeterminate sentences. 
This new science dealt a far more severe critique to the assumptions of 
the classical school on the level of sentencing; it would have involved a 
complete uprooting of these classical premises. Ferri offers an example of 
the frustration felt at the stultifying effects of the classical school, based 
upon the presumption that every infraction is the result of freely willed 
choice and that this liberty is applicable in all situations, and its increasing 
detachment from reality: 'now the classical school, which sprang from the 
marvellous little work of Beccaria, has completed its historic cycle. It has 
yielded all it could, and writers of the present day who still cling to it can 
only recast the old material. The youngest of them, indeed, are condemned to 
a sort of Byzantine discussion of scholastic formulas and to a sterile 
process of scientific rumination'. 9 
One of the greatest obstacles towards understanding the true nature of 
criminality was the notion of free will which meant that the 'classical 
school rested on a fiction... The fiction consisted in this; in believing that 
before the same action each person had an equal degree of liberty'. 10 
Criminology would dispel this fiction and in so doing would destroy 'the 
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initial equality, i. e. the judicial equality of punishment .... the idea that, for the 
same crime, it is necessary to have an identical punishment in nature and 
duration is no longer really sustainable'. 11 Instead of adapting the punishment 
to fit the crime with the result that many criminals received roughly the 
same sentence for a similar offence, criminology would adapt punishment to 
suit the individual offender. Out would go any notion of proportion between 
offence and penalty and of uniformity of punishment across a range of 
offenders. It was believed that the principles of classical justice were a 
chimera, a piece of indulgent metaphysics which were no longer sustainable, 
after scientific investigation revealed the true basis of criminality, and were 
proving to be of diminishing utility. 
Garland believes that this new science was united not only by its 
opposition to the classical status quo but also by the set of measures which 
were elaborated to deal with criminals; 
criminality was thus to be eliminated, either by prevention, 
reformation or extinction. This triple strategy required not only 
procedures of assessment and classification, which could identify 
offenders as corrigible or incorrigible, but also a diversity of 
dispositions, sanctions and techniques to implement these 
objectives. Thus we find that a major demand of the 
criminologists was for an extended repertoire of penal sanctions 
and institutions, including juvenile reformatories, preventive 
detention institutions, institutions for inebriates, for the feeble- 
minded, a variety of prison-regimes, forms of supervision, 
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conditional liberation, indeterminate sentences and pre-delinquent 
institutions. 
He finds that such measures were endorsed by a large number of newly- 
accredited criminologists and wonders 'what was the basis of this 
consistency ? How could this new discourse establish such stability and 
uniformity in such a small space of time and over such a large international 
terrain'. He adduces two possible reasons: 
(1) Simple repetition of various works 
(2) The social implications if these prognoses were accepted 
His first point seems to be that criminology was not bound by any 
ideational constraints, i. e. a hypothesis concerning criminal behaviour was not 
tied to any one explanation. This allowed various explanations to be put 
forth, many of which were collected together by individual criminologists, 
with little thought as to any orderly combination. Since criminality was a 
pressing social problem 'its investigators were committed more to that 
solution than to any single or coherent theory of human behaviour'. 12 
Garland has derived the opposite conclusion from what I would expect from 
the logic of the contingent complementary, but this is explained by his 
conflation of the ideational and social. Certainly there existed a widespread 
desire to modify criminal behaviour but this did not translate into a single 
diagnosis and prognosis. Many hypotheses were ill-adapted for mutual 
accommodation but this is to be expected in the onset of a new specialism; 
more rigorous questioning ensues, as more and more people are attracted to 
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this field and reflect critically on established findings, contributing to cultural 
elaboration. 
As theory became more elaborate, importance had to be attached to the 
various possibilities; the development of criminological theory cannot be 
pictured as a choice between two potential explanations, the environment 
(and how many variables are included in this term) and individual 
constitution, because then a 'mono-causal dispute of substance thus became a 
13 mere questioning of priorities within a multi-factorial approach'. These 
priorities had to be weighed and assessed relative to each other, for how 
else could it be estimated how effective various treatments might be? Were 
people genetically determined to be criminals or could upbringing have a 
decisive effect upon dispositions? Could such putative genetic traits be 
passed onto offspring so that perhaps society should intervene to prevent 
such unions issuing fruit? If social conditions are perhaps partially 
responsible for moulding criminal behaviour, how much effort and resources 
should be devoted towards alleviating these? Once it had been mooted that 
criminal behaviour was not wholly due to the individual's free-will, it 
opened a huge range of possibilities which could claim some sort of causal 
role; how heavily each of these was emphasised, influenced greatly the 
subsequent action designed to alleviate the problem and so a vague 
eclecticism was of little value. Tarde was well aware of both the tension 
which had arisen between the existing criminal law and the proposals of 
criminology, 'their flagrant disagreements with the new ideas of morality 
which are beginning to come to light' and the 'contradiction between these 
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ideas among themselves'. He castigated other criminologists for having 
passed over the causative possibilities of 'social factors' and criticised them 
for having come up with a definitive criminal type since 'crime is a 
crossroad of hidden ways coming from diametrically opposite points ... Thus 
there must ... a very large number of physical indications, often contradictory, 
which would disclose propensities to crime to an eye capable of unlimited 
penetration' and so there 'are as many different criminal types as there are 
anthropologists'. 14 Tarde clearly perceived the effects of the situational logic 
of the contingent complementarity and the proliferation of explanatory 
models that it encourages. 
The second reason why it is believed that criminology gained such a 
wide hearing so quickly, was that action based upon its recommendations 
could only be carried through by the state and so was supported by 
agencies and groups who stood to gain from increased state intervention: 
'criminology implied an elevation in the status and power of the likes of 
prison executives, forensic scientists, psychiatrists and other penological 
experts. It widened the fields of medicine, psychiatry and even sociology to 
cover what had been previously a judicial domain, and sought to effect a 
shift of power away from the judiciary and towards a non-legal executive 
staff . 
15 There is a presumption here that individuals will always try to 
extend their control and power and that the reasons for which they do so 
are a mask for gaining such advancement; the Foucauldian affinities are 
clear as are its weaknesses, since it makes ideas subservient to material 
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interests. That some members of these professions might be doubtful of this 
new science, on account of its theoretical basis, is never entertained. 
8.2. The English Reception of Criminological Ideas 
No longer is it the notion of free will which divides the dutiful citizen 
from the wilful offender; in some unspecified manner the criminal has been 
caused to offend. The criminal's background must be investigated more 
precisely to ascertain precisely what this mode of determination could have 
been, to arrive at a classification of the criminal. Having gained this 
knowledge, an exact punishment can be derived, which will be used to 
eliminate this criminal behaviour. Hence the profusion of eugenics which 
sprang from a belief in crime being hereditary. 
Whether the English prison authorities were able to countenance such 
unpalatable conclusions, there is little sign that these findings had made any 
impact in England; in 1890 Havelock Ellis complained that 'in the last 
fifteen years there is no scientific work in criminal anthropology to be 
16 
recorded' and that 'as an exact science [it] is yet unknown in England'. He 
set great store by the efficacy of the indeterminate sentence and he 
contended that 'the key to the failure of the prison, and a chief clue in its 
reform, lies in the system of administering definite and predetermined 
sentences by judges who being ignorant of the nature of the individual 
before them, and therefore of the effect of the sentence upon him, and of its 
17 justice, are really incompetent to judge' . This was a constant refrain of 
those who wished to reform the prisons, that consideration would have to be 
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given to detaining the individual criminal within a prison or some sort of 
detention centre, for as long as was necessary for treatment to take effect, 
though it was not usually allied with such stark criticism of the judiciary's 
expertise. 
Here we are able to witness the inchoate phenomenon of what was 
termed a contingent complementarity, the drawing of connections between 
ideas which are neither opposed to each other nor logically connected but 
which are mutually complementary to a degree. Punishment was thought to 
be necessarily connected to the idea of justice, of equal treatment for all for 
those who had committed the same offence. Criminology now threatened to 
uncouple this linkage as it suggested that punishment should be adapted to 
particular circumstances to be rendered more effective. 
Since I have argued that it was incumbent upon government to provide a 
similar system of punishment for all offenders, we would expect this 
innovation to be resisted. It was a measure not only of the faith, that all 
those involved in the penal system had in the rectitude of the underlying 
ideational support (indicating no serious splits within the prison service), that 
they felt no need to reply to these proposals, but, more importantly, that the 
relationship between a necessary and contingent complementarity needs 
activation by some social group. Although the relationship is one of 
opposition, it does not inexorably impose itself upon people. 
It is an empirical question, whether these ideas will first manifest 
themselves through personnel connected with a particular regime, or from a 
source wholly removed from it. As Havelock Ellis had pointed out, within 
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the circle of English prison administrators, there was no trace of the 
intellectual ferment which had coursed through many other European 
countries, as a result of this new path of enquiry, developed over twenty 
years. This was no accident, as English officials had made themselves 
conspicuously absent from various associations and meetings at which the 
implications of this new research were drawn out and discussed. This 
ensured that nobody would be exposed to the hostile stock of ideas which 
were circulating and be able to formulate a criticism of the prevailing ethos 
within the prison system. What such a tactic can accomplish is to cut off 
the means of formulating such criticism but it cannot stifle the actual 
dissatisfaction felt by some, even if it has been totally muted. It erects a 
wall to prevent hostile ideas penetrating but like many exercises of power 
may actually accentuate the frustration felt, and may entice people to scale 
this wall to seek out a means of criticism. This is, in fact, what Havelock 
Ellis did, attending the various conferences in a private capacity. 
The opposition will usually first manifest itself in the form of a fewdis- 
contented subordinates (since those at the top have most to lose by 
questioning the basis of their regime), who slowly begin to articulate an 
antagonistic program to the dominant ideas of the time. Recall that 
Morrison was a prison chaplain who gained his inspiration to uncover a 
more effectivepenal program, after dwelling on the perceived failings of the 
received model in a steadfastly deterrent regime. To quell such dissent, if 
actively articulated, it is no longer sufficient to simply ignore it; this is 
usually only done if there is no internal dissent. Discrediting tactics will 
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most often be used and these will not always be confined to rigorous 
intellectual probing; very often they will consist of abuse, ridicule and the 
elaboration of tenuously connected consequences, all designed to make these 
nascent ideas as unattractive as possible. 
It is an open question what the disaffected do now but if they seem to 
bemaking little headway within the system they may well opt for a quick 
exit, having received such an unenthusiastic reception. Those whose task it is 
to oversee the smooth implementation of the 'dominant ideology' may well 
be relieved to see these marginals disappear, since troublesome elements 
have been removed and the task of ideational contamination has been 
lessened. These marginals will no longer be working as double agents, they 
will have declared their true colours even if they only know what they are 
against, being unsure as to where their true allegiance lies. Defects of the 
previously dominant ideology spurred them to seek alternatives, and if a 
credible substitute is still lacking, it will be up to them to build one up. 
What happens next is dependent upon a host of empirical factors: how 
successful these marginals are in establishing a credible program which can 
challenge its rival, which has become discredited in their eyes, how many of 
the previously unaligned can be enticed to take an interest in this 
burgeoning contest, and how seriously the newly-founded rival is taken by 
those who still command a dominant position. Each of these are presented 
in consecutive fashion since the success of one will affect that of the 
following. 
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The reaction of those, whose reign has been rudely challenged, is 
dependent upon a number of factors also: did the outflow of the 
discontented provoke a crisis of confidence or a sigh of relief, how radical a 
reshuffle would the incorporation of this new knowledge involve? If it would 
completely undercut what had been the main ideational support (such as the 
conjoint notions of free will and responsibility which were at the heart of 
the classical notion of punishment), then alternatives will be subject to 
derision. This may not be so effective now that the marginals no longer 
occupy a place within the regime so that official reprimands will not work. 
Pouring cold water on unwelcome ideas may work if their holders do 
occupy a marginal role within society but will be less powerful if their 
backers number among the powerful. I will examine in the following chapters 
the fate of this nascent theory and whether it proved hardy enough to 
withstand the trials of social life and whether it found a protective 
guardian. 
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6. Striking a balance ? 
The period following the Gladstone report is crucial to revisionist 
histories, for given its emphasis upon reform, this allows them to argue that 
reforrn and related treatments achieved a hitherto unobtained prominence in 
penal policies. Reformatory institutions became an adjunct to the existing 
penal institutions and relieved them of categories of prisoners who had 
proven refractory to change and subjects the prisoners to either 
'normalisation'- making them act in accordance with the requirements of 
good citizenship, correction - detaining them on an indeterminate sentence 
until their conduct is satisfactory, or segregation - this covers all those 
categories that cannot be assumed by the Ist two polices. Each backs the 
other up so if a prisoner cannot be treated according to one policy another 
one awaits. 
I will question how thoroughly such policies were implemented given the 
necessary contradiction between reform and deterrence. In particular I will 
query whether each category of prisoner could be treated according to 
reformatory criteria or whether these had to be balanced by some measure 
of deterrence. To install some measure of reform into the penal 
establishments, the commissioners had to rely on many groups which did 
not share their beliefs totally, yet these do not feature very strongly in the 
revisionist account. I wrote in Chapter I that vested interests, which 
institutional structures distribute, are ignored by the power/knowledge 
formula; I will show how various groups, such as the Church Missionaries, 
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the prison officers and others, disagreed with the extent of reform desired 
by the prison commissioners, yet such divisiveness never features in the 
revisionist case. Their resistance is a crucial factor in how extensive reforms 
became. 
If prison officials had accumulated a great deal of control, there still 
remained the problem of dealing with those categories of prisoners which 
had proven resistant to a regime of deterrence, and resolving the dilemma of 
reconciling proportionate punishment for a particular crime with proposals 
for indefinite confinement, and, simultaneously, balancing reform and 
deterrence. It was not simply a matter of identifying a particular group 
(though this was in itself an enormous task) and subjecting these to a 
reformatory program and dealing with the vast mass of the prison populace 
as before, for the 'whether to reform and to what exteriff was posed by the 
categorisation of each group. The prison commission wished to initiate a 
slow, steady pace of reform, distancing itself from what it saw as untenable 
policies from abroad. What could unsettle this cautious approach was if the 
attempted reconciliation between deterrence and reform was deemed by some 
to be insufficient; an assault which could come from adherents of both ideas 
if they believed that their convictions were being placed in the shade. There 
does not have to be a set of ready-made alternative ideas, waiting to be 
brandished by the discontented, merely dissatisfaction with the direction of 
existing policies, for existing ideas to be questioned. The prison commission 
were also attempting to introduce a degree of specialisation within the penal 
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system, which meant involving many more personnel and bodies than 
before, in the administration of the uniform service. Control over these new 
agents will not be as tight as was the case with personnel who held 
positions within the convict service; preceptual edicts to the effect that 
certain policies should be observed, regardless of any misgivings, will not be 
effective with these more autonomous agents; they might well have their 
own ideas how the prison service should be run and more importantly, the 
possibility of making their beliefs count. 
Penal strategies in the first half of the 20th century underwent a great 
change, not always apparent to the people involved in the prisons, as many 
policies other than sending offenders to prison emerged. There was a shift 
of emphasis away from sending people to prison for short periods of time 
(usually less than a month) and also for long periods of time, with many 
sentences of penal servitude sticking to the statutory minimum of three 
years, and toward such policies as putting offenders on probation, a great 
increase in the payment of fines, and particular institutions being developed 
for single categories of offenders. I will now trace the development of these 
strategies and the problems encountered therein, keeping in mind the 
necessity of maintaining a balance between deterrence and reform and the 
principles of justice, uniformity and equality of treatment. 
6.1 Reactions to the Gladstone Committee 
The Gladstone report received little fanfare in the national press as there 
was a general election in the offing and it was not a bone of contention 
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between the Conservatives and Liberals. The Commissioners' response was 
important since it would be an indication of their sentiments about a more 
reformative regime and the lengths they would go to facilitate its 
establishment. 
A call had been issued for prisoners to be employed in labour of a more 
useful kind and the commissioners agreed to the abolition of the treadwheel 
and crank. They insisted that penal labour of a deterrent nature was 
essential, ceding the necessity of dispensing with the symbols of the 
previous deterrent regime, but still wished to retain their efficacy. They 
recognised the need for special treatment of juveniles but said little about 
women. Habitual offenders were divided into two categories, petty and 
serious, and, for the latter, they wished for longer sentences and closer 
supervision upon release. Only if this was proven to have failed, would they 
countenance detention for indefinite periods. They rejected any new powers 
for inspectors, including a proposal that inspectors should report directly to 
the Home Secretary. They made a plea for the reformatory nature of the 
prison system, despite its lack of notable accoutrements which would strike 
those unacquainted with the prisons; they would rely on a 'quiet and 
unostentatious method of orderly government, i. e. on discipline'. Not a so- 
called military discipline which fails to respect the humanity of men but 
which 'insists on order and obedience and cleanliness and industry as a 
primary and essential condition of imprisonment'; this would aid those weak- 
minded individuals whose failings were 'principally due to moral instability, 
ensuing from the absence of those controlling and steadying influences 
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which are implied in the phrase prison discipline'. If this were bome in 
mind, the commissioners were sure that 'the English system will compare 
favourably with any foreign or colonial system'. ' 
The Home Office and prison commissioners were unsure whether they 
should press ahead with a comprehensive Bill, attempting to incorporate 
refonn within prison administration. This would have required a complicated 
Bill and there seemed to be little will for such an undertaking; it was then 
that Home Office officials hit upon the idea of removing most of the prison 
rules from statutory legislation and making them subject to the discretion of 
the Home Secretary. This practically excluded Parliament from any input into 
rule-making and increased the power of the officials. 
The proposed change was partly justified by the supposed ease with 
which the prison service could adapt to changes in public sentiment, rather 
than being chained to outmoded rules. The sought-after flexibility would be 
vested in the Home Secretary, dealing with offenders according to their 
nature. In Parliament, unwilling to disturb circumspect temperaments, the 
Home Secretary spoke of 'careful and cautious experiments'. The Daily 
Chronicle, which had first levelled charges at the prison service, attacked the 
Home Secretary for his circumspect approach, using information which 
Oscar Wilde had gathered during a period in prison. The campaign was 
intended to stir up Liberal support, the Irish needing no encouragement to 
wade in and rebuke the prison authorities for their inhumanity and lack of 
sensitivity to the individual prisoner's circumstances. 
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A great number of liberals refused to see the Bill in this light, preferring 
instead to see it as a 'compromise between the present state of things and 
the demands made by those who advocate sweeping alterations'. 2 The Tories 
were at one with the Liberals and offered very little criticism but rather 
suggestions. Despite promises at committee stage to provide some of the 
desired reforms most of these were withdrawn. The reformers had long been 
crying out for flexibility and the Bill seemed to promise this; most 
politicians could not conceive it as being a retrograde step for civil servants 
to have the power to change rules. Parliament had ceded control of the 
prisons and itcould only veto rules but not instigate proposals itself. 
6.2 Possibilities for Change 
Did the new avenues of enquiry, opened up by the development of 
criminology, make any inroads on the existing conception of punishment 
within the penal system? The questions raised by criminological 
investigations were taken up not only by mavericks such as Ellis and 
Morrison, who were sceptical of the existing modes of punishment, but also 
by personnel who worked in the prison service but were far less 
questioning of the basis of punishment. It would be an error to believe that 
their support for the prisonservice was purely as a result of intimidation by 
the prison authorities, lending support to the view that ideational elaboration 
is a result of socio-cultural meddling. Many personnel did not seem to be 
convinced by the explanations offered for asserting the existence of a 
criminal type and for revising the criminal law: one claimed that 'there are 
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no theories of criminal anthropology so well-grounded and exact as to 
justify their introduction into a revised criminal law'. 3 It was accepted that 
environmental circumstances could play a part, but these could only be 
admitted as extenuating circumstances, mitigating the guilt of the individual 
but not absolving it. There was a recurrent fear that if the principles of 
criminology were accepted, then there would no longer be a basis for 
punishing offenders and respect for the law would be weakened. 
If there was a rejection of a wholesale acceptance of criminology, perhaps 
piecemeal it was a different story. The notion of an individual who was 
predisposed to crime seemed to have been confirmed by the phenomenon 
ofrecidivism, of individuals who were being continually committed to prison 
but on whom it had little effect. The prison commission, at the turn of the 
century, had made clear their desire to tackle this problem by means of 
some kind of refonnative regime, but to improve on such vagueness, more 
had to be uncovered concerning the basis and reasons for criminality. 
Tests on a large scale were to be carried out by Charles Goring with 
over 3,000 samples. Physical measurements and tests of mental ability were 
to be taken, the intention being that a solid collection of data would dictate 
to theory what, if any, was the origin of criminality. He likened criminology 
to an 'organised system of self-evident confusion whose parallel is only to 
be found in the astrology, alchemy and other credulities of the Middle 
Ages .... so criminology 
has been a superstitious study, based upon a 
preconceived notion of the criminality of criminals as found in prisons'. 
4 
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The examination was a laborious process, encompassing over 96 variables 
that were to be tested for a correlation with criminal habits. Having 
compared criminals with various control groups, the conclusion reached was 
that there was no such thing as a physical criminal type. The report 
downplayed the effect of environmental circumstances lending them only a 
'trifling' influence. What could be dogmatically asserted was that 'the 
criminal is differentiated by inferior stature, by defective intelligence and to 
some extent by his anti-social proclivities; but apart from these broad 
differences, there are no physical, mental or moral characteristics peculiar to 
inmates of English prisons'. 5 While its reception on the Continent was a 
decisive setback for the school of criminal anthropology, in Britain it evoked 
a mixed reception. Some, always convinced of the futility of criminology, 
could not see why such an elaborate examination had to occur at all. Others 
were critical of his estimation of hereditary influences, that crime was 
'inherited at much the same rate as are the other physical and mental 
6 qualities and pathological conditions in man' , which seemed to suggest a 
new sort of determinism and the relative downplaying of environmental 
influences. The acceptance of the supposition that some are 'predestined to a 
criminal career', unmodified by any effective influences after birth, would 
'call in question the whole responsibility of any person guilty of an anti- 
social act' and 'the doctor would usurp the function of the judge, and the 
bankruptcy of the old penal system would be complete'. 7 
Such a tactic is familiar to us as scare-mongering, but familiarity should 
not occlude what is being done. This labelling is a form of what Lukes 
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calls 3rd dimensional power, an attempt to structure the intellectual 
environment in which debate takes place. By placing certain ideas beyond 
the pale or indicating that an 'appalling vista' will open up if they are 
accepted, the motives and reactions of people are being moulded into 
rejecting the unwelcome theoretical developments. If the existing state of 
affairs is seen as the natural way of doing things, it is all the more 
effective, because it seems so reasonable. But it will only be effective if the 
group advocating the new ideas are a small minority, without many 
resources of their own; it depends on the great majority of the relevant 
population unquestioningly rejecting the alternative, hence the attempts to 
induce this by pointing out the most extreme and unwelcome consequences. 
Goring's report was more welcome for its rejection of Lombroso- in 
truth, this was flogging a dead horse - than for its advancement of inferior 
intellect and physique transmitted through criminal 'stocks' and advocacy of 
techniques favoured by the eugenics movement to deal with this problem. 
Prison medical staff were reluctant to extend the definition of irresponsibility 
beyond the insane and severely mentally ill and instead sought to stress 
'social and environmental forces' which could either confirm or convert any 
such inherent pre-disposition. In the words of Cyril Burt, speaking about 
young offenders, delinquency was 'the outcome of a concurrence of 
subversive factors: it needs many coats of paint to pitch a thing black 8; it 
could not be ascribed to one single factor. A distinction was drawn between 
mental deficiency and backwardness, the argument being that most criminals 
fell into the latter category because of unfavourable environmental conditions 
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especially the family. Hence the efforts in many supposedly reformatory 
institutions to create an environment conducive toward developing a law- 
abiding temperament. 
6.3 Dealing with Recidivists 
The chairman of the prison commissioners, Ruggles-Brise, was well aware 
of how a uniformly administered prison service had failed to deal with all 
groups of delinquents adequately, and that it had failed to cope with 
recidivism. He did not wish to treat recidivists to a more lax sentence nor 
did he want to impose sentences that were completely disproportionate to 
the offences. He proposed that sentences for the most recent offence had to 
be served out and any sentence of preventive detention could only be as 
long as the legal maximum time for the offence. Admitting that these 
periods of extended detention might be more relaxed than common penal 
servitude, convicts were to be transferred to a separate location, run under a 
more liberal regime. The judges articulated their apprehension about 
introducing such a departure from customary penalmeasures but still wished 
to do something about those individuals who wouldnot abstain from crime. 
They suggested a stay, amounting to 75% of the offender's sentence, in the 
more relaxed penal colony. A formula was devised by which an offender 
would serve some time (not less than 25% of his total sentence) in penal 
servitude and the rest in a habitual offender division, known as the 'dual- 
track' scheme, and if the offender had a previous conviction then he must 
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serve five years in this section of the prison system. This proposal was 
attacked as the new regime did not offer anything radically different from 
what penal servitude offered and it failed to define adequately what a 
habitual criminal was, a lacuna which was to bedevil all attempts'to cope 
with this problem. 
Despite the nebulous notion of a habitual criminal it was believed that 
those who were subjected to preventive detention should live under a 
relaxed regime which, due to its length, would still prove to be a deterrent. 
It was essential that something be seen to be done about recidivism, 
otherwise the proposed reforms, throughout the prison service, would be 
jeopardised. In 1908 Gladstone tried to revive Ruggles-Brise's combination of 
penal servitude and he distinguished between two types of habitual offender: 
those who had deliberately chosen crime as a way of life- the professional 
criminal- and those who fell into it due to some kind of deficiency- the 
petty offender who was more of a nuisance. The former would be taken to 
a special colony for indeterminate detention, having served at least three 
years penal servitude. This 'dual-track' scheme was attacked by those who 
believed that the preliminary part of the sentence in penal servitude was 
unnecessary and an offender, who was given a long sentence, would be seen 
to have paid his dues through his sentence of penal servitude and 
preventive detention would fall into disuse. Other objections came from 
Liberals and Irish nationalists who had always distrusted the prison officials 
and did not believe that a prisoner should only be released at the behest of 
the Home Secretary, supported by the 'pseudo scientists with broken down 
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reputations like Lombroso's'. 9 This had some force and the Home Secretary 
protested that the new colonies would include a reformatory element, 
indicating the degree of conftision that existed with regard to what exactly 
was a habitual criminal. Was he to be simply contained indefinitely or 
should he be treated with release in mind? The government withdrew this 
proposed prerogative of release upon the say-so of the Home Secretary and 
allowed the Higher Courts to impose a maximum sentence of ten years and 
a minimum of five, with an Advisory Board free to choose a release date 
any time between these two limits. 
The first preventive detention centre was opened on March 5th, 1912 and 
the prison commissioners tried to make it different from the normal prison 
regime. There were three grades- disciplinary, ordinary and special - the first 
most akin to the conditions of normal penal servitude for the refractory 
prisoners. Those in the other two grades could work at trades, earning a 
small gratuity which they could spend in the canteen; the prisoners were 
allowed to associate at mealtimes and join in recreational activities after 
meal-times. Those nearing release were placed in parole cabins which were 
independent units of accommodation possessing their own lavatories and 
kitchens. After two years, prisoners were allowed 'relaxations of a literary 
and social character' namely tobacco and newspapers. It is not clear whether 
all these conditions were all part of a clear plan to alter the attitude of 
prisoners or were simply a sop to enable them to ignore their extended 
sentences. The prison officials were well aware that they had departed from 
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normal procedure and they did not wish the public to know too much, as it 
would 'provoke criticism and needless suggestions for alterations in detail'. 10 
Surprisingly, agitation came from the prisoners themselves and the 
authorities quickly responded by sending the ring-leaders back to convict 
prisons. The commissioners made an effort to uncover the nature of their 
grievances and found that many prisoners believed that the term of penal 
servitude sufficed for punishment and that Camp Hill would be a place of 
detention. They thus demanded some of the conditions of a free life, liberty 
excepted. The prisoners had no interest in maintaining any semblance of 
deterrence and pushed the argument to its logical conclusion, namely, that if 
conditions of deterrence were not to have a hold over them then purely 
reformatory policies should be put in place. Of course, it was still an open 
question as to what exactly constituted a reformatory regime and did not 
necessarily (a conceptual necessity) mean a painless regime, but would have 
meant that severely punitive policies, implemented without consideration of 
the prisoners' opinions, were discounted. The prisoners had been quick to 
note the lack of fore-thought which had gone into the planning of the 
regime and exploited it. The Home Office willingly granted more lax 
conditions, exasperated by opposition which was preventing them from 
establishing a regime based purely on containment, among which were the 
judiciary who opted for the minimum period (3 years penal servitude and 5 
years preventive detention), as often as possible. The population of Camp 
Hill fell over a period of time as the judiciary were too suspicious of ideas 
which so patently clashed with the principles of classical justice, namely that 
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it involved double sentencing and dispensing a punishment that might be 
out of all proportion to the crime. 
From the beginning the prison officials were involved in a dilemma - if 
the so-called habitual criminals were to be placed within a penal colony 
straightaway, the prison authorities could well be accused of treating them 
too lightly without subjecting them to a regime that consisted of deterrent 
programs, so offending against the balance of deterrence and reform; 
conversely, if they were to serve some time in penal servitude and after 
that term had expired were moved onto a detention centre, this would be 
seen as double counting so failing to adhere to the principle of 
proportionate punishment. The prison commissioners were aware of this 
dilemma from the outset but had move no nearer a resolution by the time 
that judicial distrustand neglect had pushed preventive detention into disuse. 
6.4 Saving the women and children ? 
Women, as we saw earlier, posed problems for a regime that was 
designed to inflict deterrent measures on men; women were less able to 
withstand these rigours and a de facto compromise was worked out, whereby 
they were treated with less severity. From the point of view of operational 
convenience, it was a happy coincidence that women who ended up in 
prison were increasingly seen as conjoint with the problem of habitual 
drunkenness. 
Drunkenness was held to be either analogous to a disease or a vice. The 
latter conception had the advantage of holding out a cure, after a lengthy 
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period of detention. Support was adduced from the existence of inebriate 
asylums in America, which were purported to have a success rate of 66%; 
on closer inspection, it was found that people entered these Homes 
voluntarily and were from the upper echelons of society. They were not 
intended for recalcitrant drunkards and people were free to leave whenever 
they wished and so told the English little of how a system of compulsory 
confinement could work. 
Bills were introduced in 1872 and 1873 with the intention of detaining 
drunkards after they were sober and ensuring that they could be released, 
without succumbing to drink. The Bills were defeated for fear of interfering 
too much with individual freedom, of compelling people to be sober. The 
only Bill that could be passed into law was one stripped of its coercive 
overtones- it merely licensed the setting up and inspection of private retreats 
which patients would enter voluntarily. They had to prove both their 
readiness to give up their liberty and their ability to pay. It was applicable 
only to the affluent few and given the lack of compulsive powers, many 
habitual drunkards were unwilling to invite stigma by announcing themselves 
to be dependent upon alcohol. 
There were about 250,000 commitments of people to prison on the 
charge of drunkenness every year, yet many were convinced of the 
uselessness of committing such people to prison for such short periods of 
time, the average sentence being eight days. The prison not only failed to 
cure these people but was believed to be a boon to their drinking habits 
and long-term inebriety, since it gave the individual a chance to recuperate 
I 
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and then launched her back upon society to continue her bouts of drinking. 
Ideas were mooted about setting up specialised establishments and detaining 
the respective individuals for a period up to two years but some of the 
judiciary were reluctant to see people being consigned to such places, 
without being guilty of a criminal offence. Financial considerations also 
intruded: the government was willing to finance only one reformatory for 
inebriates, with the rest having to come from the finances of local 
government. 
The Inebriates Act of 1898 did not mention non-criminal drunkards but it 
did provide for those people who offended against public decency but not 
safety, and who had been convicted three times in the year before the 
current offence. Such people could be sent to a certified asylum (financed 
by a local authority), for a period not exceeding three years. Criminal 
drunkards would be dispatched to a State inebriate reformatory for the same 
length of time. The local authorities were to be given a small weekly sum 
to help them meet the running costs of the asylum. As in the preventive 
detention regime, it was unclear whether these habitual drunkards would be 
subjected to a program of reform or whether the socially inconvenient, such 
as tramps and prostitutes, would be swept up and incapacitated. The local 
authorities believed this was a duty of the penal authorities and, in any case, 
very few made use of them; only 35 out of 400 authorities sent inebriates to 
reformatories. This reluctance to burden the local rates unduly was coupled 
with judicial reluctance to hand down a sentence, which appeared to treat 
drunkards more severely than ordinary criminals. The judges rarely 
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committed to the State reformatories, simply because they failed to view the 
consumption of alcohol as a sufficient reason; instead offenders were 
sentenced to a customary sentence. 
The State reformatories, which finally opened in 1902, three years after 
the first certified reformatory, were ending up as a receptacle for the most 
recalcitrant cases, with a 2: 1 male female ratio, who would not submit to 
the regimes in the certified reformatories. It was no wonder that the relevant 
Inspector spoke of a pervading hopelessness. There was more optimism in 
the certified reformatories, where it was hoped that, by being surrounded by 
an atmosphere of tranquillity, the women (in 1904 91% of admissions to 
such places were female) would be induced to model themselves upon an 
ideal of contented domesticity, though there also existed an unspoken policy 
of segregation. Implicit in such a program was a rejection of the notion that 
drunkenness was anything approaching a disease and that the subjects 
would voluntarily lift themselves out of their condition if properly 
persuaded; 'yet the moralising purposes of the regime sat uncomfortably 
alongside persisting conceptions of inebriety as a disease ... at Farmfield the 
women were incongruously referred to as patients. The regime was clearly 
incoherent, both in its initial premises and in the means adopted to carry 
them out'. 11 These beliefs were also being challenged by the reality 
obtaining in the State reformatory, where the nature of the regime was 
being distorted by the infractious behaviour of the inmates and Ruggles- 
Brise complained that theyshould be sent back to the district prisons. There 
was little supervision upon release with the result that many relapsed into 
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alcoholism; in a survey of one reformatory's first 600 patients, over 80% 
had become inebriate again. The inspector of the reformatories lamented that 
it was 'Proving extremely unfortunate that the word reformatory was ever 
selected to apply to institutions intended for the reception of committed 
inebriates'. 12 The local authorities reiterated his pessimism, by trying to 
restrict access to those who were deemed reformable and disregarding those 
thought beyond aid, despite Home Office pleas to the contrary. 
A review was established and all difficulties were attributed to 
administrative failures and the Home Office still relied on a moral 
conception of inebriety. They believed that such faults could be rectified by 
the individuals themselves, when placed in a proper atmosphere for the 
necessary amount of time, which could only be provided in a specialised 
institution. They were aware that only a tiny percentage of people were 
being sentenced on account of drunkenness and that there still were a great 
number of crimes being committed by inebriates. They recommended an 
expansion of the system, with the State assuming control of all necessary 
expenditure, magistrates assuming the power to send people to the 
reformatories and expanding the definition of an inebriate- a person who 
habitually takes or uses any intoxicating thing or things. The government 
was unwilling to assume financial control but was also unwilling to compel 
local authorities, by statute, to finance the reformatories partly. Increasingly 
many inebriates were being viewed as mentally defective so that these 
seemingly feeble-minded people would be shuttled to mental institutions 
which were the responsibility of the state. The London County Council, 
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which was running the majority of inebriate reformatories, was growing 
increasingly disenchanted with them and in December 1913 refused to have 
anything more to do with them. By 1921 all the reformatories had closed 
down. 
Children were another category which were ill-suited to being assigned a 
place in a punitive prison system; since the middle of the nineteenth 
century many had been siphoned off to a place in the reformatory or 
industrial schools, where a proper environment would try to instil, in the 
children andjuveniles, restraint and self-control. As I said in Chapter 6, this 
policy was notwholly successful as there were still a large number of 12- 
16 year olds (approx. 1400) and a greater number of 16-21 year olds 
(13,000 young menand 3000 young females in 1896) within the prisons. 
The prison commission continued the policy of the previous regime by 
encouraging the idea that prison was no place for children under 16, so 
their number continued to drop. A further step was taken when it was 
proposed that courts intended solely for children be instituted, so children 
would be further dissociated from criminals. The concept of the juvenile 
court, which emerged in the Children Act 1908, provided that the hearing 
would take place in a location separate from where normal criminal 
proceedings took place. The Act prohibited the committal of children to 
prison and there were restrictions placed upon sending juveniles to prisons. 
The magistrates were extremely slow in adapting criminal procedures for 
children so that after WWI it 'was still rare for a young offender to be 
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confronted by magistrates with a sympathetic and informed insight into the 
mind of the child, by a courtroom divested of the trappings and personnel 
of an ordinary police court, and by a simple, informal and elastic 
procedure'. 13 The struggle to institute a court, geared solely to divining the 
problems and needs of the child, would continue for a decade but did not 
reach a clear-cut resolution. The Home Office wished to diagnose the 
treatment necessary forthe young offender but also stress the gravity of the 
offence and the responsibility of the offender for his or her crime. 
If children and juveniles were not to be sent to prison, then the 
reformatories and industrial schools beckoned. These had lost their 
pioneering spirit over time and seemed to have fallen in with the dull 
regimentation, typical of the earlier regime. Since they were largely 
voluntarily funded, there was financial pressure to make the inmates work at 
trades that would be profitable to the institution and not necessarily useful 
to the juvenile in the outside world. Straitened financial circumstances also 
meant that the required staff could not be recruited. Departmental reports 
frowned at the practices within but were interrupted by the Great War. As 
in the local prisons, variety was the bane of any coherent program and the 
Howard League concurred in the bleak assessment of the state of the 
schools, advocating state control. This was seen to be the only feasible 
solution to the existing problem of providing 'a satisfactory service of high 
quality through a series of semi-independent units imperfectly controlled 
from the centre'. 14 
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The Home Office baulked at such a responsibility but did agree to meet 
half of the maintenance cost of the schools, with the local authorities 
making up the rest, voluntary subscriptions having slowed to a trickle. This 
lent greaterweight to the recommendations of the government inspector who 
hoped to rationalise some of the activities of the schools. The schools' 
failure to adaptthemselves speedily enough to the new notions of treatment 
meant that, for a time, committals were dropping off, as magistrates were 
reluctant to impose aperiod of long-term detention (three years being the 
minimum period) upon young offenders. Probation was increasingly being 
seen as an attractive alternative and the local authorities applauded and 
supported less costly measures, such as this. The option of a shorter period 
of confinement had been raised but there were fears that it would be 
chosen for financial expediency and that there would be insufficient time for 
training. Officials were adamant that the sentence was meant to be a period 
of training and so had to be out of proportion to the offence: 'the idea of 
the tariff for the offence or of making the punishment fit the crime dies 
hard; but it must be uprooted if reformation rather than punishment is to be- 
as it should be for young offenders- the guiding principle'. 15 
The Home Office were alarmed at the meagre numbers being committed 
to the schools, especially when they were enjoying newly-won -success in 
their treatment of juveniles. Some juveniles were thought to be better suited 
to a period in the schools than being granted a probation order. This 
induced the Home Office to encourage the courts to look with favour upon 
the schools by shortening the maximum length of time, a decision which 
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some were reluctant to hand over to the courts. Thus the official policy was 
that some schools would be specifically short-term institutions, releasing the 
boys after six months. If their conduct was unsatisfactory then they would 
be sent to an ordinary school, with the school authorities having the power 
to decide whether the juvenile should be detained for a further period. 
Borstal D-Qy& 
If reformation was regarded as the guiding principle for children under 
16 years old, it was hardly surprising that this sentiment would affect 
considerations of how those juveniles, over 16, should be treated. These were 
often sent to prisons on remand, even though many were not sentenced to 
imprisonment but this sojourn was believed to have lessened the fear of 
prison. In the search for alternatives, attention was paid to developments in 
America, where a reformatory home was established for this age group, said 
to 'combine within itself a prison, a school of letters, a school of 
technology, a school of physical training, a series of manufacturing 
departments, and a military camp'. 16 There were great claims made on its 
behalf, as 80% of its inmates were supposedly reformed upon release. The 
Americans disseminated information about its nature to their European 
colleagues, who were wary of adopting it without modifications; one Home 
Office official castigated it, for its 'avoidance of everything that may hurt a 
sensitive prisoner's feelings, or remind him that he has done anything to be 
ashamed of . 
%17 Clearly he felt that it had veered too sharply toward reform 
and had failed to provide sufficiently punitive programs, so that to English 
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eyes, it was close to ridiculous with its elaborate facilities. It was accepted 
that some efforts should be made to forestall criminal tendencies that were 
becoming apparent in juveniles and that they not be 'allowed to drift 
hopelessly down the current of crime, without a serious attempt at rescue. 18 
Nothing radical was planned, merely a balance between the prison and 
reformatory, whilst avoiding what was seen as the excessive sentimentality of 
the American approach so that the new juvenile institutions would not lack 
'penal and coercive sides'. 
A juvenile adult group was set up at Borstal Convict prison and by 
1904 was available to all juvenile adults serving twelve months or over. A 
program was devised to head off criminal tendencies that were becoming 
apparent in young adults and the sentence imposed was to be not less than 
one year and not more than three years. The trainee (as they were known) 
could be released after six months depending on behaviour, at which time 
he would be helped by a voluntary organisation, known as the Borstal 
Association, which attracted broad middle-class support and admiration. Early 
results concerning the absence of recidivism were encouraging and statutory 
support was sought to carry out the necessary training, and gained it in the 
Prevention of Crime Act 1908. The Home Secretary, Gladstone, did not gain 
the power to extend a Borstal sentence to those summarily convicted or 
those under the eligible age. All this was evidently inspired by the 
Gladstone Committee's recommendations to subject different groups in the 
prison population to different measures, so much so that he admitted that 
freedom was being given, 'to experiment from time to time in the treatment 
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of criminals in the light of the most recent theories of criminologists'. 19 The 
favourable publicity continued so that 
the outside world was thus assured that a self-contained, 
individually oriented and systematic programme of 
intellectual, physical and moral development was under 
way in each of the full borstals. Through the annual 
reports of the Prison Commission and of the Borstal 
Association the public were told that rigorous gymnastics, 
sports, class instruction, personal influence and lectures were 
in operation. 20 
Since the Borstals had been devised with 'hooligan and lounging types' 
inmind it is no surprise that its regime was somewhat authoritarian so that 
the inmates would be respectful and deferential to authority, fuelled by the 
belief that when they left the Borstal they would enter the labouring class. 
The regime was based on progressive stages, with the boy beginning in the 
ordinary grade, with the possibility of moving either to the penal grade, for 
bad behaviour, or to the special grade where he could receive various 
privileges. Corporal punishment was not available as a sanction, although 
officials approved of it. Greatest emphasis was put on physical development 
and though much was made of the juveniles' opportunity of working at a 
skilled trade, leading many judges to rank Borstal highly, most of it was 
physical labour. The conceptual basis did not differ substantially from what 
was available to prisoners during the earlier period of reform and wasbased 
on the Benthamite pursuit of pleasure/avoidance of Pain schema. 
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Though the borstal schools were the subject of various panegyrics which 
lauded the changes wrought upon the trainees the reality was different. 
Many of the staff were taken from the prisons and were ill-prepared to be 
able towork to such different specifications and fell back upon their former 
training. Sympathy for each individual was in short supply. Not all trainees 
expected such emotional engagement and were resentful of the lengthy 
period of time which they were expected to serve. Disciplinary measures 
were provided, with many being sent back to prison from Borstal lest they 
disruptedthe wavering tone of the polices; the Home Office did not wish to 
publicise this fact, especially to the judges, as they might have taken a more 
sceptical view of the claims being made on behalf of the Borstals. There 
were an increasing number of complaints that the juveniles were becoming 
resistant to any such procedures. The Home Office was not helped by 
sniping from the Borstal Association that the Borstals should be as far 
removed from prisons as possible and, more particularly, that more 
appropriate personnel should be recruited and training, more relevant to 
employment in the outside world, be provided. The Home Office was 
perturbed by this attack from what they saw as one of their own, 'a body 
for whose policy and action I am theoretically responsible'21 , commented 
Ruggles-Brise, and firmly stressed that they had not deviated from the 
original principles of the Borstals. The conflict was fuelled by two different 
conceptions of the juveniles: one saw them as potential criminals who might 
well turn out to be recidivists and the other viewed them as children who 
had the misfortune not to have grown up in the right kind of environment. 
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Again the dilemma of how exactly to choose between deterrence and 
reform had not vanished; it reappeared again in the question of how juvenile 
offenders should be treated. Ruggles-Brise obviously did wish to see a more 
relaxed regime in place. Borstal was an improvement on the regime which 
obtained in prisons for juveniles but he was unsure as to how far this 
should proceed. As stated, it was meant for juveniles who had already tried 
their hand at criminal offences and looked to be making a good fist of it. 
On some occasions, the prison commission insisted that 'the Borstal 
institution should not be regarded and measured as if it were a sentence of 
imprisonment passed as a punishment and as a warning to evil-doers, 
having both in its purpose and effect a reformatory rather than a penal 
object', 22 which is not to say that deterrent policies could not feature 
somewhere. Unfortunately for the penal authorities, there were a number of 
bodies who knew in what direction they wished to see the Borstal regime 
proceed, among them the Howard Association; so that 'by the early 1920s a 
substantial indictment had been drawn against the Borstal system by a 
23 number of unofficial and semi-official hands' , all of whom blamed the 
Borstals for failing to provide the trainees what they needed most, the 
ability to act independently of any regime. 
6.5 Prisoners on Probation 
Apart from the fervent opponents in the separate versus silent system 
debate and the pioneering Alexander Maconochie, grave doubts had always 
existed about the efficacy of what could be achieved inside prisons, and its 
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ability to manufacture changes that would remain constant, upon exposure to 
the world outside the prisons. Probation or its nascent form in the 1870s 
seemed like an answer to these fears for the concept held out the promise 
of keeping offenders out of gaols but would still subject them to 
supervision. It was modelled along the lines of a gentle paternalism, not 
imposing changes upon an individual but looking for the individual to 
modify his own behaviour, through 'voluntary efficiency'. Superficially, it 
also seemed to promote savings for the State, substituting a short sentence 
of supervision for a long period of incarceration. 
It was initially suggested that probation be promoted through the 
provisions of the Prevention of Crime Act of 1871 and 1879, allowing for 
police supervision. The chief advocate of probation, Howard Vincent, had 
little time for the device of releasing offenders upon recognisance, an 
undertaking to reappear before the court and to observe certain conditions 
laid down by it, since it provided no mechanism of supervision and 
enforcement. For the reluctant offender, there was no incentive to reform and 
no way of upbraiding him if his conduct was unsatisfactory. In its place 
was proposed police supervision for first-time offenders, the supervision not 
lasting longer than the longest possible term of imprisonment for the 
offence in question. To many, this seemed like a gross intrusion into the 
lives of people who were hardly hardened criminals. The police were 
reluctant to become embroiled in this venture, since they considered 
unsuitable supervisors for incipient offenders and the judiciary evinced 
similar attitudes. The Act could only be passed into law if these draconian 
217 
provisions were dropped; so the court was to have regard to the background 
of the offender and extenuating circumstances of the offence and if it saw 
fit, could release him on recognisance. There was to be no supervision. In 
this amended form, there was little novel in the Act and many of the judges 
preferred to use the Summary Jurisdiction Act of 1879 since it did not 
require them to record a conviction. If the legislation was never quite a 
dead letter it was certainly moribund for quite a time. 
Following the Gladstone committee, probation was examined again. The 
Howard Association had long campaigned for its introduction as a means of 
disciplining young offenders without sending them to prison, an option from 
which many magistrates were abstaining on grounds of unsuitability for 
ones so young. It would check criminal tendencies better than an admonition 
but would be more economical than detention. The Home Office also was 
prodded toward action by the Committee of Wage Earning Children which 
stressed the need for separate children's courts with probation officers. There 
were arguments both for and against its introduction in Britain. It would 
achieve some of the desired individuality in the administration of penal 
justice, as the judge could delve into the particular circumstances of each 
case and secondly, 'the tutelage exercised by the officers during probation is 
salutary and beneficial, and calculated to check at its outset a criminal 
career'. On the other hand the duties of any probation officer might conflict 
with the police and the probation appeared to be expensive and might 
24 become inquisitorial . There existed already an unofficial form of probation 
in the form of missionaries of the Church of England Temperance Society 
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(CETS), who were sanctioned by the courts to make inquiries into cases that 
were considered as potentially suitable to be placed under recognisance and 
to keep an informal eye upon them. Based as this was on notions of 
voluntary participation and consent, it was ineffectual if offenders rejected 
the advice offered. 
The Liberal Government in 1907 attempted to establish probation, by 
giving both higher and summary courts the power to give offenders a 
conditional discharge and appoint a probation officer, to watch over those 
released while recognisance lasted. The most protracted debates were about 
who were the most suitable people to fill the role of probation officer: some 
thought the missionaries could develop probation having already had similar 
experience, others thought that these agents could not produce the intensive 
supervision necessary and suggested retired police officers instead, and still 
others believed both of the above groups were improper and thought that 
educated people with an interest in social work were best suited. Ruggles- 
Brise's chief responsibility was for the prisons of which children were a 
diminishing element. He wished to see probation being used for all 
offenders, not just children, to reduce pressure on the prisons. It would be a 
'State Scheme for furnishing an alternative to commitment to prison... of the 
vast multitude of offenders who commit trivial and unimportant offences'. 25 
Depending on whether one thought probation should be dealing mainly with 
children or adults, then this would affect the selection of personnel. The 
missionaries represented an entrenched interest whom the Home Office were 
loath to disturb, for they had gained the sympathy of many magistrates 
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through various forms of assistance and promised financial and 
administrative support. Against this, was the argument that the duties of 
probation officer and missionary might not be compatible, and the view that 
the 'police court missionary is well intentioned but narrow-minded, zealous 
but inclined to preach .... As agents of a denominational society they are 
tainted with the sectarian brush'. 26 The position of the missionaries would 
depend on whether the Home Office could be persuaded to develop 
probation along professional lines to the detriment of well-meaning amateurs, 
pointing to ideational elaboration providing the guidance for change. At this 
moment, the Home Office was unwilling to get involved in such a factious 
dispute and left it to the relevant magistrate to choose, from a list, the 
probation officer that he thought best suited to the case in hand. 
There was no mention of government finance, as it was assumed that 
those undertaking the task of supervision could do so on a part-time basis 
and without any specific training. Probation officers would be paid but the 
bill was to be picked up by the local authorities, which was resented since 
it was believed that probation would take some of the strain off the prison 
service, leading to benefits for central government. There was to be no 
central body organising the workings of the probation officers; it was 
believed that probation would be most effective through the inspiration of 
each individual officer, an effect which might be lessened if he or she had 
to adhere to a set of uniform rules. The Home Office was evidently unsure 
how probation would be received, dependent as it was on the willing co- 
operation of the magistrates, but there were also differences over what its 
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precise function should be. Nearly all the appointed officers in the probation 
service in London were members of voluntary societies, with the majority of 
them working for the CETS. The development of probation was very much 
at the mercy of the courts since they were given, in effect, a free hand to 
appoint probation officers or not; three years after the Act, twice as many 
were released on recognisance as on probation. The various penal reform 
bodies were dismayed at the apathy of the magistrates, who disdained to 
take an interest in probation (perhaps because of the financial implications), 
and the lacklustre interest of those who did. Many of the magistrates 
appointed the missionaries immediately, prompting fears about reckless 
volunteers and there were calls for a supervisory grade of officer to quell 
any organisational chaos. The Penal Reform League (PRL) was the most 
vocal in calling for suggested some central administration and finance to 
secure a more co-ordinated system. 
In 1912 those involved in probation work met to found the National 
Association of Probation Officers (NAPO) and aspired to promote the 
development of probation work and developments within the service and to 
create a more cohesive body -a bond of union - able to negotiate on behalf 
of its members. The PRL was continually pressing for greater rates of pay 
to attract better-qualified men to the probation service. The Home Office 
wanted to procure the participation of voluntary societies through a subsidy 
to provide a 'philanthropic network over the whole country 27 but was turned 
aside from this concern by fears about the rising rate of juvenile crime 
which probation had done little to check. There was, thus, mounting criticism 
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of dual control, voiced among others by NAPO who wished to see their 
status rise, believing that professionalisation would secure this. In a reaction 
to these attacks, the CETS tried to introduce a measure of uniformity into 
their work by setting up a Central Police Court Mission to organise the 
work in the various regions of the country. It also urged all member, in the 
event of a probation officer's post falling vacant, 'to use every endeavour to 
secure the position'. 28 The drive to secure a specialised, professional service 
was telling against the CETS as many magistrates began to spum their 
services. It was acknowledged by the Home Office that if such a 
professional service was to come about, then the question of pay would 
have to be addressed. A majority were paid by fees, many on the scale 
suggested in 1907. The Home Office could only remedy this by offering a 
grant. 
A departmental committee was set up in November 1920 to examine 
whether the appointment and payment of probation officers should remain 
with the local justices and whether the courts should continue to combine 
with the agents of voluntary societies or appoint their officers. The Howard 
League for Penal Reform (HLPR) 29 were asking for a paid Probation Commission, 
with national responsibility for the service but this was unacceptable to 
many, partly because of the cost but also because it might interfere with 
the liaison between court and probation officer. On the second question, the 
CETS could still make a large financial contribution, which the Home Office 
was unwilling to usurp but it could do little to counter allegations of dual 
allegiance and potential confusion of roles. The CETS received a caution 
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that considerable changes would' have to be made, among them the 
separation of the Police Court Mission from the rest of the society and the 
reorganisation along county, rather than diocesan lines. It agreed that the fee 
system should be discontinued but the committee was unable to set a 
universal scale, due to the regional differences in payment and it 
recommended that the Government should pay half the cost of providing 
probation officers, when it was able. 
The Home Office, in lieu of exercising some sort of financial control 
overthe probation service, tried once again to persuade and cajole the courts 
into a wider use of probation. Circulars were sent out in an attempt to gain 
the magistrates' attention, suggesting that committees be set up to organise 
probation work properly. There were many provincial courts which ignored 
these blandishments, and which failed to possess a probation officer, and 
among those that did, only a minority were employed full-time. Since the 
courts would not be persuaded, greater leverage in the form of a grant was 
sought, to be given only if probation work fulfilled certain conditions. 
Probation did not turn out according to anyone's expectations. The Home 
Office were glad that the police court missionaries were there to shoulder 
some of the costs but were clearly discomfited and influenced by criticism 
of them; but the CETS invoked their influence in Parliament to prevent their 
being totally squeezed out of probation. The Penal Reform bodies and 
NAPO were dissatisfied with dual control and the slow progress in 
professionalising the service, which can be partly placed at the magistrates' 
feet who displayed their customary reluctance to adapt to new arrangements. 
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6.6 The Reform of Aid Societies 
One of the most important influences which could shepherd an offender 
into a life free from crime was the prisoners' aid society. In the Du Cane 
era, many local justices turned their efforts toward these societies in order 
to help the prisoner, having lost their influence over what went on inside 
the prisons. Prisoners upon release would be given a small sum to set them 
back on their feet and enter into a mode of honest living. The societies 
received a sum from the Treasury to give to each prisoner though after 
1877, the prison commissioners were given the power to disperse it and' so 
maintain some sort of supervision upon their work, since much of the 
arrangements and financing were voluntary. Convicts could receive succour 
from the Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society, but had to give over the 
gratuities gained by him in prison which, upon release, the Society would 
hand over to him in instalments, with possibly some extra funds from the 
Society's coffers. The members of the Society were expected to work in 
tandem with the police (members of the Convict Supervision Office, est. 
1879) but many were reluctant to do so, since the involvement of the police 
was seen as inimical to their work. 
There was little co-ordination between the various societies or between 
then and the prisons, encouraging tales, perhaps apocryphal, of a 'scramble at 
the prison gate' by members of the various societies, eager to enlist the 
discharged prisoner into their group. This haphazard state of affairs was 
commented on by the Gladstone committee and a report was instituted to 
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examine their organisation. Their procedures differed enormously with some 
giving money, others clothing, others helping with securing employment and 
lodging. Many would only concentrate their efforts on certain categories of 
prisoners. Most of them (42 out of 56) reftised to countenance any co- 
operation on the grounds that local circumstances varied so much it would 
be impossible to develop any uniformity. Some societies thought their 
procedures needed little alteration, some believed that they were a 
worthwhile model for other societies and one described itself as the 'acme 
of perfection'. It was not surprising that they made inflated claims for their 
ability to aid prisoners, but only 13% of those released from local prisons 
sought their aid and under half that from convict prisons; some ex-convicts 
referred contemptuously to the Society as a 'mere bank' from which they 
could only withdraw their money in 'driblets' and then only on proof of 
good conduct. 
Once again it was the perceived phenomenon of recidivism which was 
the mainspring of innovation. It was claimed that 3 out of 4 convicts 
released in 1903-5 had been returned to penal servitude so that all existing 
policies, including aid-on-discharge, designed to guide the released criminal 
into an honest path in life were seen to have failed. The commissioners 
decided to establish an aid society under their control, named the Central 
Association, which was to assist convicts and preventive detainees. It would 
offer convicts greater grants than could be obtained otherwise in return for 
assenting to supervision. The Borstal Association had a similar function with 
respect to released juveniles and the 'public were assured that these special 
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groups were systematically and purposefully maintained and controlled for 
lengthy periods after release and that, if they proved recalcitrant, they were 
returned to institutional control by revocation of license'. 30 
The prison commission had an idea of what a model aid society should 
be and tried to impress this on all existing aid societies through use of the 
existing grant and certification. The local societies were peopled by many 
local justices and some had devoted their efforts in this area because they 
had been excluded from the prisons themselves by the commission so they 
were unwilling to accede lightly. Ruggles-Brise proposed to abolish gratuities 
to local prisons and to use this money as an increased grant aid to the 
local societies. However, he also proposed that a new 'General Council' be 
set up, elected by the local societies, to co-ordinate the aid to local prisons 
and so regulate their operations. If the strategy was divide and rule, it 
backfired. The smaller societies feared that their opinions would be drowned 
out by the larger ones and they were anxious that the smaller societies 
would have a voice equivalent to their own. A number of large societies 
were attracted to this proposal and approached the commission for advice. It 
was reluctant to be seen to be fermenting discord in independent 
organisations and tried hard not to become involved. 
In 1918 the larger societies established the Central Discharged Prisoners' 
Aid Society whose function was to help, advise and encourage local 
societies. Though Ruggles-Brise became its president after the war, it was 
not the body he had envisaged since it was little more than a talking shop, 
without any regulatory power. The functions of the commission and the local 
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societies were incompatible, for the former body had to oversee penal policy 
on a national scale but the latter had shown little concern for co-ordination 
and rationalisation of activities. They wished mainly to preserve their own 
societies and to continue to aid prisoners as they thought best, regardless of 
what the prison commission or individual prisoner wanted. Many of their 
members wished to reprove ex-prisoners while the latter were concerned to 
wring as much money from the societies as possible. 
6.7 The Discontent of Prison Officers 
The prison staff didnot welcome the changes ushered in by agitation for 
reformatory programs. They did not view the reconciliation of the 
incompatible ideas of reform and deterrence as necessarily devolving upon 
them, but as adding to the complexity and frustration of their jobs. The shift 
toward a more reformatory regime meant that staff began to believe that 
their tasks and position were losing status and that 'the bonds between 
officers and governors were being weakened, because of a strengthening 
relationship between governor grades and prisoners'. 31 The staff were not 
automatically predisposed to oppose any sort of reformatory program but 
very often they were seen as unsuited and hence excluded from the 
specialisation of the prison service and assigned to the most inglorious 
tasks, for which they were not very well remunerated. This fostered a feeling 
of growing isolation and under-appreciation. 
One of the most striking and effective features of deterrence within 
prisons had been the separate system. This was weakened through several 
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alterations, the earliest being the introduction of associated labour. The 
commissioners were willing to grant this concession if they were able to 
employ extra staff to deal with the more complex arrangements. Its 
introduction could also be utilised as a disciplinary tool since aprisoner had 
to earn the privilege to work with his fellow inmates. There were calls to 
allow the prisoners to converse together, but again it could only be gained 
after some period of time and at the discretion of the governors, many of 
whom were unwilling to award it, seeing it as 'a fruitful source of mischief 
'. Separation was shortened from the mandatory 9-month period for all 
offenders to periods of three, six and nine months respectively for the Star, 
Intermediate and Recidivist classes in 1905. In 1911 following 
representations from the writer John Galsworthy to the Home Secretary 
about the 'prolonged starvation and agony of the mind' brought about by a 
period of separate confinement, separation was reduced to one month for 
both Stars and Intermediates and three for Recidivists. Originally there were 
cries for its complete abolition but the commission was able to stave these 
off, though the outcome was appreciated by no-one. 
The staff were unhappy, although the Home Secretary, in March 1906, 
disclaimed any knowledge of their grievances but he did permit them to 
meet and discuss questions relating to their duties and position in the prison 
service. In 1910 the Prisons Officers union was founded, in part, to give vent 
to their discontent. Though they could congregate in individual prisons, a 
general meeting was contrary to standing orders. In 1915, the Home 
Secretary was asked if this sanction could be lifted but he refused, and in 
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the same year the unauthorised Prisons Officers Federation was founded. 
This new organisation did not gain the total support of all prison officers 
because it was unofficial and not recognised by the prison authorities and 
there already existed a union, the National Union of Police and Prison 
Officers (NUPPO). When the Police Act of 1919 was passed, refusing police 
officers the right to join a union, the police called a strike in which some 
prison officers took part. All were dismissed with no possibility of 
reinstatement. 
In an attempt to siphon off their frustrations, the Prison Officers 
Representative Board was set up so that the commission could consult staff 
but there were not able to withhold their services. The complaints could be 
classed as two in nature 
(i) complaints about the paucity of pay and pensions 
( ii ) fears about the weakening of their status through such events as 
confidential reporting and slowness of promotion 
Complaints of the second kind genuinely irked, since increasingly staff 
were being confined to the bottom rung. They were being excluded from 
clerical work since it required a 'higher degree of intelligence and education 
than can reasonably be expected of an officer drawn from the subordinate 
discipline staff 02 and army and navy officers could still directly enter the 
position of governor without working their way up. This, coupled with the 
insecurity introduced by confidential reporting, made the Officers feel that 
they were being increasingly neglected, a neglect which was directly 
attributed to the reformatory culture. 
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The prison officers tried to cultivate links with groups which could help 
them achieve their aims. The Labour Party, having first supported the right 
of NUPPO to strike, refused to help them when in government and so the 
relationship between them was negligible. They had joined forces with the 
Howard League who seemed equally aggrieved at the prison commission 
but it became apparent their grievances were not identical but were 
antagonistic, as the League seemed to be continually agitating for better 
treatment of the prisoner. The officers complained that 'the staff doesn't 
receive sufficient sympathy. Reform has been too one-sided and while 
numerous petty concessions have been made to the prisoner, adding to the 
worry of the officers' life, and 1001 details of his duty, he is still classified 
with an ordinary asylum attendant or a ticket collector, with a basic rate of 
pay that is adisgrace to the country' and spoke of movements that were 
intent on 'liberating the prisoner and chaining up the officer'. 33 
It would be easy to paint the prison officers as reactionaries but this 
would be a mistake. They had stated their wish to be involved in 
reformatory work but had been rebuffed on grounds of unsuitability; this 
rejection, combined with the increasing demands placed upon them by the 
introduction of reforms intothe prison service without any increase in pay, 
meant that they became militantly opposed to reform being emphasised 
within the prison service. Though they were denuded of any resources with 
which to bargain (foremost among them the power to strike), this only 
strengthened their resentment and made their co-operation ever more 
unlikely. 
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6.8 The Reaction of Prisoners 
The prison officers are one example of a group who trenchantly resisted 
any attempts at accommodation of the conflicting positions of deterrence 
and reform. The advocacy of deterrence would placed them in a more 
favourable position than the promotion of the ideas of reform. Hence, we 
see that it is not binding upon all groups to work for the reconciliation of 
the opposing ideas of a constraining contradiction but may only be the 
responsibility of one group among many. When the Gladstone committee 
said that there was to be a shift in the orientation of the prison service, it 
signalled that the ideological basis was open to negotiation from interested 
parties; this interest did not necessarily have to stem from a desire to 
engineer a settlement between the opposed positions of deterrence and 
reform. 
One of the most interested parties, with perhaps the most at stake from 
the outcome of the subsequent debate, was the prisoners themselves. Various 
structural factors (such as transient population, low prestige, lack of access 
to resources) would obstruct any efforts to outline a constructive position 
but they could play a purely negative role, refusing to endorse the reforms 
that had already come their way and demanding reforms that were more 
acceptable to them. Even if some of them were willing to recognise the 
legitimacy of the prison service and their punishment, this would not 
prevent them from requesting a regime which was more to their liking. 
From 1865-95, their opinions had been discounted since the emphasis had 
been on deterrence, so rendering their consent immaterial but if reform was 
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to work, the prisoners' participation had to be gained. We have already seen 
how prisoners in the preventive detention camps obtained a relaxation of 
conditions, since they were convinced that they had previously served out a 
term of deterrence and were entitled to more lax conditions. What of the 
great bulk of prisoners who were serving sentences in the convict and local 
prisons? Were they in a position to obtain a less severe regime? 
The prison commissioners were constantly casting around for alternatives 
to short-term imprisonment, which they were convinced was ineffective in 
preventing crime. Moreover, there were many held in local prisons who 
should not have been there, such as people who had not paid their fines or 
were being held on remand. Progress was made in clearing the local prisons 
of what might be called 'non-essential prisoners', those who did not really 
deserve to be there. Hard labour, as previously defined, was amended and so 
the wheels and cranks were discarded, to be replaced by such activities as 
sack making and stone breaking. After a month, the prisoner could proceed 
to labour in a workshop, producing items for use by government agencies. 
The prisoners were mainly divided into two classes, the intention being to 
keep the proven criminals apart from novices, to keep the latter from 
corruption. 
One of the great problems in estimating the extent of reform was that 
different groups had varying expectations of what it was that was to be 
achieved. The prison commissioners were sincere in claiming that great 
improvements had been made and, in comparison to the previous regime, 
they were probably correct. Floggings had diminished, the diet had improved 
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and women could associate whilst labouring from the beginning of their 
sentences. The entry into the local prisons of both the female suffragettes 
before the Great War and of conscientious objectors during it, ensured the 
indictment of the local prisons by the Labour Research Group in their 
report, both groups having copiously recounted their experiences Both carried 
expectations which could never have been satisfied by the conditions of the 
local prisons, premised as they were on cIgSsical notions of deterrence and 
uniform punishment; the prison, to them, had transformed what should have 
been 'elementary rights' into rewards. By their own testimonies it is clear 
that the new ideas of criminology never penetrated the local prisons as they 
complained of 'the suppression of choice and personality .... the absence of 
individualisation'. 34 As with the Fenians in the previous century, these groups 
posed a dilemma for the prison service, which could not be answered 
whilst its present form was retained. This stoked the embers of discontent 
which would, after a period, threaten to consume the existing penal 
arrangements in a campaign for change. Though the articulateness of the 
political offenders proved to be the catalyst for change, they built upon 
previously existing widespread grievances throughout the penal system, 
providing the impetus for another period of change. 
It is difficult to see how a genuine concern with the individual could 
ever enter into the local prisons, since the terms of most of the sentences 
were too short to effect any permanent influence upon the prisoners but the 
time available was sufficient for programmes of deterrence to work. Due to 
these obstacles, the prison commissioners had decided to concentrate their 
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efforts to reform prisoners upon those specially differentiated prisoners for 
whom there was the time available to operate a worthwhile reformatory 
program. Though this was the intent of the prison authorities, there was 
nothing to prevent other groups attempting to scize the initiative and 
demanding why reform was mainly confined to some groups and not 
extended to others, to the same degree. 
Similarly the prison commission did not wish to advance too quickly in 
developing reformatory programs for convicts lest sight be lost of the 
necessity of deterrence. There were various improvements such as the 
cessation of 'heavy open-air labour' and its replacement by workshop 
employment. This meant that 'the absence of industrial training is not so 
marked as in the case of local prisons' though it was claimed that 'little 
advantage is taken of the opportunity to teach trades'. 35 That the prison 
commission did not wish to be pushed too far too swiftly down the road of 
reform, is shown by their reluctance to accept some of the more radical 
reformatory proposals. Hence it was said that 'it is therefore very difficult 
to detect any radically different reformatory principle in operation in convict 
prisons or ... any strikingly different mode of managing, categorising or 
classifying them according to the requirements of eugenic or any other 
criminological theory'. 36 
6.9 Syncretism in the Balance 
The position of the penal service, 25 years after the Gladstone Committee 
was unresolved. No-one was yet sure how the balance between deterrence 
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and reform should be struck. Even after the prison commission had agreed 
to separate those for whom a spell in the local or convict prisons had 
proved ineffectual from the great mass of the prison population, they were 
still faced with two dilemmas. 
1. What kind of regime should be constructed to suit these various 
categories who had proved unamenable to the treatment provided in the 
normal prisons? 
2. For the bulk of the prison population still remaining in the prisons, 
would a regime still based primarily upon deterrence be sufficient? 
Thus we can see that the proposed answer to the seemingly irresolvable 
task of reconciling deterrence and reform was to identify groups of 
prisoners that would be more susceptible to reform and other groups for 
whom deterrence should remain the mainstay of their treatment. This 
syncretic formula had failed to satisfy many, for varying reasons. 
Magistrates and judges were extremely suspicious of departures from 
classical justice and so failed to apply punishments which seemed to them 
disproportionate to the offence, a sanction on which the viability of 
preventive detention and the schools for children depended. Indifference 
meant that probation was not greatly used by many magistrates and when it 
was, probation was carried out by police court missionaries who had were 
often suspected of working to a different agenda than what the State 
required. Likewise, after-care was facilitated by the prior existence of many 
aid societies which hindered state involvement and organisation but 
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governments were reluctant to displace or displease them for fear of losing 
the potential savings they brought. 
If for some, such as the magistrates and prison ranks, reform was a step 
too far, for others it was not being pursued fast enough. This was clear in 
1922 when a massive 700 page report on the state of the prisons was 
produced by the Labour Research Group (both of the authors had spent 
time in prison) and it was couched in damning terms with the conclusion 
being that the prison authorities had not lived up to their promises of 
introducing reformatory measures. The prison authorities had tried to hinder 
its publicationby reminding its staff that statuary rules forbade them from 
communicating with outside groups but some did so regardless. The prison 
commissioners greeted its publication with a degree of complacency noting 
that 'genuine public interest in the treatment, education and re-establishment 
of social failures is still faint 37 and the respective inquirers (sympathetic to 
the Labour party) were in opposition, though there was some trepidation as 
to what would occur if they came to power. 
6.10 The Triumph of Reform? 
I have ended my historical analysis in 1920 because Garland claims that 
by 1915 reformatory practices, inspired by criminology, had secured a place 
within penal practice. I have gone slightly beyond this period to show that 
there are grounds for disputing the revisionist case. Reform did not triumph 
because it could never shake off the attendance of deterrence; if it were to 
secure favour, there would either have to have been an exercise in cultural 
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repression, as from 1865-95, but which was made more difficult by the 
number of groups involved from 1895 on, or else great endeavour to come 
up with a formula that would reconcile the two. By 1920 neither of these 
had been achieved so that reform could not have attained the prominence 
claimed for it. By ending at this time-frame I hope I have convinced the 
reader that the problem of reform and deterrence has always been an 
indissoluble preoccupation. 
I have outlined a different history from what has been customarily 
recounted in the revisionist school of penal history, inspired by Foucault's 
Discipline and Punish. I have shown that the idea of reform did not come 
to predominate at the expense of the notion of deterrence; it did receive 
greater prominence but was not unquestioningly accepted. From the 
characterisation of reform and deterrence as a necessarily incompatible pair, 
it follows that there could not be a simple installation of policies, inspired 
by one idea with no reference to the other. Though the revisionist school 
may accept that these two ideas are incompatible, for them they attain to a 
similar end. Rather than seeing the continual advancement of reforms within 
the prison service as purely progressive, it portrays them as a more refined 
and efficient means of controlling the prisoners. The most fundamental 
question that can be asked of such an account is also the simplest: why 
should we assume that the penal authorities have such an overwhelming 
interest in supervising criminals and subjecting them to expensive 
reformatory programmes? The answer forthcoming from Foucault is hardly 
convincing: it profits the authorities to have a supervised criminal class 
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under their thumb, though typically there is scant empirical evidence brought 
forward to substantiate this position. Foucault is forced into upholding this 
position because, having admitted the failure of the prison, he asks what is 
served by this failure, i. e. there must be some underlying function that is 
satisfied by the continuing inability of the prison to reduce the level of 
crime. However, if one takes seriously the incompatible modes of punishment 
which the prison has to carry out, one will not be surprised by the lack of 
success of the prison, for it has always been expected to fulfil mutually 
exclusive orders, so forever leaving itself open to the charge of favouring 
one at the expense of the other. The failure of the prison is thus explained 
not by incorporating dubious, vaguely-functionalist assumptions but by its 
incompatible premises and the dissatisfaction (at the social level) that this 
failure, to observe both, invokes. 
To understand the impact of criminology we must see what kind of 
situational logic it promoted and how it melded with the prior ideational 
framework? This means noting the relations between the most basic 
premises of the criminological framework and establishing how these fitted 
in with dominant ideas of punishment and justice. In short, how did the 
development of criminological ideas affect the notions of the necessary 
incompatibility between reform and deterrence and the necessary 
complementarity between punishment and justice which entailed, crudely, 
equal punishment for alloffences of a similar nature? Dealing with the latter 
pairing first, we have seen that people did realise that criminology did 
threaten the notion of just punishments by advocating what were seen as 
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disproportionate stays in government detention centres; the judiciary needed 
no encouragement to shy away from what were seen as abnormal penal 
practices but warnings were issued nonetheless, of the possibility of 
sentences being determined according to the findings of lab technicians. 
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The novel ideas of criminology and their implications for sentencing 
practices were only ever gradually accepted but in the period under 
investigation they were largely shunned. 
Reconciling Opposites: 
This study has largely focused on the necessary incompatibility between 
reform and deterrence because it seems the most unlikely pairing of ideas: 
why would people endorse mutually incompatible ideas? As we have seen, 
there are a variety of answers to this: people may harbour a vain hope that 
the two are not really contradictory as the administrators of the first prison 
at Millbank believed; or they may realise how the two ideas conflict but 
seek to overcome this, by lending their weight to one and concealing this 
fact, and so it was with our second period; or else they may seek a 
compromise solution which tries to efface the most obviously antithetical 
elements but there is no guarantee that this will satisfy those who are 
devoted to just one of the ideas exclusively. 
Though the aim is accommodation there is no guarantee that this will be 
achieved because, in contrast to the earlier period, groups will be appealed 
to, who had previously been denied the opportunity to air their feelings and 
weigh in with their opinions. The party initiating the search for a 
compromise solution may come up with their own formula but there is no 
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guarantee that this will please everyone. Thus though the logic points 
toward peace the result may be discord. 
The prison commissioners wished to strike a balance between deterrence 
and reform, by selecting various categories who were either unsuitable or 
unamenable to treatments based around deterrence and subjecting them to 
reformatory programmes. The residue would be left in the convict and local 
prisons to serve out their time in a regime that would not change radically. 
Garland would not dispute this, as he believes that the institutions of penality 
were placed along a continuum of deterrence and reform with the prisons at 
one end and probation and after-care at the other. This understates the 
complexity of the problem as the problem of combining deterrence and 
reform had to be tackled within each sector of the penal system. Thus the 
need for the provision in the 1854 Act which sent the child of under 16 
yrs. to fourteen days imprisonment, before committing him or her to a 
reformatory was hotly debated and not abruptly discarded in the early years 
of the 20th century. There was similar uncertainty about the 'dual-track' 
scheme for habitual criminals: if they were to receive a disproportionate 
sentence, then surely they would have to be treated to a more lax regime 
whilst in prison. So even if no other group had intervened in the debate 
about the proper balance between deterrence and reform, problems would 
have arisen. It is a mistake to always view ideas as necessarily connected 
to the use of power, for difficulties might arise even if no-one disagrees 
about the necessity for a particular set of ideas. Power, as we said, is the 
ability to realise one's will despite resistance but what if the source of 
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resistance is not other people but the ideas themselves which Foucault had 
claimed always lead to power? Even if the prisoners themselves had 
accepted en bloc the legitimacy of their prison terms, the penal authorities 
would still have been faced with the afore-mentioned dilemma. That ideas 
may become a resource ina power struggle has never been in dispute but 
the connection is only ever a contingent one (a matter of historical 
circumstance). We should first attend to the particular situational logic of 
sets of ideas before investigating how these may be exploited by interested 
parties. 
Where criminology made the most inroads was in the area of 
contributory environmental factors in the causation of crime; it became to be 
considered a reasonable reaction on the part of the child to turn to crime, 
having been brought up in a family environment riven by poverty and 
unemployment. The solution was to create an environment which would 
foster the opposite qualities, hence the approach in inebriate reformatories 
and Borstals to establish an environment conducive to orderly behaviour. 
Once prisoners were more finely differentiated post-1895, it made the task 
of reconciling deterrence and reform all the more unlikely, for now the 
balance had to be struck not only for a single category of individuals (the 
prisoners) but within each group of newly-differentiated prisoners. The 
prisons had not reached the stage suggested by one Secretary of State, in 
1910, who stated that 'we should not now strive to make more exceptions 
from a general rule, but to make the whole system increasingly one complex 
series of specialisations so that the general mixed prison should go with the 
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general mixed workhouse into extinction 39, but specialised treatment had 
begun to find its way into penal practices. The previously immovable status 
of equal punishments was rocked and rendered the searchfor some syncretic 
formula between deterrence and reform all the more difficult. I am not 
retracting my criticism of Garland since I do not believe that the evidence 
warrants the conclusion that criminologically inspired theories of punishment 
predominated, for the reasons outlined above, in the first two decades of the 
English prison system in the 20th century. It is an open question how the 
tussle between uniformity and specialisation turned after this period. 
Defending Interests: 
The search for a more specialised penal system had inevitable 
consequences for existing structural arrangements: it entailed that various 
functions had to be fulfilled by bodies beyond the control of the centre, 
initially at least. Previously the main component of the prison service had 
been the local and convict prisons over which the government exercised 
total control. As it introduced various novel institutions to cope with those 
deemed unsuitable for treatment within the prisons, it had to deal with 
existing arrangements as it found them. It could not draw its policies on a 
clean slate but had to take these arrangements into account. This was not 
necessarily unwelcome, as the prior existence of interested parties meant that 
reforms could be introduced without having to expend a great deal of 
money, which was especially the case with probation and less so with the 
aid societies. That the government compromised with these groups meant 
that no-one got what they wanted, which encouraged elaboration and 
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clarification which would provoke the government toward increased 
intervention or contentment with what they hadalready achieved. 
This transformation would have counted for little if the government 
proved unable to persuade the judiciary to make use of these novel 
arrangements when handing down sentences. The Home Office sought more 
nuanced judgements from the judiciary as it provided more specialised 
services, in its treatment of those convicted of crimes, but was unable to 
compel the judiciary to do as they would have wished. The judiciary were 
protected from overt interference by the virtually unchallenged belief that 
the executive or legislature could never dictate to the judiciary. This belief 
hasbeen enunciated thus: 
'there is a principle of judicial independence; attempts by the 
executive arm of government to influence sentencing policy are 
unconstitutional; attempts by the legislature to interfere with the 
sentencing discretion of the courts are, even if not strictly 
unconstitutional bound to result in both practical confusion and 
injustice to defendants; the development of sentencing policy 
should therefore be left to the wisdom of the courts, under the 
guidance of the Court of Appeal, and intervention by other 
bodiescan only worsen the situation'. 40 
The inviolable nature of this belief not only affected decisions at the 
operational level but also prior to this, at the stage at which changes were 
mooted: as an official noted 'tradition must at least be respected or there 
will be trouble with the judiciary'. 41 Beyond imploring the judiciary to pay 
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more attention to incipient reforms in the penal sphere, the only way to 
influence them was to develop an ideology which would call into question 
the tardiness of the courts. Obviously this could not be done directly, as it 
would have been interference but it could be done through the various 
reform groups and more generally through the device of public opinion 
which had previously proven successful in generating movement, by the 
courts, toward greater uniformity in sentencing. As long as there existed a 
lack of consensus between the prison authorities and the courts, it was 
unlikely that there would emerge a result that could be attributed to the 
designs of any one group. If we then include the various other agencies 
who had a stake in the punishment of offenders, whatever form that might 
take, this outcome is all the more likely, so that any theory must reflect the 
consequent complexity and not reduce events to fit one particular pattern. 
What has been lacking in the revisionist account has been a pluralism of 
both ideas and groups; I have tried to show in this chapter how important 
all the afore-mentioned groups were for influencing the direction of change, 
even if they only played an obstructive role. I have shown how much was 
at stake for all groups involved, in either promoting or obstructing change, 
but the power/knowledge approach would leave them all mute except one 
whose views predominate by virtue of methodological fiat, of always linking 
knowledge with power. 
Very often, previous histories of the prisons have been denigrated as 
'idealist'; this usually means that change and elaboration are ascribed to the 
introduction of novel ideas, very often cast in the role of a deus ex 
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machina, with little importance being paid to what might be loosely classed 
as material factors. I have some sympathy with the so-called idealist 
approach since I hope I have demonstrated that ideas, beliefs and values are 
of paramount importance in the investigation of penal practices. But what I 
also hope to have demonstrated is that the 'why and how' of these ideas 
being adopted and incorporated is not simply due to passionate benevolence 
on thepart of some altruistically-minded reformers and quiet consent on the 
part of others. Ideas were very often sought because the mundane features of 
people's lives (be they prison staff or inmates) were being threatened and 
these people tried to protect them, in part by developing ideas which would 
legitimise their concerns and provide a buttress from future assault. Novel 
ideas were not simply plucked out of the air and installed within social 
practices, an impression which the Foucauldian has fostered, despite all its 
talk of power, since it can never make transparent just how ideas are 
accepted if they carry glaring logical deficiencies notwithstanding talk of 
effacing them and making them disappear which patently begs the question. 
The introduction of these ideas can have repercussions in the structural 
sphere, the prime example, in this study, being the greater differentiation in 
parts of the penal structure. This, in turn, introduced new agents into the 
debate and entailed changes for those already involved in it and meant that 
there were winners and losers according to the agents' own perceptions. 
Positions in any social structure carry associated vested interests and if this 
structure is transformed, then these interests will be affected. It is not 
stretching credulity to believe that people will take some action to defend 
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these interests whether they be linked to the new or old order and this 
action will include articulating their interests in such a form that will (a) 
grant coherence to a previously unstructured group by outlining their 
common interests and (b) justify their grievances. 
Those unhappy with the direction and/or scope of change, attempted to 
elaborate their own version of how change should proceed, with increasing 
success for those wishing to see a professional probation service and not so 
successfully in the case of prison staff. Since the various reform groups 
pressed for greater involvement of the government in the probation service, 
ithad to articulate reasons why it wished to proceed at the pace it did and 
the police court missionaries had to convince the government that it still 
had a valuable role to play in the probation service. Thus ideas of reform 
were not inserted into practices without a struggle, nor were they born in a 
wholesale manner. The foregoing account will, I hope, amend some of the 
misgivings and misconceptions that have been harboured about accounts 
dealing with the developments of ideas and their influence upon social life. 
In the next section I will give a fuller account of how various ideas 
relating to punishment and justice were influenced by what are usually 
tenned structural developments; this will correct the lop-sided impression 
given in theprevious chapters that change arose simply because of pressing 
intellectual troubles. Whilst this is not false, it fails to give the whole story. 
Any social theory must either include both structural and cultural variables 
or else explain why one predominated over the other; this is what the next 
chapter will do. I will contend that the method of analytical dualism can 
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capture the influence of material forces better than the power/knowledge 
approach despite its avowed aim of connecting ideas to the machinations 
and material interests of opposing groups. 
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7. Links between structure and culture 
I wish to argue that we must differentiate among the determinants of 
action, which we will title as structural (those having a material basis) and 
cultural (those which are rooted in ideas), to examine their interplay. Not 
only do we wish to examine the influence these determinants have upon 
agents but also the effect they have upon each other. The power/knowledge 
approach does not believe in separating out the intellectual determinants 
from action itself with the unfortunate consequences that we have seen; but 
what of structural influences? It deals with these in an extremely arbitrary 
fashion since it is a priori wedded to a particular outcome so that any 
structural influences that threatens to disrupt these assumptions is disregarded 
since these are often harbingers of pluralism. I noted how the 
power/knowledge school ignores how various positions in any social 
structure carry vested interests which induce a defence of them; it also 
passes over how the relations between various institutions may be of such a 
particular type that they promote a certain kind of action as the most 
favourable. This I now wish to demonstrate. The diagram on the next page 
gives an indication of the mutual influences between structure and culture. 
7.1 A revolution in punishment 
It is evident that punishment depended to a large extent on the existence 
of the option of transportation, what we can call an instance of structural 
compatibility. This is to say that punishment was not necessarily linked to 
248 
transportation (since it was not exclusively defined in ternis of it) but the 
conjunction of the two was seen as felicitous. Since it was a contingent 
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relationship between the two, it could be upset and completely disrupted by 
unpredictable events. Thus the American revolution completely disrupted this 
mode of punishing, since at the time it was impossible to send criminals to 
a colony with which the mother-country was at war. This impelled those in 
authority to find a new means of punishment. In an open system we should 
not be surprised find that contingent events have the potential to throw 
existing structural arrangements completely out of kilter and to ask searching 
questions of people's ingenuity and initiative. The fact that people are able 
to come up with an intelligible response should cause us to be wary of 
accounts that rely solely on structural events to provide us with an 
explanation of change. There is not just one logically possible reply which 
could have been given as an answer to this crisis, so that we could see the 
result as some sort of pre-designated response. This is why we have to 
examine what is generally placed under the rubric of culture, to understand 
why this particular response and not another was put forward. 
As we saw in Chapter 2, the outbreak of the American revolution also 
saw a questioning of the legitimacy of the then current mode of 
punishment. Ignatieff shows the two events were not completely 
unconnected, since it was the Quakers who were at the forefront of this 
interrogation. They were deeply sympathetic to those who had travelled to 
America in search of religious freedom and the fact that, in their eyes, 
England had blundered into the war, strengthened their case for reform of 
which just punishments and properly run prisons were a parL Prisons were 
being used, as never before, to cope with the bottleneck of prisoners and this 
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focused attention on the prisons at a time when Howard had published an 
exhaustive report on their dilapidated and corrupt state. This concern about 
the state of the prisons and the lack of any discernible principles that 
informed practices within, was coupled with an inquiry into many of the 
mismatches between crime and punishment. The consequent lack of 
legitimacy of the law seemed to be reflected in official disregard for their 
opinions about the course of the war. Only an impersonally constructed 
system of laws, reflecting neither bias nor caprice, could gain legitimacy and 
so rouse the conscience of the criminal who might fall under its ambit. 
An unforeseen event had wrought a great change in the structural arrange- 
ments concerning punishment. Those in authority had been caught unawares 
and, deprived of their customary mode of dealing with criminals, struggled 
to deal with the criminal body, the problem of order being exacerbated by 
an economic slump. When the possibility of transportation presented itself 
again, it may have seemed that the structural status quo could be restored 
but events had not simmered down so much, that the lid could be placed 
back on the pot. For what had happened in the midst of the structural 
turmoil was the introduction of a cultural change, as those belonging to the 
nonconformist religion of Quakerism drew lessons from the war with 
America and initiated a critique of the current state of punishment. I am not 
trying to suggest that this was wholly determined but nor was it completely 
fortuitous. Certainly an individual like John Howard was unique and cannot 
be accounted for, in a predictive fashion, by any social theory. But England's 
war with America did definitely provide an opportunity for specific sections 
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of English society to question the legitimacy of the regime and its parts. We 
have to look at cultural values for an explanation as to why national 
prisons, financially supported by the government, were built at the beginning 
of the 19th century. The same structural conditions obtained then as they did 
before the outset of the American revolution yet a different result was in 
the offing. The structural arrangement of punishment also depended on a 
cultural consensus that banishing criminals to a far-away place was the best 
way of dealing with the problem of crime. Once this prop had been pulled 
away, the structure of punishment began to sway unsteadily but was not to 
totter immediately. 
Although we should accept the validity of culture as a viable element of 
acausal explanation, this does not mean that we can assume that the beliefs 
were immediately translated into action. We must examine what aided or 
obstructed the realisation of these beliefs. The reformers identified themselves 
with mass of the public, 'they took their own heightened sensitivity to 
physical cruelty as symptomatic of general social feeling', . They could not 
fail to feel thatthey were being discriminated against almost to the point of 
being subject totyranny, due to the unjust nature of the law-they had many 
affinities withBentham's project to rationalise the criminal law and remove 
the largeelernents of arbitrariness from it. 
Not everyone shared these sentiments nor the reformers' steadfast beliefs 
that criminals could be reclaimed and returned safely into the community; 
many could not see the point of expending the finances necessary to 
properly assess these ideas. Thus, there was not only the structural influence 
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of the existing felicitous set of institutional arrangements at work , which 
militated against the novel idea of prisons, as places of punishment for all 
criminals, as transportation carried clear benefits; minds also had to be won 
over in a battle of ideas. Where the structural influence did come in was in 
showing who takes up the torch to set light to this conflagration of ideas 
and who tries to douse it, through various counter-measures. It was among 
the Whig radicals that ideas of reform found their most receptive audience, 
since it chimed with their general call for administrative reform. 
The reforms proceeded slowly, held up by the fact that those most in 
favour of them were on the margins politically and suffered from a lack of 
instant influence and control of resources, with which to put their plans into 
action. Here again, there is a structural imbalance impeding the elaboration of 
novel ideas, which makes the ideational battle all the more important since 
it is only through this that the structural imbalance can be rectified. The 
reformers could not embark on a policy of substitution, since they lacked 
the capital to finance a project which would never repay their initial 
investment of building their own prisons. The policy of substitution was 
also not viable because the judiciary would have to be convinced of the 
need to actually send the criminals to the prisons but they would only do 
this if the prisons were run with the consent of the existing political 
establishment; it was not as if they were supplying a service for which there 
was an already existing demand which was not being satisfied anywhere 
else. These conditions pointed toward a policy of restriction, having access to 
the legislature (whether through direct control or indirect influence), closing 
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down the prisons deemed inefficient by legislative mandate. They could not 
instigate such a policy, not until they had made some headway in convincing 
those in power that theirs was the proper course of action and should be 
adopted. So there had to be a breakthrough at the cultural level before there 
could be progress at the structural level (in terms of new organisations). 
There were signs that this was being accomplished as even those who 
supported the resumption of transportation expressed their doubts about its 
efficacy. One such supporter opined that 
Transportation answers very imperfectly the purpose of example... 
tho'a transported convict may suffer under his sentence, his 
sufferings are unseen ... his Chasm 
is soon filled up with and being 
as soon forgotten, it strikes no terror into the minds of those for 
whose correction it was intended to operate. 2 
Even though half of the gaols had been significantly amended by 1812 
and some magistrates were coming round to the idea of punishment within 
prisons (though whether they were filling in the concept of punishment with 
their own conceptions is unclear), what was equally significant was the 
number of corrections that were not made. We cannot assume that it was 
just stubbornness on the part of the elite which prevented these changes but 
we must also reckon with the indignation of the ratepayer, that he should be 
expected to pay for these changes. The ratepayers had an obvious material 
interest in obstructing these changes since they were to be financed out of 
their pockets and their potentially beneficial effects that the reformers 
claimed for them were dubious, a theme that would recur again and again. 
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Obstacles amidst ideas: 
However, it should not be assumed that lack of progress in the 
elaborationof ideas is entirely attributable to resistance on the part of those 
who would lose out if these ideas gained ground. There may be a period of 
consolidation, as those who once ardently supported the novel ideas are 
given pause for thought, whether through an unforeseen implication or 
bafflement, when it is unclear how the new ideas should gel with the 
prevailing consensus. The reformatory ardour and support of the Whigs 
began to cool as they realised that the prison could be used as an 
instrument of repression by a reactionary authority and thus represented a 
double-edged sword: 'it was ironic that the Whigs of the 1790s came to 
include the penitentiary in their catalogue of ministerial tyranny 
because ... Whigs of the 1780s had championed the institution. Now the 
protests of the political prisoners were bringing home the darker side of 
Howard's philanthropy'. 3 This was an ambiguity about the prison that 
reformers would never be able to resolve- they would never be able to 
ensure that punishment within prisons would be completely beneficial toward 
the prisoners. If they had not been fully aware of this, then the suppression 
of sympathisers with the French revolution emphasised that penal 
punishments could be inflicted with no thought or concern for the welfare 
of the prisoner. The conjuring up of the image of an English Bastille did 
nothing to help the propagation of reformatory policies within prisons. 
The potential incoherence of the idea of punishment, that the instruments 
of reform could be twisted to the ends of deterrence was one stumbling- 
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block; the doctrine of less-eligibility also represented one of the greatest 
obstacles to the implementation of penal reform. The belief in less-eligibility 
was one from which deterrence drew much of its support and none of the 
reformers denied its importance nor its place within the new methods of 
punishment. To do otherwise would have meant admitting that prisoners 
would enjoy better living conditions than many of the law-abiding but 
impoverished citizens, which would have been repugnant to the idea of 
punishment. What this affirmation of less-eligibility meant was that the 
reformers were driven toward reassuring those sceptical sections of the 
public that deterrence and reform could be reconciled, that the rigours of 
punishment would not be lessened by the introduction of ideas of reform. 
This was only a superficial response which was undermined by actual 
practice. Once the government had taken control of some prisons, the only 
way it could have maintained the idea of less-eligibility was to abandon 
internal control of the prisons; only this would have ensured that some of 
the appalling and poverty-stricken conditions in the wider society were 
replicated within the prisons. Once the government had insisted on 
supervising some sort of program of punishment, this meant that conditions 
would be superior inside than for many outside the prison walls. This either 
contravened less-eligibility and so meant that reform was accentuated at the 
expense of deterrence or else that more traumatic psychological punishments 
were sought to denigrate and lessen the impact of the profusion of 
relatively luxurious material conditions. 
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The realisation that penal reforms could never unambiguously be a force 
forthe benefit of prisoners because some measure of deterrence would have 
to remain, despite being antithetical to the project of reform, meant that the 
reformatory movement was checked but not completely halted. We can see 
that these ideas, in spite of the problems associated with them, began to 
have an increasing influence on the structure of punishment. It is difficult to 
date this structural elaboration exactly but it could be said to have begun 
with the first national penitentiary at Millbank for this was an intrusion of 
central government into the area of penal punishment from which it would 
never withdraw. After this the government took an increasing interest in 
prison reform and of the cries about the disparities of punishment within 
the country. The policy they adopted to rectify this situation was one of 
restriction, compelling the local prisons to adhere to newly-passed legislation 
through an inspectorate, a result which was to culminate in all prisons 
coming under the direct control of the government. This was believed to be 
the only fail-safe way of ensuring uniformity. 
The structural elaboration of penal arrangements cannot be traced entirely 
to the circulation of new ideas. Notwithstanding the problems in working out 
a doctrine of reform we may still ask why they were they taken up at this 
time rather than another. The period between 1805-24 saw almost a 
threefold increase in the number of people committed for trial at assizes in 
4 England and Wales and the causes of this upsurge were manifold . 
Much of 
the agricultural work had become seasonal so that many who had worked 
during the high season drifted with the coming of winter, some turning to 
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crime; the labour markets of the industrial towns were highly susceptible to 
the vagaries of international demand and if a downturn came, many were 
thrown out of work. There were concerns also about overpopulation in the 
big cities and hence the lack of jobs for the young and the escalation of 
juvenile crime. As old methods of punishment seemed not be working, the 
authorities were ready to try novel ways which promised better results 
which did not necessarily mean that prisons were supported simply for 
purposes of reform but were also intended to distil a greater measure of 
deterrence. The existence of these strains in social relations were not a 
sufficient condition for these ideas to be taken up-this would be to ignore 
the intense lobbying carried out by reform groups over a number of years, 
though they may be said to have been a precipitating factor. Still less can 
the prison reforms be said to have been just an attempt to reassert social 
control in the face of various crises since 'the fact of crisis itself would not 
explain why authorities chose the particular remedies they did, why they put 
such faith in institutional confinement when greater resort to hanging or to 
convict gang labour in public might have been equally eligible responses to 
the perceived breakdown of social controls'. 5 
Is my position not perilously close to Foucault's since I admit the 
influence of ideas upon social structures even though it is a position which 
I have hitherto disavowed? My position is not in complete agreement, for the 
influence brought about by these new ideas are neither immediate nor 
complete. They are not immediate for these ideas had been circulating for a 
long period before they were adopted, indicating the necessity of taking 
258 
pluralism at the ideational level seriously; we must also accept that the 
ambiguities and incoherence at this level may have played a part in 
delaying the introduction of novel ideas. This leads onto my second point 
that the influence was not complete: the reformers were disappointed that the 
government, even when they had indicated a degree of support for their 
ideas, did not proceed at the pace they would have liked. There were 
powerful arguments and interest groups against so doing, so the reformers 
did not have a clear field on which to play. There were powerful groups 
lined up against them, a point which Foucault seldom heeds. The second 
way in which the influence was not complete, was that we cannot see the 
realisation of these ideas as a purely cultural event, a disconnected battle of 
ideas but rather we must see their introduction as attached to very definite 
structural conditions. Foucault in his narrative does try to connect up the 
changes in the penal sphere with the fear of the propertied classes over the 
increasing restlessness of the masses following the French revolution but 
with his methodology, it is difficult to see how this sort of occurrence could 
be included. This is because he sees power as intrinsically connected to the 
development of knowledge but as we have seen, ideas may be circulating 
for a long time before they are granted recognition and a place within the 
relevant policies. 
7.2 Governmental interventions 
Following the building of Millbank prison the direction of governmental 
intervention was as fixed as the remorseless logic which directed it; this is 
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not to say that all sections of Tories and Whigs were enthusiastic about it, 
rather they could not devise a convincing argument against reform and the 
eradication of regional variations in punishment. Only when reform seemed 
to be contributing to the crime-rate were they given a sturdy enough stick 
with which to beat the proponents of reform. 
The only way to reduce variations in punishment was to become more 
interventionist, whether this meant passing more restrictive legislation that 
would set ever stricter criteria for the upkeep of prisons or building new 
prisons, which would prove to be a substitute for those with which 
dissatisfaction was mounting. So increasing centralisation, whereby government 
officials connected to the government accumulated more influence and power 
and the extinction of alternatives to prison, chiefly the hulks and 
transportation, were the main features of the structural changes in the penal 
sphere. 
Unintended effects* 
These changes were the result of the ever-more effective influence of the 
reformatory ideas which were to manifest themselves in the decision to 
discontinue the use of transportation. There were two principal objections to 
it: the first was that it failed to provide a certain punishment since what 
would befall any offender was unknown. Thus a once-off criminal might be 
visited with a disproportionate punishment and the hardened criminal the 
reverse, thus punishment had descended into a 'mere lottery'. The lack of 
certainty concerning the severity of sentences was said to be undermining 
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its effectiveness as a deterrent since many offenders believed they could 
gain a better life in Australia. The second objection to it was that it made 
no attempt at reforming the offender but relied on the method of inflicting 
pain which did nothing to teach the offender to abstain from immediate 
gratification. Thus the criticisms were based on the long-standing beliefs of 
the reformers: there must be equity of punishments and consequently there 
would be certainty about their effects insofar as similar offences received 
roughly the same punishment; so attempts at reform would have to be 
admitted into practices of punishment. These objections surfaced at the 
Molesworth Committee on Transportation in 1838 and, having decided that 
building prisons would be more expensive in Australia than in Britain, the 
members said it should be gradually run down, a result which was to be 
achieved in the 1850's. 
It is ironic that as a result of the tailing off of transportation, achieved 
largely through the deployment of arguments favoured by the reformers, this 
(structural) change should rebound back upon the policies in operation 
inside the prison. For in Chapter 3,1 gave an account of the fears that were 
raised by the early release of convicts in England, fears which were to be 
the catalyst for the ever-present calls, for more deterrence within the prisons, 
to become more vociferous. This was to culminate in more severe programs 
of punishment as it was believed that refonnatory policies were ineffectual 
in persuading criminals to desist from crime. 
The other unintended effect of the prominence of reformatory ideas was 
the proliferation of different types of penal practices, the elimination of 
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which was the chief reason why prison reform had gained such support. 
This result was the effect of internecine disputes among penal administrators 
as they could not agree on the best method of punishment and devised ever 
more elaborate models to withstand the criticisms of their rivals. Not all 
prisons partook in this ideational battle but dragged their feet for as long as 
possible since they had still to be convinced that all the amendments were 
actually worth the money required to implement them. The introduction of 
novel ideas had exacerbated the situation which they had been designed to 
resolve, the disparate state of punishments throughout the country, so much 
so that Dixon detailed five different models of punishment by 1850; but this 
worsening of the situation eventually worked in the favour of those who 
favoured centralisation since further governmental intervention seemed to be 
the only possible solution towards reducing the stubborn state of diversity 
amidst the prisons. 
Government control was all the more imperative- following the decision 
to buck the situational logic of the necessary incompatibility: it was the only 
way to ensure that deterrent policies would be pursued, since not all 
personnel in the local prisons could be entrusted to do likewise. Centralising 
the prisons was a result of the need to stifle debate about the place of 
reform through the simplest possible way: by denying access to those who 
might be interested in reform, be they prison personnel or members of the 
public. I then tried to show how problems were internally derived from the 
nature of the scenario itself and we did not need to postulate that the 
prisons infringed on and interfered with independent groups' interests. The 
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fact that this can be demonstrated is yet another reason for disregarding a 
theory which proposes an intrinsic link between power and knowledge, since 
the possibility of deriving change from lacunae within the most consistent 
ideational configuration is automatically ruled out (for further discussion, see 
below). 
From the above outline we can rule out several simple scenarios which 
might be thought useful in social theory. Any one-way determinism whether 
it be structure upon culture or vice-versa is irrelevant as it fails to capture 
the complexity of the events. Despite structural elaboration proceeding in one 
direction there was not a corresponding uniformity among ideas; if anything 
the increasing prominence of reform only served to multiply the various 
conceptions of this very concept as people disagreed about the implications 
of what they observed in the prisons and devised their own models which 
they thought would better encapsulate the essential elements of reform. 
Neither can we assume some kind of cultural determinism (which almost 
always incorporates ideational monism) since then we would have to say 
that everything should go according to plan. There would be no room for 
the kind of unintended result that followed from the termination of 
transportation and which proved to be the undoing of reformatory policies 
for quite a while. 
Structure derails the-direction of culture: 
Following the adoption of a more hard-line policy within the prisons 
whichexcluded notions of reform, the government assumed more and more 
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control of the prisons, resulting in the complete centralisation of the prison 
service on the back of promises of subsequent equity, uniformity and 
efficiency. I have tried to show why the continuing diversity of ideas was 
not reflected in actual social practices and, in so doing, to disarm 
commentators of the belief that deterrence continued because people had 
wanted it in 1865 (those that counted anyway) and it would be thus until 
people wished otherwise. I hoped to avoid notions of cultural systems 'just 
happening' or through the equally dubious notions of cultural inertia, by 
pointing out that the tactics adopted were conceived with the express 
intention of concealing what was truly happening within the prisons, so 
stifling calls for a return to a more reformatory inclined program. The 
problem with characterising a period as exemplifying one idea or another is 
that this may mislead readers into thinking that this was the wishes of those 
concerned and so ignoring how some people may be manipulated into 
thinking so. It also faces the problem of explaining any major shift in the 
values or ideas that people endorse. If it was assumed that most people 
support the policies in place, whence did these alternative ideas arise? Yet if 
we see the maintenance of any system of ideas as a dynamic affair we will 
be able to detail how and why the tactics that supported this system of 
ideas broke down and lost support. 
I have stressed that one of the original inspirations behind penal reform 
was a desire to remedy the perceived inequities in the criminal law. As I 
outlined in Chapter 3, this preoccupied many in the 1840s & 50s and much 
work was done to rectify deficiencies relating to disparities in sentencing 
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through proposed codification of the law. All these efforts were to come to 
nought due to the powerful interest group of lawyers and judges, which 
possessed extensive influence throughout the Parliament. This is a good 
example of how intellectual turmoil may not be reflected in structural 
changes since any such change has to pass through the medium of agency; 
here it was prevented from being transposed into the structural sphere. 
Nothing more was done by the prison directors because there was little 
point in taking on thejudiciary until they were in a position to implement 
any concessions they might gain from them; they were already having 
problems encouraging local prisons to adopt the measures they 
recommended. It was not surprising that they refused to tackle this problem 
until conditions made it worthwhile for them to do so. It is only until 
structural conditions made it favourable for certain interests that ideas were 
taken up, so showing the relative influence of structure upon culture. 
The connection between the ideas of punishment and justice was 
advantageous, since they seemed to fit together so naturally that no-one 
could deny the link between them. This logical connection was the most 
obvious candidate for Foucault's power/knowledge formula since it, of all the 
logically possible connections between ideas, approximated most closely to 
his idea of ideas bestowing benefits upon those who hold them. I say 
approximate, because although this is a likely scenario it does not always 
hold true; occasionally there may be factors preventing the usual pay-off. 
Since the ideas relating to reform of sentencing had been in public 
circulation since the late 1830s, why was it not until the 1880s that the 
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issue was raised afresh since it had been repressed in the 1850s? The 
potential benefits accruing from the elaboration had not altered but the 
structural relations which had pertained before had. By 1883 the government 
had moved from playing a leading to a dominant part in prison affairs, so 
that it could now pursue the linkages confident in the knowledge that any 
benefits it could secure, in the face of judicial resistance, it could put in 
action. The judiciary were placed on the defensive as they did not question 
the manifest connection between punishment and justice but simply 
disagreed on the best means of obtaining it. What they could not deny was 
the lack of any obvious principle behind sentencing practices and so they 
were forced to work toward a more rational sentencing policy. No-one 
disputed the obvious togetherness of the ideas of punishment and justice so 
it does seem to fit under Foucault's formula. I would repeat what I said in 
Chapter I that Foucault ignores the temporal element in the exploration of 
the link in a necessary complementary but also fails to show how structural 
conditions may help or hinder such an exploration. If structure can influence 
the most favourable cultural logic then we should attend to the possibility 
that a structural influence may pertain when the benefits of pursuing the 
logic of ideas are less evident. 
I am trying to draw out the continual causal connections that must be 
made between both structure and culture to establish a viable social theory. 
There is a constant interplay between them which alone provides the motor 
for social change. The power/knowledge formula fails this test as it puts 
forward one possible scenario as definitive of all ideational development 
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which in itself is untenable and fails to attend to the structural conditions 
which may make the elaboration of this knowledge feasible or not. When 
we examine the direction of both structure and culture, we see that structural 
developments were converging toward a uniform and centralised prison 
service but cultural developments threatened an upset this because only 
deterrence was being acknowledged in penal policies. As historians have 
recognised since, it was partly due to the usage of cultural power by the 
prison commissioners that this structural development was able to proceed 
smoothly, since dissenting voices were cut off from the means of making a 
protest or criticism. These strategies would eventually prove ineffectual 
against the problems harboured within the very idea of promoting a 
uniform prison, primarily geared toward deterrence. 
Not only is it difficult to envisage how the power/knowledge formula 
could accommodate structural influence but the account given in Chapter 4 
should make us more wary of even accepting that the scenario of a 
necessary complementarity presents an impenetrable barrier which can 
deflect any criticism. The gradual acceptance of the validity of the connection 
between punishment andjustice led to the government assuming control of 
all prisons and the years following centralisation in 1877 seemed only to 
demonstrate the incontrovertible benefits that would follow, if two such 
connected ideas were adopted; the alleged savings and increase in efficiency 
seemed to bear this out. The prison service basked in the reflected glory of 
a falling crime rate though it did not claim exclusive credit for such a 
reduction. There was little innovation as prison administrators deliberately 
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shied away from the conferences that were discussing the conclusions drawn 
from the new science of criminology; why should they have innovated as 
there was little incentive to change the policies which seemed so successful? 
The cries that had been raised a century before for a closer link between 
punishment and justice were at last bearing fruit and the prison leadership 
were not about to turn their back on this harvest even if some of the fruit 
was spoiled. 
If the leadership was happy with the prevailing state of affairs, there 
were others in the prison service who were not but these occupied more 
menial positions. These saw the need for a more diverse set of punishments 
to deal with those cases who were not being adequately served by the 
existing rationale of punishments but since this represented a small minority, 
their apprehensiveness was overlooked. Thus the logic of the necessary 
complementarity could not cope with a number of cases: to have done so 
would have subverted the rationale underlying the treatment of the greater 
number of criminals. So even the most adventitious of ideational scenarios 
is not all-encompassing as Foucault's formula would have us believe; it may 
carry within itself blind-spots, problems which are resistant to solutions 
according to the prevailing logic and which may be a source of discontent. 
The obvious socio-cultural reaction to such problem-areas is to pretend they 
do not exist and that nothing needs changing but there may be more active 
policies pursued to ensure that dissent is muffled. If people cannot be 
coerced into keeping their criticism silent, whether through resistance or the 
impossibility of applying enough pressure- since to do so would have 
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brought attention to the very issue that was being concealed as in the case 
of the prison clergy- the next reaction will be to cut off any possible source 
that would suggest how change could be sought. Hence the penal 
administrators' studied disdain of criminological investigations and innovat- 
ions: 'what need did they have of these' was their public attitude but it 
was clear that they represented a potential threat to how the prison service 
was run. The influence of the necessary complementarity meant that the 
administrators drew a protective ring, to ward off any questions or 
developments that would imperil the standard manner of punishing. 
So even the most favourable scenario produced some malcontents but we 
must not forget that this was not the only ideational relationship relevant 
here. The other was that arising from the necessary incompatibility between 
reform and deterrence which produces a situational logic of syncretism, of 
finding some common denominator between the two incompatible ideas. I 
have already explained the reasons why this conditional influence was 
disregarded and the various tactics adopted to ensure that undue emphasis 
could be concentrated on just one of the two components of the necessary 
incompatibility. These tactics had worked for as long as the prison directors 
enjoyed unquestioned control over the prisons; this situation altered after the 
centralisation of all local prisons and control was transferred to the officials 
of the Home Office who thought the administration of prisons exceedingly 
anomalous. It had to be, since it could never be admitted openly that reform 
had been disregarded as completely as it had been. The civil servants were 
able to pry into areas which had been closed to others and questioned this 
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state of affairs which seemed to them unduly harsh and reliant on the 
prejudices of a few men. Although the structural rearrangement of the 
prisons seemed to usher in a victory that would ensure that all prisons 
could be operated without accountability, the very complexity of the task 
meant that Home Office officials had to be drafted in to aid in the 
administration of these prisons. There was no guarantee that they would 
follow the party-line of the commissioners; they opened up again the vexed 
question of how reform might be introduced yet again into the prison 
service. 
Through the deployment of cultural power, the prison directors had been 
successful in preventing an outbreak of hostilities at the socio-cultural level 
despite the existence of divisiveness at the ideational level. The confluence 
of those who were marginalised and frustrated by the existing methods of 
punishment and who tried to vent their frustration, coupled with the 
disenchantment of the civil servants who became appalled at how the 
prison service had been run as a personal fiefdom through arbitrary diktat, 
meant that the whole basis of punishment was reassessed. Thus structural 
change brought in a new body which upset the cultural status quo and 
eventually led to proposals for further rearrangement of the prison service 
which were to have further repercussions in both the structural and cultural 
spheres. Cultural power had done its job but was unable to deal with a 
influx of people who shared neither the interests or outlook of the prison 
directors and who were not directly answerable to the prison directors but 
to the Secretary of State: 'the incursion of the outside world, in the form of 
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other interest groups, vaunting precisely that which should remain concealed 
but cannot be hermetically sealed ... shows the impotence of these S-C [socio- 
cultural] strategies when changes in the social structure remove dependence 
in social relations'. 6 Itshould be remembered that this external interest group 
was brought in as adirect result of the government centralising the prisons. 
That was intended to ensure the continuance of deterrence so that the 
change which resulted can be seen as deriving from within the dynamic of 
structural and cultural relationships. Hence we can presume that potential for 
change can reside even in the most favourable situation. 
Unlike Foucault, I have been trying to stress how even the most 
advantageous coupling of ideas may carry the potential for its own downfall 
and together with structural developments, this proved to be the case. The 
power/knowledge formula bids us only to look at the ideational scenario and 
if this is favourable, to assume that any dominance can be attributed to the 
power of ideas even if they are reinforced by various socio-cultural 
strategies; it remains dead to the possibility that a particular structural 
scenario may be influential in maintaining the flow of benefits or that its 
influence may mean that the implications of some ideas are not chased up 
since the prevailing structural context make it unprofitable to do so. 
7.3 A period of transition 
The analysis of the last period that Ihave studied is more complicated 
thaneither of the two preceding periods and consequently the role played 
by ideasis more difficult to assess. The problem can be briefly surnmarised 
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as one of providing for a plurality of demands through semi-autonomous 
units whilst attempting to retain overall control and dictate policy. Thus 
there was not only the ideational conflict continually alluded to before but 
also the structural problem of attempting to reconcile the need for 
centralised control while allowing specialised units to work; the two, 
centralisation and specialisation pulled in opposite directions. Moreover this 
is the scenario at the outset of the problem and there is no guarantee that 
there will not be further change which adds to the complexity, through 
additional interest groups and more alternative ideas, which further 
diminishes the commissioners' prospects ofregaining complete control. 
I outlined in Chapter 4 that there was no pressing need to alter the 
structureof the prison service, at least not until the government had become 
convinced from various sources that it was necessary to restructure the 
prison service. Here we witness the power of ideas for, unlike the birth of 
the prison service which was a response to several crises, the crime rate was 
falling in 1895 but still a fundamental restructuring of the prison was 
called for. The prison service had been a victim of its own success as 
attention was turned to how it treated its prisoners and some prisoners were 
unamenable to even this treatment. 
Results 
-f recoQnisi 2 reform: 
Though it may have seemed that by giving into the situational logic of 
the necessary incompatibility and seeking a syncretic balance between the 
conflicting ideas, despite having held out against it for some time, that the 
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most unproblematic route had been chosen. Would not the various pressures 
that had afflicted the prison commission, when it had opted almost 
exclusively for deterrence, have ceased. This is to ignore the complex 
interplay that arose between the realigned structural and cultural variables 
and the subsequent change in different groups' reactions, as a result of a 
reassessment of the changed situation; this, in turn, formed a feedback link 
to effect further structural and cultural change. Acceding to demands is one 
thing, fulfilling them is another. 
After 1877, the prison commission had been able to achieve its objective 
of being able to define the content of punishment; since the definition was 
spelt out in deterrent terms, the commissioners dealt mainly with the local 
and convict prisons and largely ignored the other existing organisations. 
These either supplied methods of punishments unsuited to the inmates of 
the gaols, such as the reformatory schools, or were agencies intended to lend 
succour to the prisoner, such as the aid societies. After 1895, the onus was 
on the leading part of the prison administration (the commissioners) to 
include explicitly the idea of reform within the content of punishment but 
also not to lose sight of necessity of deterrence. The government lacked the 
resources to instigate such changes themselves; this entailed that the 
institutions that hadpreviously been beyond the remit of prison commission 
would have to be brought into the fold. As they had been quite 
autonomous of the government before and as they were not being offered 
any great inducements beyond recognition, it is not surprising that these 
institutions would struggle against any attempt at governmental interference. 
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They would try to make their voices heard in the composition of penal 
punishment. This was the price that the commissioners would have to pay if 
they were to get a more diversified prison system. This inevitably meant 
some decentralisation, as the political centre would play a less dominant 
part than before. The problem was that a centralised prison system would 
have to incorporate diverse bodies into the prison service, since it did not 
have the resources to replace them, and would expect them to carry out 
specialised operations, i. e. distinguishing between children and adolescents 
and. administering treatment according to their background and problems, 
within the context of satisfying an overall strategy, of which the diverse 
institutions may not even have been aware or cared. 
The prison commission was faced not only with imposing its will amid 
the increasing cacophony of voices demanding their say but of instilling 
some kind of order within a prison system that was growing more complex. 
This was difficult because the novel parts were still quite autonomous, i. e. 
those which could ordertheir own operations without help or interference of 
another group (whether this was done efficiently or not is not an issue 
here). The prison commission was clear that it saw many of the new 
adjuncts to the prison service as a way of regulating the overall prison 
population, of diverting prisoners away from overcrowded gaols to 
establishments better suited to reformatory endeavours. Systernatisation was 
an intrinsic part of gaining some kind of balance between reform and 
deterrence, because only if connections were drawn between the various parts 
of the prison service could, for example, children and inebriates be kept out 
274 
of gaol. Obviously the connection here is negative but it could also be 
positive as in the case of recidivists who were to serve a certain period of 
time in penal servitude then another period in preventive detention camps. 
The reasons behind this systematisation of the prison system were not as 
Foucault might have put it, to punish more efficiently, with less effort and 
more effect but to ensure that the plural demands of punishment were being 
met. Again monism is disavowed since it offers us little explanatory leverage 
upon the complexity of social life. 
Even if the prison commission had been able to resolve the tension 
between a maintaining a centralised service and allowing specialisation, there 
were still other hurdles to vault. To ensure an adequate state of 
systematisation throughout the prison service, the prison commission would 
have had to control the most important influence on what would happen to 
a convicted offender, namely the courts. There could be no negotiating with 
the courts because neither the prison commissioners nor the government 
itself could offer the courts anything, yet the syncretic enterprise depended 
on thejudiciary taking note of the developments and innovations within the 
prison service and acting accordingly: sending those prisoners for whom 
these innovations had been devised to their designated sites. This 
independence of the judiciary or dependence of the commissioners upon 
them is what makes the social control scenario so unlikely; for reform to 
have gained such a dominant position it would have entailed that (a) the 
prison service was systernatised so that those deemed suitable for 
reformation were sent to the necessary places, but as we read in Chapter 6, 
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the judiciary remained highly sceptical of the reasons advanced for 
admitting such changes even in the cases of children; and (b) that even if 
the former condition were fulfilled, those who were running these 
reformatory establishments would have to concur with the government as to 
how each category of prisoner should be treated. This was not 
unproblematic, since the government found that it had to devise a balanced 
punishment for each category of prisoner, a prognosis with which not all 
the other groups involved in the reformatory endeavour necessarily agreed 
or followed. 
Compromises of b-ii- 
The prison commissioners clearly signalled that they wished to set the 
pace and establish the extent of the changes but they did not reckon on 
howvulnerable they were in such a situation-Not only were they tentatively 
trying to introduce more reformatory policies to undo the undue emphasis 
that had previously been given to deterrence but they were also attempting 
to repel the danger to the classical justice model, that was built upon 
proportionality and equality of sentencing. Part of the problem resided in 
the fact that the admission of reform into penal practices would be 
obnoxious to the classical justice model and be seized upon by those who 
wished to see more radical change forced through; nevertheless some 
measure of reform had to be carried through. They were not quite in the 
situation of fighting with onehand behind their back, because one hand was 
beckoning the ideas of reformcloser while the other was fighting them off 
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This was the paradoxical situation they found themselves in: simultaneously 
embracing the logic of a necessary incompatibility, and attempting to defend 
the principles of classical justice against the encroachment of punishments 
influenced by criminological developments. So not only was there the 
structural incompatibility between centralisation and specialisation but also 
the ideational dilemma of trying to instil some measure of reform into the 
prisons. And this was so whilst trying to maintain the standards of classical 
justice and ensuring that they would not be sullied by the advance of 
criminology. 
The commissioners were hamstrung by two factors: the first was that did 
not have the finances to facilitate all the initiatives they wished to see 
established, so they were dependent on resources being provided from 
elsewhere. The government were driven by their relative paucity of resources 
to bargain with groups which had the relevant expertise, resources or both at 
hand. If the government did not have finances, what could it offer in return? 
Approval, formal recognition and an imprimatur for various interested parties 
to pursue their (mainly ideal) interests. The converse of this was that groups, 
who already possessed their own establishments, could escape complete 
domination by the government. The government lacked the resources to 
replace them and since their co-operation was needed, could not simply 
outlaw and close them down, as was done with many of the local prisons. 
Although I have characterised the relations between the political centre 
and the semi-autonomous groups as one of bargaining, this should not be 
taken to mean that things were done in a spirit of amiable co-operation, as 
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it was more often a grudging trade-off. Thus in the case of the inebriate 
reformatories, the commissioners wished to use them to off-load those 
categories of prisoners thought to be unsuitable for ordinary prison- 
conditions. The local authorities were being asked to take on an overflow 
and bear the cost themselves, an operation which was clearly to the benefit 
of central goverru-nent. The government was unwilling to offer anything in 
return. When the local authorities proved reluctant to take up the slack, 
central government was unable to coerce them through legislative action; nor 
was there any other body to which it could turn and which would provide 
the reformatories. In the absence (or presence) of such structural conditions, 
the role of ideas and values will prove vital in determining whether they 
persevere with the project or it is quietly shelved which was the choice in 
this case. 
The probation service represented another opportunity to take the strain 
off the prison by diverting those convicted for relatively minor crimes into 
probation as a punishment rather than sending them to prison. Again the 
prison commissioners hoped to reap the benefits of this service without 
having to put up the finances for it. They were aided in this by the 
existence of the C. E. T. S, but in gaining financially they were passing up 
the opportunity to dictate the guiding principles of the service. What they 
did not reckon on was the probation officers who were not employed under 
the auspices of the C. E. T. S coming together to form a pressure group (a 
union), which would bargain for enhanced status. Their protracted tussle with 
the C. E. T. S is instructive for while it was clear that through a counter- 
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ideology, backed up by the Howard League, they had devalued the service 
the church missionaries were providing, by claiming that the missionaries 
were unable to disassociate themselves from temperance propaganda, their 
victory was incomplete. They had not been able to convince the government 
that their plight was so urgent that it demanded financial intervention. We 
have an example of a group which won the battle of ideas but thanks to 
their opponents' superior resources were unable to dislodge them 
completely. The government turned to groups such as the C. E. T. S because 
they represented a form of probation that was already underway and so 
their incorporation into the penal network promised major savings. The 
important term is 'represented', because the prestige that was originally 
attributed to the missionaries could be stripped away if portrayed as being 
harmful to the very ideas it purports to be promoting; prestige is like any 
other resource in that it can be diminish or accumulated through the course 
of social interaction. 
Again we have an example which diminishes any prospect of an easy 
equation of power and knowledge: the probation officers had the better case, 
as was demonstrated by the government asking the missionary society to 
reorganise themselves but this was not enough to induce the government to 
turn its back on the finances provided by the voluntary societies. This was 
not the end of the story, as this outcome left both groups feeling that they 
had been badly treated with the probation officers redoubling their efforts to 
secure status. Power is neither a matter of being able to dispose of greater 
resources in any one encounter than one's opponent nor is it solely a 
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matter of being able to summon the superior arguments which successfully 
challenge the validity of the opponent's activities but must encompass both. 
We can only estimate how powerful one or another group is not by looking 
how many resources are at their command unilaterally but by examining the 
imbalance between the sets of resources that both parties bring to the 
negotiating position. This is not to deny that groups can be encumbered in 
the quantity of resources that they can command because of the previous 
effects of power nor that only the original set of resources is with what 
each group continually bargains. Resources can increase or diminish as a 
result of social interaction or a group may be persuaded to devote a greater 
share of its total resources to gain its way. We should not picture the 
government as coming to the table with a fixed number of bargaining-chips; 
if necessary, that is, after having been convinced that such-and-such a course 
of action was essential, the government could call up extra revenue with 
which it could finance a venture. 
The price paid by the government for gaining voluntary input and 
funding was a diluted say in how operations should proceed; this did not 
matter as long as affairs went according to the government's wishes but 
even if this is so at the outset of operations it is no guarantee that things 
will remain this way. As groups become more involved in the running of 
day-to-day affairs, they may begin to develop their own ideas as to how 
operations should be run: this was so in the case of the probation officers 
and the members of the Borstal Association. Both groups underwent a 
conversion from being relatively passive groups which were to do the 
280 
bidding of the commissioners, to ones which had realised that they had a 
different outlook on their area of interest and organised themselves in a 
more structured fashion to press their demands. Thus we should be alert to 
how groups can alter the very nature of their composition (from being an 
unstructured collection to a group aware of its ideals and where its interests 
lay). 
Docile groups aroused: 
This may happen to a group that was not even involved in any original 
negotiations but was affected as a result of the changes wrought. Since all 
people are agents capable of reflective action there is no guarantee that 
previously dormant bodies, with the potential of becoming an organised 
group, will slumber on while around it there is turmoil which could affect 
its interests. So it was with the prison officers who were considered by the 
commissioners simply as part of the environment in which the proposed 
changes would take effect and were not considered as an active group, 
capable of sustaining protest. They could only see the introduction of 
reformatory bodies in negative terms, since the running-down of the separate 
system and the changes in the silent rule made their task, which was 
primarily one of control, all the harder. There was, then, a greater emphasis 
upon rewards to guarantee good conduct of prisoners and they were also 
able to complain about staff misconduct which could entail that the prison 
officer 'would presently be watched without his knowledge and quietly 
tested, and dealt with accordingly'. 7 Coupled with the prisoner officers' 
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exclusion from the more prestigious posts that were being introduced as a 
result of the changing definition of Punishment and the government's 
disregard of their complaints, some felt driven to organise themselves to 
protect their interests. However governmental sanctions, especially the sacking 
of those who went on strike, ensured that this group would never regain 
their former status but their failure only added to their bitterness. Just 
because a group is unable to make its voice heard or translate its 
grievances into action, should not lead us to pass over this discontent, for 
two reasons: though the group may be unable at the present time to secure 
change at the institutional level (the macro) they may prove to be an 
obstacle to change at a micro level simply through the aggregate effect of 
individual officer's frustration; hence the failure, cited by the Labour 
Research Group, to introduce an attentiveness to the individual prisoner's 
circumstances. Secondly we should not assume that the their frustration is 
permanently dispelled but rather that it may be stirred up again, creating 
problems in the future (as in fact occurred through the rising incidence of 
industrial action, incidents which had their roots in the reforms initiated by 
the Gladstone commission). 8 
The changing nature of these groups, such as the prison officers, could 
then act back on the group which brought them into the area of social 
action in the first place, bringing the possibility of contention. It also 
introduces the second problem which handicapped the commissioners' efforts 
to get their own way. As many of these groups became more organised 
they developed ideas to promote what they saw as their interests. This made 
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it more difficult for the prison commissioners to dictate the pace of change, 
since alternative ideas had developed as to how reform should progress. 
These groups may not have to look far for such ideas; it may be as simple 
as the Borstal Association returning to 'the principles laid down for those 
institutions' and asking for a more consistent application of them, much to 
the commissioners' discomfort. None of the groups that issued such calls 
carried the commissioners' overall responsibility so that they did not have to 
worry about balancing deterrence and reform. Maintaining their preferred 
course of action would have been hard enough, given the burgeoning 
number of groups each with their own demands, but it was all the more 
fraught, given that the commissioners had to consider the total balance 
between the two opposing ideas that comprised the notion of punishment. 
Manning the barricades: I 
This is not to imply that the principles which previously animated the 
prison service were totally discarded. This is a premature step for two 
reasons: the first is that just because some people are dissatisfied withhow 
the prisons had been run, does not mean that everyone was unanimous about 
how they should be run (pluralism again). This would be to assume that all 
grievances could be superimposed on top of each other but it is clear that 
many of the demands were incompatible with each other. Dissatisfaction was 
evident but agreement about how to end it did not appear so quickly, yet 
while the different grievances were a matter of contention, the prison 
service still had to continue according to some format (the classical justice 
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model). Secondly we cannot assume that those prison elites would not mount 
some kind of defence in the face of criticism; what happens now is that the 
focus of their strategies changes. Before they were intent on maintaining the 
loyalty of the personnel of the prison service, by ignoring or suppressing 
any sources of theoretical innovation which might have called into question 
the basis of punishment. After the cat was out of the bag their concerns 
were directed outward, toward maintaining the classical justice model against 
the threats to it, whether this meant conducting their own experiments to 
refute the recent criminological findings or making a few strategic 
withdrawals, to maintain the rest of the system. 
The fact that the prison directors had to build a barrier against those 
pounding on the walls to get in shows that their earlier attempt to quash 
any incipient rebellion, before it had begun to arise, had failed. That they 
failed is not surprising, for to have succeeded, they would have had to 
ensure that none of their personnel were exposed to the alternative theories 
of criminality that were sweeping the Continent; even they could not dictate 
personal reading tastes and ensure that no tales of hardship reached the 
press or government. They succeeded in this by casting doubt upon 
unattributable stories (the defence as far back as the Kimberly Commission 
in 1878) or by accumulating power to themselves which worked until the 
advent of the civil servants. They were still able to capitalise on the 
scepticism of the public, which was partly a result of their own 
naturalisation strategies which presented the classical justice model as the 
only possible model of justice, and by aspersions to the calamitous results 
284 
that would ensue if criminological findings were allowed to direct 
sentencing. It was a sign that they did not have perfect faith in such a 
strategy, since some had already shaken off its influence to instigate the 
questioning in the first place, that they ordered a set of experiments by 
C. Goring to refute the findings of the criminologists; no longer was it being 
dismissed as a 'quack' science but one whose findings were capable of 
being proved or disproved. This tacit admission of the possible validity of 
criminology was confirmed by Goring's own results which were welcomed 
for their dismissal of the continental criminologists but attacked for 
admitting the possible influence of hereditariness upon criminal behaviour. If 
one directly invests knowledge with the endowment of power, then all the 
strategies for maintaining a cultural consensus will be passed over; not only 
those that are utilised to quell conflict before it is ever arises, which 
pertains to the era of deterrence, but also those which are used to help keep 
a protective barrier up to prevent the acceptance of ideas that are foreign 
to the current consensus. 
The determination with which the prison commissioners and prison 
medical staff fought against criminology was exhibited by the vigorous 
campaign against eugenics which threatened criminal responsibility. The 
project to keep culpability at the heart of criminal justice was aided by 'the 
tendency of prison medical staff to narrow the definition of irresponsibility 
to traditional insanity and severe mental defectiveness and they were 
therefore distrustful of eugenists or others who urged inherited predisposition 
as the major cause of behaviour'. This accent on how the environment could 
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shape pre-natal potential led them into open conflict with the sterilisation 
proposals of the eugenics movement and to stress their emphasis upon 
working on the 'normal human intellect'. Unlike the previous period, when 
ideas that deviated from the cultural consensus could be dismissed out of 
hand, the commissioners took the threats that these ideas represented very 
seriously and went to great lengths to refute them: 'the medical personnel of 
the Prison Commission were concerned in laborious attempts to define the 
exact nature of the various attempts to define the exact nature of the 
various insanities which they entirely accepted should exculpate the offender 
from punishment'. Criminology had questioned an aspect of the classical 
justice model which tended to assume a simple, rough and ready bifurcation 
of criminals into those who were responsible and the contrary. The response 
by the commissioners was to issue detailed experiments, whose findings 
clashed with that of the eugenics movement but they did concede some 
ground by 'widening the boundaries of mental treatment and diagnosis to 
include large numbers of people who were never considered to be either 
insane or certifiably mentally defective'. 9 Even though the purpose of the 
experiments by the government prison service, they unwittingly contributed to 
further ideational elaboration because of the challenge of eugenics. 
I have written that Foucault puts a misplaced emphasis on power since 
he views it as an inevitable accompaniment to knowledge; this leads to an 
unwarranted assumptions about the coherence of any set of ideas so that he 
can never see where power does arise in a study of the politics of culture, 
namely shoring up any intellectual deficiencies through containment or if 
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these deficiencies are exposed, by a process of contention and rebuttal such 
as the above. For all the talk concerning power, its true role is concealed by 
the power/knowledge school. 
A vacuum abhorred: 
The Gladstone Committee had given rise to extensive rearrangements 
throughout the prison service as a result of its vague calls for reform and 
individual treatment without specifying exactly what was being called for. 
Tbusthese calls were filled out by people who had their own idea of what 
was meant by the committee. The prison commission was faced with 
problems inthe structural sphere as they attempted to set up establishments 
that would cater for the variety of demands that were now being pressed 
upon them and yet still tried to maintain a dominant say. This was 
undermined by the afore-mentioned extent of cultural variation as many 
possessed their own ideas as to how far the introduction of reformatory 
policies should proceed. They tugged on the lead that had been given to 
them and tumed on the prison commissioners when they believed that 
reforms were not being implemented according to their own pace or plans. 
It was not just reform groups that had weighed in with their views about 
future developments, groups which had sensed that the current of opinion 
had begun to flow in their direction and wished to effect a more rapid 
change, but also groups which stood to defend their own conception of the 
status quo such as the prison officers or judiciary. 
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What should be stressed is that this represents a transitional period in the 
development of the penal structure. Due to its inability to serve a 
multiplicity of demands it had shifted from a tightly unified, centralised 
system to one which was trying to admit much more diversification whilst 
the political elite still had the last say in all important matters. It might 
seem that I am suggesting that the period after 1895 represented a complete 
switch to a decentralised system comprised of autonomous units, but this is 
not so. What I am saying that this period represented a time when much 
was up for grabs but since the government could increase its resources to a 
far greater extent than other bodies could, it is just as likely that it could 
re-impose control. I doubt whether its control could be classified as complete 
since there was the above structural tension between centralisation and 
specialisation, itself partly deriving from the necessary incompatibility of 
reform and deterrence. 
The government did not stand in the same kind of relationship to them 
all nor were all of these bodies possessed of the same ideals or resources 
so that there was a different outcome in practically every case. It is difficult 
to draw many conclusions from the variety of these results except a 
negative one which casts doubt upon the social control thesis. Whatever its 
sophistication, this thesis depends upon on all outcomes of the reform 
debate serving the maintenance of a particular distribution of wealth and 
power in the wider society. Unless this thesis is to descend into a series of 
ad hoc hypotheses which claim that every outcome favours the existing 
elites but which refuses to formulate in advance what might serve as 
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favourable evidence, then the conflicting nature of individual results, 
considered collectively, must call into question the social control thesis. It is 
highly unlikely that the series of advances and retreats that characterised the 
prison service after 1895 can be encapsulated within the boundaries of the 
social control thesis: the failure of the preventive detention camps and 
inebriate reformatories, the difficulty in persuading the judges to dispense 
with proportionate judgements to give reformatory training time to work, the 
reluctance and recalcitrance of the aid societies and missionary workers to 
adopt themselves to the dictates of the central government; on the other 
hand there was some success with the Borstal camps and reformatory 
schools and a slow development of a professional probation service. 
This mixed bag of results weakens the possibility of identifying the 
outlook and shape of the prison service with any one body, even one as 
powerful as the central government. Power cannot be estimated apart from 
the relation and context in which any particular person or group stands; 
what made the central government strong previously was that it occupied a 
dominant position within a unified prison service but the structural 
relationship began to change after 1895. Within this structural framework, it 
was possible to see penal policies as the result of one group but the 
transition toward a less unified system comprised of more autonomous units 
made it impossible for central government to put its own stamp upon 
policy, at least not without smudging by the actions of others. 
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The necessity to take into account structural influences has been one of 
the points of this last section: I have tried to draw attention to structural 
influences that may impede or boost the development of ideas and beliefs 
by making the price of this development unattainable so that elaboration 
would have to await a more favourable moment. The best example of this 
was how slowly the reduction in the disparities in sentencing and 
punishment came about despite the validity of the necessary 
complementarity having been acknowledged for a long time before. 
One of the great bulwarks of the social control thesis has been a denial 
of pluralism or if it is admitted, it has been dismissed as irrelevant to the 
outcome. What the foregoing account has demonstrated is not that the 
necessary conditions which the social control thesis postulates are never 
apparent (this was what the second period demonstrated), but that they 
depend on highly specific circumstances that are themselves dependent on 
strategies of containment and concealment. There is nothing irrevocable 
about them for their downfall can be internally derived; that is to say that 
the policies of deterrence came apart because (i) their very success meant 
that more attention was focused on the cases that could not be solved 
according to general policies, and (ii) centralisation (to ensure that 
deliberately weighted policies were implemented) brought in a group which 
did not share the same perspective on punishment. There was no group 
which suddenly discovered its operations were being frustrated by penal 
policies so we had to look for reasons contained within the penal practices 
for clues as to how it failed. Hence the conditions of the social control 
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thesis may be disrupted, even without the advent of a group which realises 
that the prevailing consensus is obstructing them or preventing them from 
accomplishing something they desire. 
When the cover is blown on cultural containment and concealment, this 
does not necessarily mean that the game is up; the presentation of 
alternatives makes the task of maintaining some kind of consensus much 
more difficult than when there was not such a profusion of choice. The 
tactics used to prop up some semblance of consensus are a lot more overt 
and the chances of success have lessened. The power/ knowledge school gets 
off on the wrong foot straightaway because by binding power and 
knowledge together, the use of cultural Power to maintain socio-cultural 
quietude in the face of ideational variety will never arise. This is because 
there are extreme assumptions made about the coherence of the prevailing 
consensus so that no defects or lacunae can be detected within it. Even 
Kuhn, who was wont to portray scientific development as the rise and fall of 
a dense network of interconnected ideas, admitted that these 
complementarites do not have the answer to everything and thus the 
practitioners tend to shunt theunanswerable problems aside until there is a 
day of reckoning on which they must be faced. 
It is difficult to tell which comes first and which influences which: the 
conception of power as always connected to ideas and so subordinating 
thenito practical exigencies or one set of ideas as definitive of or dominant 
within any one period but the end result is equally unpalatable. We end up 
with few clues as to how ideas attained the position they did, how they 
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were maintained in their dominant position and finally how they were 
toppled from it. Not only are ideas treated in a idiosyncratic fashion but 
there is little attempt to connect up their advancement with structural 
developments and agency is reduced to the dumb implementation of these 
ideas with little creative input. If we take the simple step of admitting 
pluralism in both the ideational and social spheres, then any immediate link 
between power and knowledge will be cut. Pluralism precludes monism and 
animates agency since now they have something to fight for; it introduces 
intelligibility into the choices of agency as, having discarded ideational 
monism, we have to ask ourselves why this group chose this particular set 
of ideas as opposed to others that were conspicuously public; what is it 
about this set of ideas that matches up with the interests and outlook of 
this group. As there is ideational pluralism we have to ask ourselves why 
such pluralism arose, what is being served by it. Such variety can only mean 
that no idea holds out all the answers but has a more limited range so that 
some ideas exist to rectify the deficiencies of others and so introducing the 
notion of fractures and fissures at the ideational level. 
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis has had two objectives: the first to question the methodology 
of revisionist histories of the prisons, namely the clasping together of power 
and knowledge. I did so because I was convinced that employing this 
method precluded certain events being featured in penal histories. All 
changes within the prisons and in forms of treatment and sentencing are 
seen as more efficient means of obtaining a goal, which was either never 
made very clear, or if it was, could never be held as a tenable thesis. The 
second was to develop an alternative approach which would suggest how 
the role of ideas should be appreciated, without them being a priori wedded 
to power. 
There are obvious affinities between the power/knowledge formula and 
the more general 'dominant ideology' thesis which held sway twenty years 
ago, most notably that public perception is manipulated to bring about a 
state of affairs beneficial to a certain class. The objection I threw forward 
was that which was slung at the 'dominant ideology' thesis, namely does 
there actually exist only one coherent set of ideas which are endorsed by 
this ruling class? The key phrase is 'one coherent set of ideas' for this asks 
whether there is monism or pluralism at the ideational level and whether 
the idea(s) are themselves coherent or do they contain contradictory 
elements. 
This was the greatest objection I levelled against both the progressive 
and revisionist schools of penal history, that they both see the course of 
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prison history as being dominated by one idea, reform, though both derive 
radically different conclusions from it. What I tried to show is that, from its 
first insertion into penal practice, the idea of punishment was riven by a 
contradiction: it contained prescriptions for treating the prisoners as a means 
to lower the crime rate, justifying practically any means by which this end 
could be secured and for treating them as an end-in-themselves, as the 
primary concern was to stir a recognition by the prisoner of the wrong he 
had done. As this recognition had to be voluntary, punishment could not be 
so coercive as to cause harm to the very faculties through which this 
recognition was to be achieved; if the prisoner's mental reasoning was 
impaired there was little prospect of him arriving at the desired conclusions. 
This emphasis upon the contradictory elements within the idea of 
punishment helped me to understand much of the subsequent conduct and 
led me to the endorse analytical dualism. This was based upon the 
conviction that ideas have a real but conditional influence upon social 
conduct and so adopted a method which would enable this influence to be 
understood. It is not enough to remain with vague blandishments that ideas 
have an influence; we had to move beyond this stage and specify what 
particular influence specific configurations of ideas have upon social life. 
Analytical dualism which enjoins social theorists to examine the social 
influences (structural and cultural variables) apart from their interaction with 
social life. This method is liable to misunderstanding, so it should be 
stressed the separation is a methodological one, necessary to estimate the 
conditional influence they have upon agents. I am not suggesting that these 
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influences actually stand apart from social life. Another point which must be 
stringently maintained is that the influence of these variables is strictly 
conditional, since in the last instance agents are free to do anything they 
want, whatever the cost. What analytical dualism allows us to do is to 
estimate what is the least costly and troublesome thing to do: thus in the 
case of sentencing reform, I showed there was little point in the prison 
commissioners pursuing this point until they were in control of all the 
prisons themselves. There was a strong likelihood that any proposed reforms 
would be disregarded or ignored, like many other directives from the 
political centre so that any such efforts to reduce sentencing disparities 
would be wasted. 
One of the central tenets of this study was to reject the type of analysis 
offered by the power/knowledge school since this represented a denigration 
of the influence of ideas. This was trumpeted as a virtue because it was 
claimed that this would let us see ideas as perennially entangled in a 
struggle for mastery between competing groups. This forbade any attempt to 
arrive at an estimate of the ideas' influence because it was impossible to 
tell if the agents were reacting to this influence or were they completely 
disregarding it. Only by pulling the two apart and examining both separately, 
could we arrive at a satisfactory estimation of the influence of ideas. I hope 
I have offered adequate proof throughout of the less than compelling story 
and implications that the power/knowledge school can offer and thus why it 
must be rejected. The alternative approach, that I offered, proclaims itself to 
be realist but is this not pejorative point-scoring- who would not want to be 
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a realist? Let me say a few words about realism as a methodological tenet 
and how it distinguishes itself from the power/knowledge approach. 
Realism refined: 
Realism as a thesis about the social world entails that society is made 
up of more than the sum of individuals within it and that this extra 
something is the influence of frameworks of action which are irreducible to 
individuals. This is not to say that these frameworks stand apart from 
individuals but possess properties of their own. As these properties possess 
causal influence, some method must be adopted which will enable them to 
scrutinised. Hence my advocacy of analytical dualism which does this. 
To those versed in the debates of social theory, it will be obvious that 
the inspiration for a realist approach derives from the works of Roy 
Bhaskar, who labelled his approach variously as transcendental or critical 
realism. This was to distinguish it from both empirical realism which 
confounded events with the mechanisms generating them, or, in our 
terminology, actions with the frameworks which facilitated them; and also 
from transcendental idealism which would invoke the notion of a framework 
as a heuristic device but deny that we could ever affirm its existence or 
say that it possessed causal powers. The second of these options is the one 
most often taken by social theorists who may be suspicious of any notions 
that would undercut the autonomy of human agency The real battle is 
between those who affirm the real and irreducible existence of such 
structures as the prison service and those who simply believe it is a 
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convenient shorthand device for all the people within it. it is then 
incumbent upon me to clarify why the conditions of action must be 
accorded a real presence. 
The hint in the last sentence concerning conditions of action is an aid. 
This implies that such conditions can neither be depicted as a constraint or 
enablement prior to knowing the location of social actors but may beeither, 
depending upon where the actors are placed within society. The frameworks 
of action do not simply hinder action(they may do thisdepending upon the 
course of action) but make it possible in the first place. Unless this is 
conceded it would have to be said that all action begins ab initio. A 
realism of the social sciences would want to say that 'conscious human 
activity, consists of work on given [Bhaskar's italics] objects, and cannot be 
conceived as taking place in their absence' and, importantly for this thesis, 
'these objects may be either material or ideational[my italics]'. ' This is to 
say that people may try to effect change upon an institution, such as 
making local prisons more accountable to central government, or changing 
the law in the light of some previously unheeded connection or innovation. 
This conviction, that human activity often consists of the transformation or 
preservation of the frameworks of action which are construed as given, 
carries a number of important notions within an apparently innocuous 
assumption. That these frameworks are given implies that they pre-date 
current action and so are irreducible to them. If this is not conceded, then it 
is difficult to ascertain what might influence action, apart from that of the 
personal realm. But once we admit that these frameworks exist, prior to the 
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actions of any agents whose conduct is being scrutinised, then we must 
accept that these frameworks, by virtue of their influence, possess irreducible 
properties that can be ascribed only to them. 
To elucidate his idea of human agency, Bhaskar supplies us with the 
model of the 'sculptor at work, fashioning a product out of the material and 
with the tools available to him or her... [this model] applies to discursive as 
well as to non-discursive practices; to science and politics, as much as to 
economics. Thus in science the raw materials used in the construction of 
new theories are established results, half-forgotten ideas, the stock of 
available paradigms and models, methods and techniques of inquiry'. 21 wish 
to emphasise that Bhaskar's transformational model of social activity (as he 
callsit) applies equally well to the development of ideas and knowledge as 
it does to the elaboration of particular structures. I would also wish to 
amend the image of the sculptor slightly to bring out certain aspects of 
social reality that might otherwise be ignored. 
The possibility of successfully achieving the desired result depends upon 
two things: the quality of the material with which one is working and the 
tools that are available to oneself. If the material is granite-like and one 
onlyhas a feeble pick then it is unlikely that a rapid transformation will be 
forthcoming. Translating this into a more sociological idiom, not all social 
structures or ideational systems are equally susceptible to transformation and 
such change is partly dependent upon the resources that the respective 
agents can summon to the task. Thus in the example of central government 
trying to wrest control away from the local prisons, the political elite could 
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be far more direct than when it was dealing with the judiciary which, while 
however incompatible its sentencing policies were with an efficient prison 
service, was essential to their operation. Such a relationship between 
institutions is itself emergent, i. e. it only arises when the two are considered 
relationally and not separately and is the material or situational logic with 
which agents must contend. 
The question of the distribution of resources has not gone unanswered in 
either political science or sociology but the former point, which addressed 
the properties of the various frameworks of action, has not been adequately 
attended tp. In this thesis, I have dwelt on the logical properties possessed 
by ideas and the difficulties that contradiction between ideas places in the 
way of agents' activities. This is not an impenetrable barrier but an obstacle 
which, if people are determined on a particular course of action, must be 
circumvented, all of which costs greater time and effort than if another 
route had been taken. Likewise structural frameworks bring about distributed 
costs and benefits so there are winners and losers as the result of structural 
conditioning. This, in turn, will influence agents' efforts to transform or 
retain the current social structure. Whilst I am upholding the position that 
structural conditioning brings into being a vested interest in change or 
stability and that such interests are not merely the result of agents' 
perception of their situation, this does not imply that agents are bound to 
defend or act upon these interests. 
The actions of the prison officers represented the best example of the 
conditional effects of a social structure: there was no doubt that the effects 
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of reform were deleterious to their position but not all officers rushed to 
defend their interests. This is not to say that those who did not take 
militant action, did not care about their worsening situation but were 
hampered by the culture of ready obedience and deference to those in 
authority and, following the dismissal of those who had gone on strike, 
believed that the costs of opposing the government were greater than the 
effects of reform. Thus we see that structural influence is mediated by 
agents and that even those occupying the same position are not predisposed 
to pursue identical courses of action. Of course, the miscalculation by the 
prison officers who had taken industrial action reinforced the belief of the 
other prison officers that they were caught between the devil and the deep 
blue sea and that they would simply have to accept their lot. 
This is what is missing in many social control accounts, for no attention 
is paid to how a particular cultural or structural framework may predispose 
agents to accept or oppose change. It must be reiterated that this 
conditioning is itself emergent - it arises from the link between the present 
situation and the proposed changes. Thus prior to 1895, penal practices had 
been geared toward deterrence but the proposed policies of reform were 
antithetical to deterrence. Only by examining the interplay between the two 
can we understand why the prison officers feared for their positions. The 
strain between the incompatible operations of reform and deterrence (a 
systemic incompatibility) was replicated at the level of agency, in the guise 
of frustration over the impossibility of ever reconciling the two and through 
the consequent disruption of reform or deterrence as the one always 
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impeded the other. Since both were believed to be necessary for successful 
penal practices, a compromise was the most inviting solution. There is an 
obvious affinity between the situational logic of structural and cultural 
frameworks here but I would want to stress that the two cannot be 
collapsed into each other. Can I provide any reasons why there should not 
be such a conflation? 
One of the most obvious reasons for collapsing structure into culture is 
the purported concept-dependence of social structures - unlike natural reality, 
the components of social reality do not exist apart from the conceptions that 
people have of them. It is too large a step from admitting that social 
structures are dependent upon some concepts, to conceding that they are 
simply these ideas. If this was the case we would be at a loss to explain 
why the structure of the prison service was able to perdure despite their 
being extensive and protracted disagreement about the very nature of the 
prison. Equally we cannot brush culture under the rug of structure for the 
inception of the prison did not call into being one determinate set of ideas 
but rather provoked great disagreement about its exact role. There may be 
those who would concur in granting social structures a real presence but 
would be queasy at according the same status to ideas; this is because of 
the oft-noted capacity of ideas to be interpreted in various ways. This 
pluralism seems to undercut any objective conception of knowledge as there 
may be no deterrninate agreement on an idea might mean. I have 
demonstrated, throughout this thesis, that those who upheld either reform or 
deterrence often did not grasp the total implications of either idea or were 
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divided among themselves as to what each concept might entail but this did 
nothing to lessen the contradiction between the ideas. Nor am I committed 
to the position that there is an unvarying idea of, say, deterrence for as we 
have seen it began to undergo radical changes in the twentieth century. 
The resolute sceptic may still harbour doubts about the realist nature of 
both structure and culture or alternatively may believe that one or the other 
has greater primacy. Whilst I would not want to deny that structural or 
cultural influences may play a dominant part in a particular study, as I 
believe that ideas often did throughout the history of the prisons within 
Britain, this cannot be advanced as a general methodological position. There 
may be some who would wish to say that a structural influence, such as the 
crime rate, ultimately plays a determining role even though this influence 
must be mediated through ideas otherwise this influence would never come 
to fruition. Though it is impossible to estimate the exact weight of influence 
of either structure or culture- for how could we find a common denominator 
for the influence of both since we would have to know the answers to 
various counter-factual questions- this does not mean that either influence 
could be reduced to an epiphenomenon of the other. If anyone wishes to 
advance such a proposition, it is incumbent upon them to explain why this 
particular structural or cultural outcome occurred. 
It is insufficient to shelter behind the notion of an obvious affinity 
between a structural cause and a cultural result for there was no obvious 
reaction to a rising crime rate or an evident structural rearrangement of the 
prison service as a result of calls for more reform. Several outcomes were 
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equally possible and for those who wish to maintain a one-way structural or 
cultural determinism, the burden of proof lies upon them to explain why a 
particular outcome occurred. 
The flow of history; 
One of the strongest reasons why these frameworks of action were not 
accorded a real existence was that they are not immediately apparent above 
and beyond the activities of agents. This is even more the case when we 
view past events historically, i. e. as a continuous unfolding narrative carried 
out by agents, and do not break them up to ask how are such actions were 
possible. When we do this we realise that human action would impossible if 
the existence of such frameworks were not conceded and so recognise a 
causal criterion of reality. The rejoinder from those who are unwilling to 
grant such frameworks an autonomous existence would be that while they 
may possess causal efficacy they do so only in virtue of the individuals 
through which they act. Realists would accept this but state that this is 
insufficient to undercut the existence of these frameworks because there still 
exist properties which are irreducible to any individuals or groups. Thus the 
ideas of reform and deterrence only had influence when taken up by active 
agents but these ideas should not be conflated with the subjective mental 
states entertained by the individuals concerned - this was what I called the 
confusion between the psychological and logical. For instance, some people 
might try to implement both ideas simultaneously, without recognising the 
contradiction of the two ideas together; this was the case when the 
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goverment first began to establish convict prisons. The fact that people 
were not aware of the contradiction did nothing to lessen its force. 
Accepting this pre-existence and autonomy of the frameworks of action 
entails that we go along with Bhaskar and recognise that 'in every process 
of productive activity a material as well as an efficient cause is necessary'. 3 
Agency is the efficient cause but it must deal with a pre-existent 
framework which is the material cause. 
The power/knowledge approach has consistently refused to grant that 
there may be such material causes in social life and hence it has not seen 
any need to take them into account, nor develop a methodology which 
would allow us to assess their influence. The implicit assumption of the 
power/knowledge school is that agents and groups are free to devise their 
machinations unbeholden to the past and unconstrained by either material or 
ideal factors. What I have tried to show is the role of penal administrators 
carried with it certain duties which, however inimical to the individuals 
concerned, had to be observed. This means that we should not view history 
as a continual ceaseless flow but rather a series of stops and starts as 
people fill the positions and roles bequeathed to them by the past and 
grapple with their influence. 
Influence assessed: 
By breaking up history so that we can seen see the influence of both 
structure and culture and by outlining the situational logic allows us to 
understand events that would otherwise remain obscure or susceptible to ad 
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hoc explanations. For second period in which deterrence was heavily 
enforced and emphasised, the explanations given for it being a period of 
repression are usually given in terms of the authoritarian or military 
personality of the Director of Convict Prisons, but if his conduct is 
examined in the light of the necessary contradiction, it can be seen as an 
intelligible attempt to accentuate only one element at the expense of another 
and to ensure that such undue emphasis would go unnoticed and continue. 
Having first examined the situational logic, we can pass to studying the 
means by which this influence can be discounted. One of the virtues of this 
approach is that it permits us to see how a consensus may be maintained 
and actively striven for, rather than viewing it as the result of a great 
clamour which then subsides. The consensus continues as a result of inertia 
until the next great uproar for a different set of principles marks the 
introduction of a different set of principles. This is the equivalent of the - 
4great wave' theory of ideas which sees their realisation as inevitable as the 
tide coming but offers a paltry explanation as to why this should be so, 
because it is ungrounded in human agency. This was where the notion of 
power came in, as it could be deployed to conceal the undue emphasis 
given to one idea rather than another or to defend a particular consensus 
that may be under attack from several novel alternatives. I faulted the 
power/knowledge school for having missed this, for all their talk of 
reconnecting power with the study of the advancement of ideas. Hence the 
active intervention of agents is the link between the rise and fall of ideas 
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and their favouring of one idea over another can be responsible for the 
eventual introduction of the idea that they abhorred (cf. 1865-95). 
Both schools of history alluded to above could be faulted for their lack 
of reference to human agency: the Whig version which saw prison reforms 
as being the inevitable accompaniment of the innate decency and 
beneficence of the elites and so were unquestioningly adopted and 
implemented; and theFoucauldian inspired school which viewed reforms as a 
most effective means of ensuring social control and again were adopted 
without a hint ofdivisiveness amidst the ruling class and were administered 
without hitches to the dumb lot that comprised the prisoners. There is no 
indication in either account that punishment might have been a field of 
contention, that some might have thought that the prisoners were being 
shamefully pampered or that others might have thought they were being 
callously treated; nor that suchdivided opinions might have found their way 
into actual policies of punishment and that a particular opinion might have 
been elevated far above its counterpart, thanks to the machinations of its 
supporters. 
The existence of such divided opinions did find their way into the very 
notion of punishment so that many found it impossible to conceptualise it 
without bringing to mind these two contradictory ideas. It was left to the 
inspectorate and commissioners to find some way of reconciling them. It is 
pluralism that is the wellspring of innovation and which proscribes any 
attemptto view penal history as the inevitable rise of one idea or another. 
The power/ knowledge formula is ill-equipped to deal with this phenomenon 
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since its assertion of any such necessary connection between power and 
ideas leads it to mistake the history of ideas as comprising only one 
particular ideational configuration out of a possible four. 
One of the main thrusts of this thesis was to criticise the power/ 
knowledge through an examination of one of the sites the scouring of 
which, it is claimed, justifies the promulgation of their favoured thesis. I 
have concentrated upon what might be called cultural variables to attack any 
notion of a necessary connection between ideas and power but in Chapter 7 
I emphasised that structural influences must be accounted for by any viable 
theory of penal change. Mass structural trends such as democratisation are 
held to be pivotal but often inter-institutional influences are ignored. Such 
relationships like that between the prisons and judiciary are often given 
scant reference in penal histories but their relationship and the exact nature 
of it must figure in any adequate explanation. Their operations were 
obviously connected since the prisons existed to carry out the sentences 
passed by the judiciary and the prisons were highly dependent on the 
judiciary, as it was them who controlled the number of people who would 
be sent to prison. Since the two were so linked, they obviously had to find 
some form of accommodation so that each of their operations was not 
greatly obstructed. This meant that neither institution would get its own 
way. It should be noted that the 'when and the how', of such a relationship 
coming about is a highly contingent affair, dependent upon many empirical 
factors, such as their being a dominant part of the prison system that could 
set the agenda for the rest of the prison service. It is not a constant 
307 
relationship perduring through time and the delicate balance that 
characterises this relationship may be upset by novel factors, such as the 
switch to a decentralised regime, for whatever reason. 
The effect of a structural relationship may have a great influence upon 
the genesis and transformation of ideas pertaining to punishment and it was 
Foucault's inability to allow this kind of explanatory variable in his account 
that was one more nail in its coffin. While I would concur with the 
revisionist attempt to draw some kind of connection between the rise of 
reformatory ideas and structural events such as the temporary cessation of 
transportation and its beneficial effects and a rising crime rate, where they 
go awry is an inability to explain why reforms were proposed as a solution 
to a perceived problem of social control. As I said before there is no 
obvious or logical connection between structural events and the rise to 
prominence of certain ideas which could trace the latter as an entailment of 
the former. I partially avoided this problem by noting that the rise of reform 
did not totally dislodge the notion of deterrence but also by tracing the 
genesis of ideas of reform and its connection to ideas of equity which were 
promoted by Whig radicals. Thus the ideas of reform can not be seen as a 
response to a short-term problem but were, in part, devised as a remedy to 
some long-standing cultural problems, ones of legitimacy, fairness and justice. 
Since their genesis pre-dated many of the structural problems with which 
they were supposed to deal then they cannot wholly be seen as a response 
to the problems of escalating crime among the working class. 
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Again the two histories, Whig and revisionist, mirror each other's defects: 
the Whig version sees the reorganisation of the prison service and the 
assumptionof greater control by the government as inevitable once the need 
for refonn was recognised and so culture dominates structure; the revisionist 
sees the introduction of reforms as a clever ploy by the ruling elites to deal 
with crime rates in a more insidious way and so structure dictates the ideas 
that will be taken up, though it is a general structural trend which 
predominates and not the particular structures of institutional systems. 
Obviously the way out of this dilemma is to find some method which 
allows us to link structure and culture without permitting either to dominate 
and which lets agency intercede without being domineering toward structure 
and culture. I believe that the method elaborated above allows to gauge the 
options that the structural and cultural variables present to agency by 
deriving the situational logic of each from their respective configurations. 
I have tried to explain, though it demands a thesis in itself to explain 
adequately, why the call of uniting power and knowledge has proven so 
seductive to so many, so much so that it is a commonplace to open a 
book, whether it be a work of theory or an ethnographic study, and find it 
prefaced by the assertion that knowledge is power. This has sprung from 
the laudable recognition that ideas can be incorporated within ideologies and 
so serve as a means of domination. Yet contrary to the tenets of the 
power/knowledge school (for the recognition that a corpus of knowledge is 
detrimental to ones interests is itself a knowledge-item and so should lead 
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directly to the exercise of power) this realisation does nothing to alleviate 
the restrictions imposed. Even if it is not recognised that this admission of 
the unjust nature of the current consensus calls into question the 
power/knowledge formula, it cannot allow for the very emancipation which 
people sought andwhich drove them to adopt the power/knowledge formula 
in the first place. The best that one can do is replicate Foucault's vain and 
vague calls for resistance. Even if his theory did not offer such a meagre 
return in terms of historical analyses, its futility as an instrument to combat 
injustice or repression should cause many to discard and search for a 
method which can obtain a better understanding of how ideas may rise, 
despite the manifest costs it imposes on some. 
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